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ABSTRACT

“A DAINGEROUS LIBERTY”: MOHAWK-DUTCH RELATIONS AND THE COLONIAL
GUNPOWDER TRADE, 1534-1665
By
Shaun Sayres
University of New Hampshire, May, 2018

This thesis examines seventeenth-century Mohawk-Dutch relations through the lens of
the colonial gunpowder trade. Looking through the eyes of cultural brokers such as Arent van
Curler or Saggodryochta, it argues the Dutch colonies of New Netherland and Rensselaerswijck
and the Mohawk Nation of the Haudenosaunee formed a symbiotic relationship that significantly
altered the geopolitical landscape of eastern North America in the seventeenth century. As time
wore on, and neighboring European colonies and Indian nations grew stronger, the Mohawks and
Dutch grew increasingly dependent on one another for survival. These Mohawk-Dutch
encounters and negotiations, dictated by the need for gunpowder and pelts, reveal a distinct arc
of intertwined fates, outlining their shared rise, peak, and decline within a world embroiled in
conflict. As a result of perpetual mourning wars, and a colony plagued with indigenous conflicts,
New Netherland never possessed adequate stores of guns, powder, and shot to defend itself from
invasion or fuel endless Mohawk conquests. The Mohawks survived, but the Dutch did not,
relinquishing New Netherland to the English without a shot in 1664.

xiii

INTRODUCTION

“We are joined together with chains.”

On an early summer day in 1689, an embassy of Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, and Oneida
sachems treated the Albany magistrates of colonial New York to a rich oration of
Haudenosaunee history. They had come to “Renew the old Covenant” with the English, first
“made with Jacques many years ago who came with a Ship into their Waters” and recorded them
as “Bretheren.”1 The Five Nations wanted this “Governor Called Jacques” to establish himself
among them, and together with Jacques they drew a “General Covenant,” metaphorically
concluded by planting the “Tree of good Understanding.”2 They had “allways been dutifull to
this Government,” recounted the orator to his English audience, with whom the Haudenosaunee
sought to “Confirm the old Covenant made here” where the “Sun may allways shine on them.” 3
Having cast “Beams to the Sun of Peace,” the speaker concluded the oral history by returning to
its starting place.4 From the memory of Jacques, the orator recalled how the Mohawks, Oneidas,

1

This speech is one of three such recorded accounts dated 1678, 1689, and 1691. For all three accounts, extracted
from an anonymous notebook in the possession of the American Antiquarian Society, see Daniel K. Richter,
“Rediscovered Links in the Covenant Chain: Previously Unpublished Transcripts of New York Indian Treaty
Minutes, 1677-1691,” American Antiquarian Society, Proceedings, XCII (1982), 45-88; 48-49 and Appendix B. A
separate, loosely transcribed version of this speech can be found in Cadwallader Colden, The History of the Five
Nations: Depending on the Province of New-York in America, and Are the Barrier between the English and the
French in That Part of the World (London, 1747), 99. The notebook, donated by Thomas Jefferson to the AAS in
1815, is catalogued under Indians of North America, Miscellaneous Papers, 1620-1895, Manuscript Collections,
American Antiquarian Society.
2

Jacques is referred to as a “governor” in the preceding 1678 oration, all other quotations come from the 1689
oration. Richter, “Rediscovered Links,” 48-49.
3

Richter, “Rediscovered Links,” 48-49.

4

Richter, “Rediscovered Links,” 48-49.

1

and Onondagas “did carry the Ankor of the Ship that Jaques came in to onnondages [Onondaga
Country],” grounding the English to this old covenant, originally made with Dutch colonists, the
Five Nations now “renew [and] Confirm.”5 The oral tradition evokes elements of clarity, kinship
and alliance, all deeply anchored by a chain to a distinct moment in the past, to the time when
Dutch traders first encountered Haudenosaunee peoples in the Hudson Valley. Beginning with
the “Governor called Jacques,” this covenant made between the Haudenosaunee and Europeans
remained in a state of constant flux, of rust and renewal, one that the Haudenosaunee had come
to make “Bright” again.6
Following the lead of the Haudenosaunee orator, this thesis focuses on the initial links in
the relationship between the Five Nations and Europeans, first established between the Mohawk
Nation of the Iroquois and the Dutch traders that came to North America in the early seventeenth
century. By examining the colonial gunpowder trade, it argues that Mohawk imperialists and
Dutch colonizers formed a symbiotic relationship, which drastically altered the geopolitical
landscape of eastern North America. With the help of Dutch munitions, the Mohawks
transformed themselves into an expansive colonial power, leading to their sweeping conquests
that would stretch from Nova Scotia to Wisconsin.7 In return, the Dutch received a powerful, and
feared, indigenous ally it desperately needed in order to survive the turbulent currents of a

5

Richter, “Rediscovered Links,” 48-49.

6

(“linking of arms”) Mary Druke Becker, “Linking Arms: The Structure of Iroquois Intertribal Diplomacy,” in
Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800, eds. Daniel K.
Richter and James H. Merrell (University Park, PA.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987), 29-39; 29.
(“bright”) Richter, “Rediscovered Links,” 48.
7

For histories of seventeenth-century Mohawk responses to change and strategies of survival, see Jon Parmenter,
The Edge of the Woods; José António Brandão, “Your Fyre Shall Burn No More,”; Richter, Ordeal of the
Longhouse; “War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience,” WMQ vol. 40 (1983), 528-559; Francis Jennings, The
Ambiguous Iroquois Empire; and Ian K. Steele, Warpaths.

2

predominantly native space and a powerful ally who helped curb English and French territorial
expansion.8 In the pages that follow, I retrace the footsteps of the “Governor called Jacques” and
“Old Corlaer,” known also as Jacob Eelckens and Arent van Curler, as participants in the
intercultural gunpowder trade, both crucial links in the chain of events that saw the MohawkDutch partnership rise and fall while each attempted to navigate the complex entanglements of
seventeenth-century America.9 Out of separate needs for munitions and beaver pelts, Dutch
traders and Mohawk imperialists found common ground, forming a mutually-beneficial
partnership, which would contribute both to New Netherland’s economic prosperity and the
Mohawk quest for empire.
The significance of gunpowder cannot be understated. Europeans could not produce
gunpowder domestically in the colonial period. Saltpeter, gunpowder’s chief ingredient, came
almost exclusively from the East Indies, forcing Atlantic imperialists to rely on amicable
diplomatic and trade relations with Asian polities. Moreover, although the Dutch would lead the
global market in munitions by the seventeenth century, wars in Europe and in more important
Atlantic colonies left New Netherland at the bottom of the keg. Through the colony’s duration,
gunpowder remained scarce to the point Director-General Petrus Stuyvesant began maintaining
records of it, as if to preemptively prepare for a defense for why the colony fell.10 Despite a clear

8

On the histories of New Netherland and Rensselaerswijck and their ties to the Mohawks, see Allen W. Trelease,
Indian Affairs in Colonial New York, Richter, Ordeal of the Longhouse; Jacobs, New Netherland; Merwick,
Possessing Albany; Parmenter, The Edge of the Woods; Venema, Beverwijck; Burke, Mohawk Frontier;
9

“Old Corlaer” appears in the oration of 1678 and refers to the Dutch trader Arent van Curler, Richter,
“Rediscovered Links,” 49, 55. For brief summations of both Jacob Eelckens and Arent van Curler, see Richter,
“Rediscovered Links,” 50-56.
10

See an account from the Gunner’s Delivery Book detailing incoming shipments of powder and its dispersal from
May 1661 to September 1664; DRCHNY 2: 460-471.

3

scarcity of gunpowder in the colony, however, colonial records suggest that New Netherland’s
continued existence depended heavily on a consistent flow of gunpowder to their Native
American allies. Dutch officials quickly identified a need to meet indigenous demands for
gunpowder, lest powerful nations such as the Mohawks begin seeking “munitions from our
neighbors the English.”11
Analyzing this Mohawk-Dutch partnership through the colonial gunpowder trade draws
from several subfields colonial historians have developed in recent years. First and foremost, this
interpretation builds on the recent explosion in Native American scholarship.12Several scholars
of Iroquoia have reconstructed the Haudenosaunee’s complex relationship with the Dutch, while
some New Netherland scholars have integrated dealings with the Haudenosaunee into the Dutch
colonial narrative.13 As a study deeply immersed in both worlds, this analysis benefits from the
11

February, 24, 1654, Council Minutes II, 116 (“munitions”).

12

Native American history as a discipline has changed tremendously since the days of “shattered” peoples written
about in James H. Merrell, The Indians’ New World: Catawbas and their Neighbors from European Contact
through the Era of Removal (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1989) and Richard White, The Middle
Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1991). Following the steps of Daniel K. Richter’s Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of
Early America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), historians have now begun creating continentallyoriented histories that both shed the trappings of Eurocentric analyses while also reinserting Native Americans
within the contexts that shaped their decisions and developments. Best examples include: Kathleen DuVal, The
Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2006); Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Michael J. Witgen,
An Infinity of Nations: How the Native New World Shaped Early North America (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2012); and Michael A. McDonnell, Masters of Empire: Great Lakes Indians and the Making on
America (New York: Hill and Wang, 2015).
13

On histories of the Haudenosaunee and their relationship with the Dutch, see Allen W. Trelease, Indian Affairs in
Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1960); Francis Jennings, The
Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies from its
Beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1984); Daniel K. Richter, The Ordeal
of the Longhouse; Matthew Dennis, Cultivating a Landscape of Peace: Iroquois-European Encounters in
Seventeenth-Century America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); José António Brandão, “Your Fyre Shall
Burn No More:” Iroquois Policy toward New France and its Native Allies to 1701 (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska, 1997); and Jon Parmenter, The Edge of the Woods: Iroquoia, 1534-1701 (East Lansing: Michigan State
University Press, 2010). On histories of New Netherland and Dutch-Iroquoian relations, see Donna Merwick,
Possessing Albany, 1630-1710: The Dutch and English Experiences (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1990); Janny Venema, Beverwijck: A Dutch Village on the American Frontier, 1652-1664 (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 2003); Susanah Shaw Romney: New Netherland Connections: Intimate Networks and Atlantic
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great strides made in recent years on intercultural encounters and partnerships.14 In relation to
gunpowder, a few New Netherland scholars have touched upon the contraband trade and
smuggling as pieces of larger studies on Dutch colonial trade and administrative policy.15 In this
vein, historians have gradually begun to consider the impact of European weapons technology on
Native American society. As David J. Silverman has argued in Thundersticks (2016), Native
American adoption of gunpowder technology dramatically altered the course of events in Early
North America.16 “A Daingerous Liberty” draws on these approaches to help explain how Dutch

Ties in Seventeenth-Century America (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2013). Many anthropological
works have contributed to these discussions as well including: William Engelbrecht, Iroquoia: The Development of
a Native World (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2003); William N. Fenton, The Great Law and the
Longhouse: A Political History of the Iroquois Confederacy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998); Jordan
E. Kerber, ed. Archaeology of the Iroquois: Selected Readings & Research Sources (Syracuse: Syracuse University
Press, 2007) and James W. Bradley, Before Albany: An Archaeology of Native-Dutch Relations in the Capital
Region, 1600-1664 (Albany: New York State Museum, 2007).
14

On intercultural encounters, alliances, and partnerships pertaining to New Netherland, see: See Cynthia J. Van
Zandt, Brothers among Nations: The Pursuit of Intercultural Alliances in Early America, 1580-1660 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2008); Evan Haefeli, “Kieft’s War and the Cultures of Violence in Early America” in
Lethal Imagination: Violence and Brutality in American History, ed. Michael A. Bellesiles (New York: New York
University Press, 1999), 17-42; and “On First Contact and Apotheosis: Manitou and Men in North America,” in
Ethnohistory vol. 54, no. 3 (Summer 2007), 407-443; Daniel K. Richter, Trade, Land, Power: The Struggle For
Eastern North America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Jeffrey Glover, Paper Sovereigns:
Anglo-Native Treaties and the Law of Nations, 1604-1664 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014);
Mark L. Thompson, The Contest for the Delaware Valley: Allegiance, Identity, and Empire in the Seventeenth
Century (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2013); Andrew Lipman, The Saltwater Frontier: Indians
and the Contest for the American Coast (New haven: Yale University Press, 2015); Donna Merwick, The Shame and
the Sorrow: Dutch-Amerindian Encounters in New Netherland (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2006); Paul Otto, The Dutch-Munsee Encounter: The Struggle for Sovereignty in the Hudson Valley (New York:
Berghahn Books, 2006); Tom Arne Midtrød, The Memory of All Ancient Customs: Native American Diplomacy in
the Colonial Hudson Valley (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012); and of the Dutch more broadly, Mark
Meuwese, Brothers in Arms, Partners in Trade: Dutch-Indigenous Alliances in the Atlantic World, 1595-1674
(Boston: Brill, 2012).
15

On Dutch trade, see Jaap Jacobs, New Netherland: A Dutch Colony in Seventeenth-Century America (Boston:
Brill, 2005); Oliver A. Rink, Holland on the Hudson: An Economic and Social History of Dutch New York (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1986); Dennis J. Maika, “Commerce and Community: Manhattan Merchants in the
Seventeenth Century," Ph.D. diss., (New York: New York University, 1995) ; Janny Venema, Beverwijck: A Dutch
Village on the American Frontier, 1652-1664 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003); Susanah Shaw
Romney, New Netherland Connections; Wim Klooster, The Dutch Moment: War, Trade, and Settlement in the
Seventeenth-Century Atlantic World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016).
16

David J. Silverman, Thundersticks: Firearms and the Violent Transformation of Native America (Cambridge: The
Belknap Press, 2016), 21-55. For an older account, see Carl P. Russell, Guns on the Early Frontier: A History of
Firearms from Colonial Times Through the Years of the Western Fur Trade (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1957). For a source on the broader Dutch arms trade, consult Jan Piet Puype and Marco van der Hoeven, eds., The

5

colonists and Mohawk natives operated within a contested space shared by powerful European
and indigenous rivals. Moreover, connecting colonial events to gunpowder highlights the
importance of tying events in North America to broader developments in the Atlantic World and
beyond.
By analyzing gunpowder as both a commodity and tool of diplomacy, New Netherland’s
role within the Dutch Atlantic and broader Dutch empire becomes especially crucial to its
developments within New Netherland and by extension Iroquoia.17 In an examination of the
mutually-beneficial, Dutch-Mohawk partnership, this thesis examines how the Dutch and
Mohawks slowly crumbled under the pressures of a contentious power struggle between
powerful Native American groups and other European forces, when faced with the realities of a
limited gunpowder supply. Examining the colonial gunpowder trade places the short tenure of
New Netherland in new light, underscoring the significance of Mohawk-Dutch relations and the
importance of Native American warfare and the unpredictable fur trade that ultimately
contributed to the their mutual rise and decline.
*

*

*

Arsenal of the World: The Dutch Arms Trade in the Seventeenth Century (Amsterdam: Batavian Lion International,
1996) and Michiel de Jong, ‘Staat van Oorlog:’Wapenbedrijf en Militaire Hervorming in de Republiek der
Verenigde Nederlanden, 1585-1621 (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2005) [‘State of War:’ Arms Industry and
Military Reform in the Dutch Republic, 1585-1621].
17

For other examples of histories centered on commodities, see Noël Deerr, History of Sugar, 2 vols. (London:
Chapman and Hall, 1949); James Walvin, Fruits of Empire: Exotic Produce and British Taste, 1660-1800 (New
York: New York University, 1997); Russell Menard, Sweet Negotiations: Sugar, Slavery, and Plantation Agriculture
in Early Barbados (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 2006); David Hancock, Oceans of Wine: Madeira and the
Emergence of American Trade and Taste (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); Jennifer L. Anderson,
Mahogany: The Costs of Luxury in Early America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012); Jane T. Merritt,
The Trouble with Tea: The Politics of Consumption in the Eighteenth-Century Global Economy (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2016); and Brian Fagan, Fishing: How the Sea Fed Civilization (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2017).
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As Daniel Richter once wrote, the “Iroquois used European goods and tools in
distinctively native ways.”18 Following this insight, this thesis seeks to explore how the
Mohawks adopted and manipulated European gunpowder technology for their own purposes.
Building on the recent work of David Silverman, it examines the Mohawk-Dutch partnership in
greater detail, in order to expand Silverman’s brilliant elucidation that the Mohawks did not
decline after the advent of firearms, but mastered them, “making choices for their own futures
instead of suffering as passive victims of colonial decisions, abstract economic forces, or foreign
technology.”19
Yet in order to understand how Native Americans made European technology their own
to the fullest extent, historians need to go one step further, by recreating the world as the
Mohawks saw it. In order to better understand the complex web of relations in the colonial
northeast in which the Mohawks and Dutch operated, I have adopted the term, Ahnowahraake, as
a place name for the eastern woodlands of North America in which this history takes place. In
Mohawk, Ahnowahraake (A’nowara:ke) means “on the turtle,” a concept that originates from the
Haudenosaunee Creation Myth: the myth of the Earth Grasper, also known as the Woman Who
Fell from the Sky.20 In the tradition, Sky Woman is falling violently to the earth composed
entirely of water. Various animals scramble to save her, frantically sacrificing themselves to
obtain dirt from the ocean floor. Muskrat succeeds, placing a clump of dirt on a floating turtle’s
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back. The turtle’s back is transformed into an island, and Sky Woman is gently carried down by
geese onto it, completing the intersection of the physical and spiritual realms from which life
begins.
This is how the Mohawks envisioned North America in the seventeenth century, as a
giant floating turtle upon which all life existed, swaying back and forth as it navigates the cosmic
waters of the universe. Ahnowahraake is a native space, a world set in motion long before
Europeans arrived. Ahnowahraake becomes a lens for historians to view the eastern woodlands
of North America the way Europeans encountered it as “a network of relations and waterways
containing many different groups of people… that was sustained through the constant
transformative “being” of its inhabitants.”21 Reconfiguring the historical analysis of North
America as a predominantly native space in this way reveals more nuanced views of Mohawk
imperial construction and intercultural exchange. The Dutch, in this instance, tried and failed to
establish themselves in a native world embroiled in conflict, one the Mohawks navigated with
exceptional prowess by drawing on years of cultural experience and traditions molded over
generations of change. The Mohawks were more than just people of the longhouse, they were
people of the canoe, utilizing lakes, rivers, and streams to exert imperial dominance over eastern
North America.

21

Lisa Brooks, The Common Pot: The Recovery of Native Space in the Northeast (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2008), 3. My interpretation and use of Ahnowahraake follows a long theoretical trajectory of
reclaiming (and renaming) native spaces such as Brooks’s “Common Pot” as well as Tsenacommacah and
Anishinaabe. On Tsenacommacah, see Karen Ordahl Kupperman, Indians and English: Facing Off in Early America
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); Frederic Gleach, Powhatan’s World and Colonial Virginia: A Conflict of
Cultures (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1997); April Lee Hatfield, Atlantic Virginia: Intercolonial Relations in
the Seventeenth Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) and James D. Rice, Nature and
History in the Potomac Country: From Hunter-Gatherers to the Age of Jefferson (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2009). On Anishinaabe, see Michael Witgen, An Infinity of Nations: How the Native New World
Shaped Early North America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012) and Michael A. McDonnell,
Masters of Empire: Great Lakes Indians and the Making of North America (New York: Hill and Wang, 2015).

8

Beyond its utility in portraying the eastern woodlands of colonial North America as an
inherently Native world, Ahnowahraake as a framework also stresses the importance of imperial
entanglement and a shared colonial experience. Following the lead of Eliga Gould, Jorge
Cañizares-Esguerra, and others, I use Ahnowahraake as a means of shattering the rigid colonial
boundaries that once were the foundation of comparative histories.22 Indeed, as this study
reveals, the colonial gunpowder trade formed the conduit on an interconnected space in which
the ebb and flow of Dutch, English, French, Swedish, and Native American jurisdictions moved
as one, juxtaposed between two overbearing forces: the Atlantic and the heart of the continent.23
In order to explain my view of the Mohawks as a dominant force in Ahnowahraake, there
are two additional elements of my analysis that must flushed out here. The first, as I have already
alluded to, is my conception of the Mohawk Nation as an empire. This historiography of the
Iroquois empire begins with Lewis Henry Morgan and Francis Parkman in the nineteenth
century, whose works first envisioned the Iroquois as masters of the wilderness, ruthless
imperialists skulking about the eastern woodlands in search of enemies to torture and consume.24
Then in 1940, George Hunt contextualized the Iroquoian themes of declension and war into a

22
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new thesis: the beaver wars.25 Economically motivated, the empire of the Five Nations now had
a vision, to obtain beaver pelts by any means to trade for European goods. Finally in 1960, Allen
W. Trelease added the final link to the history of the Iroquois empire, transforming Hunt’s study
within the context of English and Dutch colonization.26 Trelease maintained the framework of
declension, but for the first time, “European trade and aid were indispensable components of
Iroquois greatness.”27
For a moment, scholars appeared to be closing in on the more familiar concepts of
indigenous autonomy and agency used today. The publication of Francis Jennings’s The
Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, however, took the scholarship in a different direction.28 Morgan’s
“empire for the Iroquois never existed.”29 In its place, Jennings inserted the Covenant Chain,
diminishing the imperial reach of the Five Nations to an ancillary extension of English
hegemony in North America, and thereby reducing the Iroquois into a state of perpetual
dependence, devoid of an independent political identity. Finally, in 1987 a collection of essays
edited by Daniel K. Richter and James H. Merrell hit the final nail in the coffin, confiscating
empire from the Haudenosaunee once and for all, albeit in a fashion that posed more questions
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than it answered.30 Together, these scholars compiled the most in-depth analysis of the Iroquois
of the time, forcing scholars to build a new theoretical framework from which to understand
Iroquois history.
Daniel K. Richter’s The Ordeal of the Longhouse answered it beautifully.31 Following the
example of Merrell’s The Indians’ New World, Richter chronicled the history of the
Haudenosaunee in a continual state of regression and renewal, adapting to the trials and
tribulations of seventeenth-century North America in order to preserve their cultural identity and
autonomy.32 Richter’s monograph has since remained the standard work on the Haudenosaunee,
and has had a powerful influence on the progression of the field ever since. While other scholars
including Matthew Dennis and José António Brandão have subsequently published important
contributions to today’s perception of the Iroquois, none have matched the impact of Richter’s
magisterial work.33
After a revolution of sorts in Native American history, however, the great chain of
Iroquois history seemed in need of repair, so that by 2010, it appears historians had already
begun to take Iroquois history in a new direction. Jon Parmenter, David L. Preston, and Gail D.
MacLeitch, among others, put forth studies “positioning native people as central actors” in order
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José António Brandão, “Your Fyre Shall Burn No More: Iroquois Policy toward New France and its Native Allies
to 1701 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1997).

11

to enhance the trajectory of survival, what Edward Countryman has recently broken down into
“four successive historical situations in which the Iroquois found themselves compelled to take
part:” the seventeenth century; a period of development situated between the Great Peace of
Montreal and the beginnings of the Seven Years’ War; the imperial crisis and American
Revolution; and the foundation of the early American republic leading up to the Civil War.34
These recent studies, combined with the Mohawk (and Haudenosaunee) traditions
established in older works, suggest in my view, that the empire the Iroquois was not so
ambiguous. In the same ways that the Comanche, Powhatan, Anishinaabeg, or Quapaws dictated
the course of their relationships with Europeans, so too did the Mohawks with the Dutch.
Invoking the precursor to what would become the basis of the Covenant Chain agreement later
formed with the English and French, the Mohawks implemented an alliance framework called
kaswentha or “Two Row.”35 First put into practice with the Dutch, kaswentha in theory
symbolized “a separate but equal relationship between two entities based on mutual benefit and
noninterference.”36 Although the relationship between the Mohawks and Dutch did not always
pan out this way, it is nonetheless important that the Mohawks routinely chastised the Dutch
when their actions broke kaswentha protocol. Kaswentha thus formed the basis of how the
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Mohawks absorbed Europeans into their space and forced them to accommodate their own
customs, traditions, and ambitions regardless of whether or not the Dutch consented. The
Mohawks dominated Ahnowahraake, and as the Dutch quickly realized, Europeans did not. The
strategy implemented by the Mohawks–who continually insisted that the trade in gunpowder
belonged within the framework of diplomacy established by kaswentha–worked.
By the 1660s, the Mohawk-Dutch partnership proceeded to deteriorate under the
mounting aggression of neighboring Europeans and Native Americans, no longer incapable of
carrying out protective countermeasures. While English settlers increasingly penetrated New
Netherland’s borders, Indians from New England, New France, and the Delaware River Valley
initiated disparate retaliatory offensives into Iroquoia. Together, the disparate movements
crippled the Mohawks and Dutch at a time of increased vulnerability, created from the inability
to recover from years of war that strained resources and population numbers. The Mohawks and
Dutch suffered a mutual political decline, culminating in the loss of New Netherland to the
English and a Mohawk Nation in recoil. The Mohawks would rise again; the Dutch would not.
Central to all of this, was gunpowder. Through the context of the colonial arms trade,
with special attention to gunpowder, this thesis examines the transformation of this intercultural
symbiosis from separate factions to brothers in arms “joined together with chains.”37 These
Mohawk-Dutch encounters and negotiations, dictated by the need for gunpowder and pelts,
reveal a distinct arc of intertwined fates, outlining their shared rise, peak, and decline within a
world embroiled in conflict. The first Dutch observers might have described North America as “a
blessed country, where milk and honey flow,” but in reality, these initial European traders
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encountered a volatile landscape stricken by indigenous discord.38 These Native American
contests for power and autonomy, notably those between the Haudenosaunee and their
surrounding neighbors, conjured a vortex that inevitably swallowed the Dutch whole. To be sure,
New Netherland’s relationship with the Mohawks was unsustainable, but it was also
unavoidable.

38
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CHAPTER ONE

THE MOHAWKS’ OLD WORLD: THE BEGINNINGS OF THE MOHAWK-DUTCH
PARTNERSHIP, 1534-1639

Introduction
Most histories of Iroquois-Dutch relations begin with Henry Hudson’s infamous voyage
in 1609; this one does not. Ahnowahraake was a world set in motion long before the arrival of de
Halve Maen and the waves of Dutch traders that followed its wake. Traditionally, this moment
has been described in the context of encounters, a potential first contact between the Native
Americans of the Hudson Valley and Europeans, immortalized in the context of discovering a
new world.
1

Yet the actions of these indigenous groups described in the records paint a different picture.

Upon sailing within the vicinity of Castle Island near modern-day Albany, Indians believed to
have been Mohicans met Hudson’s crew ready to trade beaver and otter pelts for “Beades,
Knives, and Hatchets,” although no documented voyages had come remotely close to Mohican
territory since Giovanni Verrazano’s peripheral visit almost a century earlier.2 Because of the
entangled indigenous networks of Ahnowahraake, the Mohawks and their neighbors were well-
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acquainted with Europeans and their goods long before European traders entered the Hudson
Valley. Indeed, the world that Hudson’s crew encountered in 1609 was in fact quite old.
Bringing Mohawk history to the fore reveals a nuanced interpretation of how events in
the first years of Dutch trade and settlement unfolded. By pulling back into the sixteenth century,
when we first see Mohawk responses to European trade goods as well as the preexisting
geopolitical rivalries set in place, historians may rediscover patterns of continuity otherwise not
visible, which influenced Mohawk objectives and actions in the seventeenth century. This simple
understanding, then, suggests the initial encounters between the Mohawks and Dutch traders are
more complex than historians have previously believed.
When grounded in the deeper history of Ahnowahraake, Mohawk responses to Dutch
trade and settlement become more pronounced, adding depth to the shallow areas of the
historiography of Mohawk-Dutch relations traditionally defined by moments such as the
construction of Fort Nassau, the Mohawk-Mohican War, and the “beaver wars” of the 1630s.
These events can be seen quite differently when considered in the context of entanglement, the
unseen ties that bound the Dutch to a world entrenched in Native American rivalries and
conflicts they could only begin to understand. Ahnowahraake was no edenic paradise ripe with
the fruits of profit, but an old world over which the Mohawks exhibited incredible influence
over, a blanketing cloud of manipulation and power under which the Dutch quickly fell.

The Sixteenth Century
Mohawk responses to the advent of European trade date back well into the sixteenth
century. As European fishermen of the North Atlantic began probing the coastline near the
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mouth of the St. Lawrence River, these Laurentian Iroquois–and their Algonquian neighbors–
proved more than willing to resupply European food stores in exchange for metal goods. The
bulk of these encounters took place in or around the flourishing trade center of Tadoussac, but
occurred as far away as Newfoundland.3 Tadoussac’s location across the St. Lawrence River
from Île aux Basques provided European mariners the unique opportunity to carry out usual
business in a centralized location from which they could reprovision themselves while also
touching into indigenous trade circles. By the late sixteenth century, European traffic to
Tadoussac reached close to 100 ships a year.4
The Laurentian Iroquois, Algonquians, and Montagnais benefited immensely, usually
carrying off superior metal tools in exchange for provisions. A growing consciousness of the
potential profit of the fur trade, driven by the increased demand for beaver hats in Europe,
gradually led to a growing number of European vessels sailing to the St. Lawrence valley in
subsequent years. In the interim, while European mariners continued to take advantage of the
trade at Tadoussac, others began exploring the coastal interior for resources and a potential route
to the East Indies. This was precisely what Francis I of France instructed Jacques Cartier to do in
1534.5 Cartier reached the Gulf of St. Lawrence in 1535, and his accounts provide the first
documented accounts of Iroquoian peoples.

3
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The Mohawks, too, quickly developed an interest in the new European trade goods that
gradually flowed into the interior. Archaeological evidence reveals the arrival of trade goods
from Tadoussac into Iroquoia by the mid-sixteenth century. Exotic glass and metal objects,
found in grave sites located as far west as Seneca territory, illustrate a clear map of the complex
web of indigenous trade connections sprawling inward across the continent upon which the
Mohawks initially relied.6 For them, items such as glass beads or copper kettles possessed
spiritual qualities congruent with the traditional appreciation for wampum. Like wampum, the
Mohawks revered these objects for their orenda, “a supernatural force inherent in shiny objects
that seemed to come from outside the natural world.”7 The increased practicality and spiritual
value of these new European goods drove a gradual demand for more among the Mohawks and
their neighbors. As a result, by 1550 the Laurentian Iroquois benefitted as middlemen in a
burgeoning indigenous trade system between Iroquoia and Tadoussac which–along with the
trade axis developing out of the Chesapeake–became one of two “key axes of human, material,
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and informational movement during the early contact period of Iroquois history.”8 As both axes
continued to expand, the Mohawks found themselves–as historian Jon Parmenter argues–
increasingly isolated after 1560, a decline possibly related to the severe drought that fell upon
much of North America at the time.9
In addition to the growing fear of isolation, the Mohawks grew increasingly concerned
over a developing alliance between the Europeans and their northern rivals, the Montagnais,
Algonquins and Wendats (Hurons). The Montagnais benefitted the most. The growing French
presence at Tadoussac enabled the Montagnais to act as middlemen, controlling the inward flow
of goods to their allies located deeper in Ahnowahraake.10 The Mohawks, longstanding enemies
of the Montagnais, feared the repercussions of this newfound French connection the Montagnais
had cultivated. Unsatisfied with their limited access to European goods via the Laurentian
Iroquois, the Mohawks aggressively pursued direct trade access to Tadoussac, relieving
themselves of their dependence on the Laurentian Iroquois while simultaneously threatening the
control over the area exerted by their Montagnais enemies.11
Just around the time the Mohawks began a forceful push towards Tadoussac, the
Laurentian Iroquois dispersed. Exploring the vacant lands once occupied by the Laurentian
Iroquois in 1608, Champlain remarked the Indians “abandoned them on account of the frequent

8

Parmenter, Edge of the Woods, 12.

9

Parmenter, The Edge of the Woods, 13-14. On the Megadrought that hit eastern North America by 1560, see David
W. Stable and Jeffrey S. Dean, “North American Tree Rings, Climatic Extremes, and Social Disasters,” in,
Dendroclimatology: Progress and Prospects (Developments in Paleoenvironmental Research, vol. 11), ed. M. K.
Hughes (New York: Springer, 2010), 313-315, see especially Figure 10.12.
10

Bruce Trigger, The Children of Aataentsic: A History of the Huron People to 1660, 2 volumes (Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press, 1976), 1: 208-214.
11

The Montagnais allowed their Algonquin neighbors access to trade in exchange for defensive support against
Mohawk onslaughts, Parmenter, The Edge of the Woods, 13.

19

wars which they carried on there” and “out of fear for the enemies.”12 Historians have since
debated possible reasons for the dispersal of the Laurentian Iroquois, including disease,
migration, and war. Presently, the consensus is the Laurentian Iroquois is a combination of the
three, with most of their population believed to have been absorbed by other Iroquoian peoples,
the Wendats and Mohawks.13 For the Mohawks, absorbing the Laurentian Iroquois refugees into
their communities solved multiple problems. On the one hand, the culturally and linguistically
similar Laurentian Iroquois were easier to incorporate into Mohawk society. On the other,
overlapping Laurentian territory gave the Mohawks better access to trade with the French, who
had established a trading post at Tadoussac by 1600.14
French efforts to entrench their presence in the St. Lawrence valley negated any
advantages the Mohawk gained from absorbing Laurentian Iroquois communities. Their
incipient alliance with the Montagnais, made clear by their new trading post at Tadoussac, was a
dark omen for the future of Mohawk trade ambitions in the St. Lawrence valley. Committed to
keeping the Mohawks out of Laurentian trade, the Montagnais sent two diplomats to the court of
King Henri IV in 1602, brokering for a military alliance. Having foreseen the advantages of a
Franco-Algonquin union for the advancement of the fur trade, Henri agreed to assist the
Montagnais in making peace. His commitment to maintain a French presence in North America
however, meant war was not off the table. The two diplomats, accompanied by a Champlain-led
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convoy, returned to North America the following year to make peace with the Iroquois, but the
negotiations went sour fast.15 The Mohawks wanted access to Tadoussac; the Montagnais would
not allow it. The French kept their word, and Champlain promised to send for additional forces.
In the interim, a treaty was struck with the Montagnais, Algonquins, and Eastern Abenaki. For
every inch the French advanced towards control of the fur trade, the Mohawks lost a mile.16
By either good fortune or adept observation, the French quickly established themselves in
the Laurentian trade axis, effectively dipping their hands into the highest quality fur market
while also obtaining a post in a newly formed northern alliance. The Montagnais were keen to
protect their profitable position as middlemen for themselves and went great lengths to secure it.
In 1603, an invitation sent to the Kichesipirini Algonquins was well-received when their
headman, Tessouat entered the walls of Tadoussac, ready to trade with the French in exchange
for military assistance against the Mohawks and their Iroquoian allies. As a result of their
inability to secure a direct trade line, the Mohawks resorted to perpetual raids against the
Algonquins to obtain metal goods, forcing the French to take the side of the Algonquins and
Montagnais in the ensuing rift.17
An alliance with the Montagnais gave the Algonquins the defensive strength they
desperately needed. In addition to partnering with the Montagnais, they also sought out an
alliance with the Hurons, who intended to utilize their Algonquin connections to establish their
own tradelines with the French, which would make the Hurons middlemen for furs coming from
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the interior of the continent.18 Traditionally, the Laurentian Iroquois hold over the St. Lawrence
River forced the Montagnais and Algonquins to continue utilizing the older trade routes of
sixteenth-century copper goods that connected Tadoussac to the Great Lakes region via a long
arch following the trajectory of the Saguenay River and St. Jean basin, the line of which can be
traced today by the modern settlements of the region.19 The incoming tidal wave of furs rushing
towards the French meant a stronger presence in Canada would be required especially in order to
transform the St. Lawrence River into a central artery for the flow of trade. The disappearance of
the Laurentian Iroquois conveniently provided the French with an empty space from which they
could seamlessly enter Ahnowahraake, further impeding Mohawk efforts to establish control
over St. Lawrence trade routes while strengthening their northern Indian rivals.
The French blockade against Mohawk advances into the St. Lawrence continued in 1608
when Champlain erected a small fort at Quebec, only a short distance from the abandoned site of
Stadacona.20 Thus a well-fortified French presence was established at the heart of the St.
Lawrence valley, and the river was opened up to trade, now well-protected from the Basques,
Spanish, and the private French traders in the area.21 Later that year, Champlain confirmed he
would assist an Algonquin war party in an upcoming expedition against the Iroquois, with whom
the Algonquins “had long been at war, on account of many cruelties practised against their tribe
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under the colour of friendship.”22 “Having ever since desired vengeance,” the Algonquins were
ready to shift the balance of power to themselves and their new Wendat and French allies.23 In
Champlain’s mind, this provided the perfect chance to earn the trust of his new trade partners,
while also enabling the further exploration of the interior with native protection.
The events that followed mark the beginning of a new era in Native American warfare. In
1609, Champlain and his men accompanied a war party of Montagnais, Wendats, and
Algonquins into Iroquoia. The coalition encountered a Mohawk war party off the shore of Lake
Champlain. While the sachems of both sides deliberated on when to fight, Champlain and his
men remained concealed in their canoes, evading detection by Mohawk eyes. Both parties agreed
to fight at dawn, and through the night the French remained hidden, never once giving the
Mohawks reason to suspect their presence. The battle lasted only seconds. Within the blink of an
eye, Champlain’s arquebuses gunned down two Mohawk chiefs, and mortally wounded a third.24
Bewildered by the thunderous noise and immediate loss of their leaders, the Mohawk warriors
fled, even leaving their shields behind.25
Historians have traditionally used this moment to describe two related, but distinct
trajectories: the beginnings of a long and bitter rivalry between the French and the Five Nations
and the deadly impact of European firearms on technologically inferior Native American
peoples.26 As David Silverman has argued, however, this analysis is incomplete when one
22
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considers the broader trajectory of Indians’ assessment and adoption of firearms. “The ironic
result of the colonists’ superiority in firearms,” Silverman explains, “was the Indians’ so-called
skulking way of war, which plagued Euro-American society throughout the colonial era.”27
Indeed, this “Champlain thesis” as Silverman calls it, was not paradigmatic as a moment from
which Native Americans collectively declined in an inevitably deterministic pattern akin to Jared
Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel.28 Instead, we see a transformative saga in which Native
American groups such as the Mohawks embraced gunpowder technology. This short encounter
marked the beginning of a new era in Iroquois (and Native American) warfare, setting in motion
the gradual transition of the Mohawks to gunpowder technology that would gain traction in the
coming decades. This gunpowder was Dutch in origin, but it was the Mohawks that make the
most of its power.
The destructive power of gunpowder technology forced Native Americans to design new
military strategies. The technological advantages of firearms gave Indians with first access a
quick advantage over rivals who lacked them.29 Up until then, battles were fought with relatively
few casualties. Traditional armor and shields provided adequate protection from arrowheads, but
quickly proved useless against musket balls and shrapnel. The Iroquois’ early entrance into a
Native American arms race allowed them to advance through enemy territory with relative ease.
Their ambitions drew from a combination of forces: the need for adopted captives, hunting
grounds, beaver skins, and the glowing opportunity to subjugate their ancient rivals once and for
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all.30 As we shall see, the inability to make gunpowder themselves left the Mohawks dependent
on access to European traders, a need the Dutch would fill in return for beavers. In this way, Fort
Orange would become a portal to the international arms market, and one the Mohawks sought to
reserve for themselves.

The Governor Called Jacques
News of Hudson’s voyage caught the attention of many merchant capitalists in
Amsterdam and a scramble ensued for merchants seeking to establish themselves in the
burgeoning fur trade. In 1611, the Van Tweenhuysen Company (VTC) dispatched the St. Pieter
to the New World.31 In 1613 or 1614 a crude trading post was erected on Castle Island near
present-day Albany. The post’s construction, and the decisions of some men to stay behind and
maintain it, was likely the VTC’s response to increased merchant competition in the area.32 After
a brief period of hostility, the separate companies conceded “transatlantic ventures could only
yield profits if the purchase prices for beaver pelts were kept down and the costs of maintaining a
small fort could be shared.”33 The directors of the four companies petitioned for a monopoly, and
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by October the companies had amalgamated into the New Netherland Company.34 The
protection from rival merchants however, did not make the process of familiarizing themselves
with the Indians any easier.
Although the economically-minded Dutch were not compelled to record the details of
their relationship with the Indigenous groups, Haudenosaunee oral traditions place great
importance on this period in the formation of their alliance with the Dutch and a “governor called
Jacques.”35 In 1678 for instance, a delegation of Onondagas recalled, to the English officials at
Albany, the beginnings of the “Ancient Brotherhood” that emerged “from the first Instance of
Navagation being in use here (at the Time of a Govr Called Jacques) & hath continued to the
Time of Old Corlaer & from Old Corlaer to his Present Excely.”36 Historians do not know
definitively who Jacques was, but his perpetual resurgence in the oral traditions calls attention to
his importance to the Haudenosaunee.37 For the Mohawks and their Kanosoni brethren, personal
relationships were essential to the nature of gift-giving and their partnership with Europeans,
Dutch and English. Inquiries into the mysterious figure of Jacques could potentially illuminate
the context behind the Mohawk-Dutch alliance, and perhaps answer questions regarding what
both groups expected of each other.
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The most convincing case put forth by Richter and others suggests ‘Jacques’ must have
been none other than Jacob Jacobsen Eelckens, a Dutch mariner whose career involved ventures
for several fur trading companies and is also believed to have spent considerable time with the
natives.38 Born in Amsterdam in 1593, and then relocated to Rouen around 1600, Eelckens grew
up exposed to the rising merchant culture of the burgeoning fur trade.39 His career began as a
merchant clerk, but by twenty one years of age he was a skipper of a supercargo accompanying
Christiansen to North America for the VTC.40 Historians have assumed Eelckens was one of the
company men to stay behind on Castle Island following the construction of the trading post.41 Of
the group known to have remained, we know there were at least six and can name four of them:
Esker Annes, Dirck Claesz, Cornelis Hendricksen, and a man called ‘Kleyntjen,’ or ‘shorty.’42 It
is possible Eelckens was present as well, but likely not until after 1615 since his first mention in
the record comes from July 1614, referencing his return to Amsterdam with Christiansen.43 Hart
implies Eelckens returned to North America in 1615 as a member of the New Netherland
Company and resumed command of the trading post on Castle Island then.44 We do not know
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when he left the post, but it must have been around the time the Hudson washed away the trading
post in 1617, since Eelckens was sailing for a new company on a new ship in 1618.45
This account of Eelckens goes against some of the assumptions historians have made of
his involvement in North America thus far. These discrepancies in the narrative can be attributed
largely to the fascination with a dubious treaty, and also to a deposition made by Eelckens to
English officials in 1633 in which he claims to have lived “foure years” with the Indians.46
Historians have used this information to argue Eelckens must have lived on Castle Island from
the construction of the post between 1613/14 and its destruction in 1617, but no records exist to
confirm this. Their willingness to accept it relates directly to the treaty Eelckens is said to have
authored.
The treaty aforementioned, is most commonly known as the “Tawagonshi Treaty,” a
trade pact alleged to have been drawn up by Eelckens and Christiansen and signed by
representatives of the Mohawk, Oneida, and Onondaga. Both sides are believed to have
commemorated the accord per their own customs. The European traders had the written
document, while the Iroquois responded with a gift of wampum, signifying the beginning of
what has become known as the “Two-Row Tradition,” or kaswentha. The meeting is said to have
followed the construction of the Dutch trading post, but the rest is unclear. The document has
been purported by certain parties to carry significance as the first documented treaty between the
Dutch and the Iroquois as well as that between Indigenous peoples and Europeans in North
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America. While historians may continue to debate the legitimacy of this document, others must
now revisit this formative period with the tools necessary to revise our understanding of what
happened, a process that inevitably includes the daunting task of separating assumptions from
fact.47 Multiple arguments have been made to demonstrate that a treaty drawn between the Dutch
and Iroquois is unlikely, but this does not mean a ceremony intended to serve such a purpose did
not occur. Eelckens, nor any other Dutch trader in the Hudson Valley at the time, possessed
permission from the States General to conduct treaty negotiations. More likely than not,
Eelckens orchestrated an agreement facilitated via an exchange of goods. A presentation of metal
goods and cloth to the Mohawks and/or Mohicans for the right to build on their land would have
followed Dutch protocol in other parts of the world in establishing trade relations, while the
Mohawks would have understood this moment as a ceremonious gesture to a new mutuallybeneficial partnership that could level the balance of power with their Montagnais-French
enemies.48
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That Eelckens and Christiansen drafted any type of diplomatic treaty document with the
local indigenous peoples is unlikely on multiple counts that highlight the importance of
understanding these initial encounters within their proper contexts. Neither Eelckens nor
Christiansen likely exhibited the literary skills required to draft such a document.49 Indeed, as
skippers of private trade vessels, neither possessed the authority from the States General to
execute diplomatic functions. Such would have been unnecessary anyway given the lack of other
external threats to the local geopolitical structure like an Iberian presence in the area.50 An ability
to conduct matters of international diplomacy would serve no benefit to merchants in the
Hudson, who continued to exercise business on behalf of themselves and their respective
companies.51 Moreover, cultivating a direct relationship with the Iroquois at this time would not
have been a priority given the willingness of other Hudson Valley native groups to trade. The
drawing up of treaties and desire to establish alliances with local communities was atypical for
Dutch trading, based on previous experiences in other parts of the world including South
America and Africa.52 This is not to say however, that Eelckens did not contribute to the
formation of the Mohawk-Dutch partnership. The evidence available suggests he did.53
Looking at this period from a Mohawk perspective helps explain the discrepancies
between the written record and oral traditions over the involvement of men like Eelckens. That
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the only mention of the “governor called Jacques” stems from the oral history, demonstrates the
differing expectations the Mohawks held for their new foreign neighbors. In the immediate
sense, the arrivals of the Dutch and English would have given the Iroquois a useful
counterbalance in their quarrels with the French in Canada and direct access to the trade they had
been fighting for. Moreover, on a metaphysical level, the success of these interactions with
orenda–the omnipresent spiritual power of the universe–mattered greatly to the well-being of
their communities and the retention of balance in the world.54
In the Spring of 1617, melting ice upriver caused the Hudson to swell over Castle Island
and destroy Fort Nassau.55 In response, the Dutch traders opted to relocate a few miles
southbound where the Tawasentha Creek or “Norman’s Kil” flowed into the Hudson. “The new
situation was well chosen,” writes Brodhead, “The portage path of the Mohawks, coming from
the west, terminated about two miles above at Skanektade.”56 It was once alleged by nineteenthcentury historians and Iroquois ethnographers the word Tawasentha translated to “the place of
the many dead” in the Mohawk language.57 This was sacred Mohawk territory, an intersecting
plane between the spiritual and physical realms. One wonders how the Mohawks perceived how
the Dutch almost blindly stumbled right up to the eastern doorstep of their extended longhouse.58
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Despite some initial success for Eelckens and others however, trade did not always go so
smoothly. In October 1618, leading NNC officials sent Christiaensz aboard the Swarte Beer back
to the Hudson to resume trade. Christiaensz had been warned by Eelckens and Engel not to
hinder their trading, but proceeded anyway, sealing his fate. In 1619, just off the coast of
Governor’s Island, Indians violently attacked the Swarte Beer killing Christiaensz and most of
his crew.59 The limited records available do not discern what might have provoked the attack, but
other documented incidents reveal flaring tempers and violence were not necessarily uncommon.
That following year, a tense situation aboard the Schildpad climaxed when Eelckens took four
Indians hostage. The secondary account provided by Hart suggests tensions rose out of
indecision on the part of the Indians and paranoia on the Dutch, but that the Dutch only released
the four prisoners after a ransom in wampum was paid signals their openness to aggressive
trading strategies. Indeed, ransoming captured Indians for wampum quickly became a pattern.60
In 1622, “Jaques Elekes,” imprisoned a Pequot sachem on his ship and threatened to “cut
off his head” unless a ransom of 140 fathoms of wampum was paid.61 The quick ability of the
Pequots to fulfill the demand demonstrated to Eelckens and compatriot Hans Hontom the
Pequot’s wealth and power, while also underscoring the importance of wampum in indigenous
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societies.62 For Dutch traders like Eelckens and Hontom, “always interested in learning about
commodities in order to expand their commercial activities,” the process was largely
successful.63 Later on in the Hudson Valley, Hontom took a Mohawk sachem hostage following
a brief altercation.64 To the horror of the Mohawks who met Hontom’s demanded ransom of
wampum, Hontom “cut out the male organs of the aforesaid chief, and [hanged] them on the
mast stay with rope, and thus killed the sachem.”65 It is unclear how this incident affected
Eelckens’s relationship with the Mohawks. His presence, if not involvement, might explain why
the West India Company did not employ him after 1624. Nonetheless, Eelckens’ dealings with
the Mohawks years later unfolded quite differently from that of Hontom’s, who the Mohawks,
and their sachem Saggodryochta remembered quite well.66

Mohawk-Mahican War
The first test for this Dutch-Mohawk relationship erupted in the form of a native conflict
known as the Mohawk-Mohican War. In the early summer of 1626, a Mohican war party made
its way into Fort Orange. In short order, they were joined by Dutch commander Daniel van

62

Salisbury credits Eelckens’ actions as the cause of wampum transforming into a colonial “currency” for which
many Dutch traders would soon seek out to buy in bulk to exchange for furs at Fort Orange. Manitou and
Providence, 149. On Hontom and his trading affiliations, see Hart, Prehistory, 60-61.
63

Meuwese, “The Dutch Connection,” 307-308.

64

Gehring and Starna, “Dutch and Indians in the Hudson Valley: The Early Period” The Hudson Valley Regional
Review 9, no. 2 (1992): 15-16.
65

Gehring and Starna, “Dutch and Indians in the Hudson Valley,” 16; “Examination of Bastiaen Krol,” VRBM, 302304.
66

The Eelckens Company regularly sent ships to New Netherland up until 1623, but Jacob Eelckens would continue
trading well after the company’s dissolution by taking up service with English companies. Jacobs, New Netherland,
37, 110; Gehring and Starna, “Dutch and Indians in the Hudson Valley, 15; Hart, Prehistory, 37-38.

33

Krieckenbeeck and several of his men. The entourage marched into Mohawk territory, where
suddenly a waiting band of Mohawk warriors “fell so boldly upon them with a barrage of
arrows.”67 Krieckenbeeck, three of his men, and several Mohican warriors were killed. The
Mohawks consumed one Dutchman, burned the rest, and “carried a leg and an arm home to be
divided among their families, as a sign that they had conquered their enemies.”68 Bewildered by
the news of what transpired, then Director-General Pieter Minuit sent Pieter Barentsen, a trade
with years of experience in learning indigenous customs and languages, into Mohawk country to
make peace. Barentsen’s experience, including regular contact with the Mohawks through his
work on the sloops, made him a favorable candidate as an intercultural ambassador and likely
contributed to the success of his mission for peace.69 “They wished to excuse their act,” Van
Wassenaer later recorded of the Mohawks, “and asked the reason why the latter [Dutch] had
meddled with them [Mohawks]; otherwise, they would not have shot them.”70 Van
Krieckenbeeck’s ill-fated attack is the only documented case of Dutch involvement in the war,
and little is known of why he elected to support the Mohicans, breaking the WIC’s strict policy
of maintaining neutrality. Historians continue to argue over the causes of the war and why the
Dutch became involved, but the results are plain. Both the Mohawks and Dutch had different
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objectives and presently remained uncertain of how to proceed without interfering in the affairs
of the other.
Among a select group of scholars, the Mohawk-Mohican War has received critical
attention in recent years that, in addition to the historical misconceptions they address, must be
recounted to some degree here.71 To begin with, the Mohawk-Mohican relationship remains
ambiguous to historians. The two nations were at peace when the Dutch arrived in 1609, but had
been at war previously for an unknown number of years. Although the history of this prior
rivalry is lost, archaeologists have discovered Mohawk sites from this period closely hugged the
bends of the Mohawk River, making use of the topology to ward off potential Mohican attacks,
thus indicating relations were at times less than amicable.72
Complicating the issue further, is the issue of van Krieckenbeeck’s intervention. At a
glance, any Dutchman living at Fort Orange must have known challenging the Mohawks with
only a handful of gunmen was not only dangerous, but also potentially ruinous for trade. The
lack of strong Mohawk retaliation suggests this was an isolated incident, and not indicative of a
deeper anti-Mohawk stance. Nevertheless, left with only two relatively vague sources, historians
remain divided to the meaning of van Krieckenbeeck’s ill-fated decision and its implications for
the Mohawk-Dutch relationship.73
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Historians’ attempts to discern the cause of the conflict stem primarily from two
contemporary accounts, one from the hand of Secretary de Rasiere and the other from the ear of
Champlain. The focus of de Rasiere ’s entry on the war is the disruption of trade and as such he
outlines Dutch objectives in the conflict: to rid themselves of the Mohawks and restore trade
with the Canadian Indians to the north. Champlain’s document, informed solely by Native
Americans, tells the Mohawk/Mohican side of the story which is less concerned with the fur
trade. On the Dutch perspective of events, the passage oft quoted from de Rasiere reads as
follows:
“I must perforce go up the river to see whether I can get the Minquaes
[Mohawks] to come to an agreement with the French Indians whereby they may
obtain forever a free passage through their country. That being accomplished, I
hope to carry out my design of [exploring] Lake Champlain, and, if this cannot
be done by amicable means, I beg your Honors to authorize me to go with 50 or
60 men on an expedition against them in order to drive them off, which in the
end will have to be done anyway, as they are a vindictive race. I shall take great
pleasure in it.”74

Meanwhile, listening from afar in Quebec and relying on Indian intel, Champlain recorded:
“During the winter some of our savages [Montagnais and Algonquins]
went to the settlements of the Dutch, and were asked by them and the
savages [Mohicans] of that region to make war on the Iroquois, who had
killed twenty-four of their men and five Dutchmen, for not willing to
allow them free passage to go and make war on a nation called the Wolves
[Sokokis], with whom the Iroquois were at enmity. And in order to
persuade our savages, who were at peace with the Iroquois, to undertake
this war, they made presents to them in wampum belts, to be given to
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certain chiefs, amongst others, to the Reconciled, in order to break the
peace.”75

From these contemporary accounts, historians at first assumed the Mohawk-Mohican
War stemmed from a fierce desire on both sides to control the Dutch fur trade.76 Economically
motivated, the Mohawks attempted to monopolize the trade by denying the French Indians “free
passage” to trade with the Dutch while also driving out the Mohicans.77 By extension, historians
have interpreted the Dutch to have regarded the Mohawks as a threat to the enterprise. As
evidenced by Champlain’s journal, the Dutch welcomed efforts by the Mohicans, and the French
Indians, to drive the Mohawks out. By 1628/29 it becomes clear the Mohawks proved successful
in driving the Mohicans–at least partially–into the Upper Connecticut River Valley, thereby
resuming sole control of indigenous access to trade at Fort Orange.78
In the traditional view, historians have since gone on to interpret the significance of this
conflict in terms of economically-motivated imperialism and alliances. The war became
famously known as the first indigenous conflict in North America to have directly erupted out of
tensions created by the introduction of European trade. The success of the Mohawks established
the base of a longer imperial saga in which the Haudenosaunee went on to conquer their
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surrounding neighbors in a hunt for beaver skins in order to further guard their relationship with
European traders and the flow of goods from their hands.79
Based on this narrative, the Mohawk-Mohican War initiated the “beaver wars” of which
the Iroquois would fight several in the 1640s and beyond. “While it was in the Indians’ interest to
trade with more than one European power,” Trigger concluded, “no tribe in the area was
sufficiently self-confident that it was prepared to acquiesce that its enemies, or even potential
enemies, should trade with the same European power with which it had an alliance.”80 The
Mohawk-Mohican War, then, established a pattern of Mohawk (and Haudenosaunee) ambition to
control the fur trade.81
With both sweeping developments in Dutch and Native history, it should come as no
surprise that this view has not aged particularly well. For one, Iroquoian historians writing since
Hunt have done little to correct the Eurocentric economic model he employed. Trelease, Trigger,
and Jennings all maintained the same basic framework employed by Hunt, and only in 1992 had
Richter only initiated the process of adopting the Mohawks’ perspective.82 Shortly after,
Matthew Dennis echoed the usual narrative, but crucially added an important distinction that
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bears renewed consideration. “While European materials and trade goods held great attraction for
native people,” Dennis continued, “the Iroquois and other Indians did not conceive of their
relationships with Europeans simply in economic terms.”83 With historians finally
acknowledging the limitations of the ethnocentric approach, it seemed the opportune time to
rewrite the entire event in new words. Despite such remarkable progress however, when Starna
and Brandão set out to set the record straight in “From the Mohawk-Mohican War to the Beaver
Wars,” they missed the mark.84
Together, Starna and Brandão echoed the argument put forth in previous publications by
Starna, that scholars had continued to interpret the conflict incorrectly.85 “The primary sources,”
they insisted, “simply do not describe the Mohawks, or their native foes, as doing much at all of
what they are said to have done.”86 They focused on perceived errors in the interpretation, but
offered little on the problematic methodology. To be sure, the piece is relatively successful in
refuting the correlation between the Mohawk-Mohican War and the Beaver Wars originally
proposed by Trigger. The Mohawk-Mohican War did not establish a pattern of indigenous
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dependence on furs that–as beaver populations dwindled–perpetuated military campaigns by the
Haudenosaunee in order to accumulate more furs to trade for more goods.
However, Starna and Brandão found themselves distracted by the conflict’s legacy and
failed to offer an accurate alternative interpretation of the conflict itself, which if done correctly,
may greatly change our understanding of Mohawk-Dutch relations in this period. In this vain, the
basis of their argument countered four core assumptions that continued to pervade in the
historiography: first, the Mohawks enjoyed only limited trade with Europeans before 1628;
second, this limited access to European goods, and importantly Fort Orange, due to the Mohawks
being “landlocked” by the Mohicans; third, the Dutch, in turn, considered the Mohawks
“marginal to their economic interests” and actively pursued higher quality furs from Canada; and
fourth, that the Mohawks recognized this Dutch desire to trade with the French Indians and
sought to cut them off.87 Having now stated the aims of their scrutiny, what follows below does
not attempt to rehash, but proposes a new interpretation based off factual evidence and
conservative assumptions from the existing scholarship.
From a Dutch or European perspective, the lack of sources makes piecing together the
outline of the conflict difficult. From a Mohawk perspective however, despite the lack of
sources, it is clear enough to justify why they would have initiated a new war against the
Mohicans. The Mohawks were losing ground in the St. Lawrence river valley and along the
Ottawa River by the 1620s, while their relationship with the French remained especially rocky.
This directly conflicted with the increased necessity of hunting grounds as a result of the
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population boom that saw Mohawk numbers increase to more than 4,500 between 1580 and
1614.88
A renewed peace with the Montagnais in 1624, orchestrated predominantly by
Champlain, allowed the Mohawks to reset themselves, recalibrating to the increased volume of
trade around Fort Orange and Quebec. It is likely the Mohawks made use of their peace with the
French Indians to renew war against the Sokokis as Champlain’s intelligence described. Mohican
territory acted as a buffer to the Indian nations of the Upper Connecticut River Valley including
the Sokokis, Pennecooks, and Pockumtucks. As a strong eastern Algonquian speaking power, the
Mohicans frequently protected these eastern nations from Mohawk war parties. It is also possible
that the Mohawks sought war against the Mohicans who then turned to the Upper Connecticut
River Valley Nations for help. Curiously, this can be evidenced by threats from Champlain to
help the Mohawks if a coalition did emerge.89
But why might the Mohawks have initiated war with the Mohicans and why did the
Dutch side with the Mohicans? To reiterate, it has been traditionally argued–and debunked–that
the Mohawks attacked the Mohicans to gain access to trade at Fort Orange while some historians
have assumed the fighting erupted out of the refusal of the Mohicans to allow the Mohawks free
passage into the Upper Connecticut River Valley. In view of the sources at hand however, there
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appear to have been other possible motives. First, it is possible the Mohawks, in a manner
relative to their imperial power, sought to take control of all Fort Orange trade for themselves as
the Pequots had successfully done around Fort Good Hope around the same time.90 This move
would have allowed the Mohawks a primary say in who the Dutch could and could not trade
with, an especially crucial position they would have used to prevent the Dutch from trading
wampum to their enemies, the French Indians.
Secondly, and equally likely, the Mohawks sought to displace the Mohicans as
middlemen in a burgeoning wampum trade. The Mohicans possessed geographical advantages
the Mohawks coveted access to, controlling the wampum trade axis that extended north-south
from the coastal groups of Southern New England and the Long Island Sound to the First Nations
of Canada.91 In doing so, the Mohicans could collect wampum from coastal groups via either
tribute or trade, and then turn around and exchange this wampum to the Northern Algonquians
for their beaver skins before then trading these skins to the Dutch for more wampum. If one
considers this indigenous trade network, one that mattered little to the business of European
traders, the Mohawks were indeed landlocked, not from Dutch trade, but from the wampum
producing polities to which the Mohicans had access.
In a manner of good fortune, the Dutch entering Ahnowahraake inserted themselves
along key nodes of the indigenous wampum trade. The location of Dutch trading posts scattered
along the coast from Narragansett Bay to the Long Island Sound gave them direct access to the
largest wampum production zones. Dutch traders could obtain the shell beads from the
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Narragansetts and Pequots and then use them as a bargaining piece to lure in trade of the
Canadian First Nations that did not have local access to wampum.92 According to Neal Salisbury,
“It was the prospect of wampum that drew the Ottawa Valley Algonquin and the Montagnais
allies of the French to begin carrying many of their furs to the Mohicans after the Dutch
established a new Hudson River post at Fort Orange in 1624.”93 It should be seen as no
coincidence then, that the Mohawks promptly established peace with the Montagnais in order to
pursue a new war against the Mohicans for trading with their enemies. These actions should not
be taken lightly. From a Mohawk perspective, a steady flow of wampum into the hands of their
enemies in Canada would contribute to a spiritual strengthening that could then leave the
Mohawks at a disadvantage in future conflicts.94 For these same reasons, the Mohawks would
not have wanted Northern Algonquian groups such as the Montagnais trading with the Dutch,
thereby negating the advantage the Mohawks possessed from having access to the Dutch
themselves.95
Although only a blip in most histories of the period, the Mohawk-Mohican War had
significant short and long-term consequences in Ahnowahraake. Fear of Mohawk retaliation
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following van Krieckenbeeck’s ill-fated attack forced the Dutch to relocate south. Shortly
thereafter, Director Pieter Minuit and Secretary Isaac de Rasière orchestrated the purchase of
Manhattan Island for a bundle of tools and goods worth approximately sixty guilders.96 The
island provided the Dutch with an ideal location to facilitate trade with the indigenous groups
that surrounded the harbor, but also control entrance of the Hudson River. This new location was
also more easily defensible, since no other indigenous groups inhabited the island. Also of note is
how the war changed the geopolitical landscape. By 1629, the Mohawks had effectively driven
the Mohicans out of the Hudson Valley, forcing the nation to relocate with their allies in the
Upper Connecticut River Valley and instituting a tributary system there.97 This rivalry would
continue through the duration of New Netherland, and embroil the Mohawks in intermittent wars
the Dutch could not avoid. The Mohawks were a problem the Dutch–nor any other seventeenthcentury colonial power–could not solve.98
While Starna and Brandão are correct in identifying some historical misconceptions and
errors that have skewed our understanding of this event, they have equally become distracted in
the event’s overall importance. Indeed, the Mohawk-Mohican War, for what it was, is not
significant for being “the first and defining example of a conflict fought in direct response to the
European-introduced fur trade,” true or otherwise, but for its illuminating light on a complex web
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of geopolitical rivalries and tensions that which contemporary observers could only partially
understand.99
Historians including Trelease, Richter, Parmenter, Trigger, Starna, Brandão, and others
have all grappled to some extent in illustrating the true nature of this conflict, diverging wildly in
how the conflict relates to the French and Dutch, and also to several Native American political
groups including the Mohawks, Mohicans, the Upper Connecticut River Valley Indians, the
coastal groups in Southern New England and around Long Island Sound, and the French Indians
including the Montagnais, Algonquins, and Hurons. When one considers the breadth of this
disorienting geopolitical landscape, it stands to reason then that historians have overly relied on
the written record, composed by contemporaries lacking an adequate sense of the complex web
of relations they sought to describe.
While excellent historical and anthropological scholarship has done well to help color in
some of the missing pieces, this event will frustratingly remain a shattered mosaic for historians,
just as it had been for the contemporaries we rely on to describe it. The reality of the MohawkMohican War remains an elusive truth, one that may only be uncovered if the motivations of the
Mohawks and Mohicans are fully considered, rather than those of Champlain or de Rasiere. If
the Mohawk-Mohican War may not have produced a pattern, but its historiography has: the
inability of historians to recognize the Mohawks and Dutch inhibited disparate objectives and
different interpretations of the events happening around them. Moreover, the conflict initiated a
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“contest for power” between the Mohawks and their eastern Algonquian rivals, “[that]
significantly influenced life in the Northeast for the next half century.”100

Disease and Uncertainty
How the Mohawks perceived their position by the 1630s might be best illustrated by the
death of a nameless Mohawk sachem who readily accepted his execution at the hands of the
Montagnais, satisfied with the imperial position the Mohawks had carved out for themselves. In
1631, an Algonkian-Montagnais war party returned to New France with the spoils of the recent
raid of a Mohawk village. Nine Mohawks including the sachem were captured, the Algonquins
kept six captives for themselves and left three for the Montagnais to take back to Tadoussac so
they too could share their trophies with their families. At first, negotiations delayed the ritual
execution process as the Mohawks and Montagnais attempted to broker a peace. Unfortunately
for the captives, however, the murder of one of the captives by a drunken guard stalled
negotiations indefinitely. As a result, the rest of the prisoners were killed including one particular
“powerful and courageous” sachem in particular whose confident taunts captured the attention of
French observers.101 Upon learning of his impending death, this Mohawk sachem happily
boasted of his own Montagnais conquests before adding “his friends will take still more.”102 In
resignation of his fate, the sachem bade farewells to his friends, family, allies, and even the
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“Flemish Captain who goes to trade for furs in the country of the Hiroquois by the Northern
sea.”103 This last quip, undoubtedly the warrior’s final means of taunting his executioners,
perfectly captured the confidence of the Mohawks as they entered the 1630s, both well-seasoned
in battle and primed to take advantage of the Dutch connection they controlled.104
The Mohawks, a stronger nation with a powerful grasp over the indigenous geopolitics of
Ahnowahraake possessed the upper hand over a small faction of traders inexperienced in the
local customs and too weak to disregard them. The Dutch may have had wampum and other
exotic goods of use to the Mohawks, but trade as a medium of exchange held equal weight in
diplomacy. Trade with the Dutch occurred on Mohawk terms, and as the Dutch would discover,
this meant exotic goods took second place to the value of established connections and personal
relationships. The Dutch learned this lesson the hard way when Eelckens returned to New
Netherland under an English flag, and to their dismay, briefly resumed trading at Fort Orange as
if he had never left.
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In 1632, Eelckens returned to the Hudson River as skipper of the William, commissioned
by London merchants to dispute Dutch commercial claims to New Netherland. Following a brief
standoff with Van Twiller in Manhattan, Eelckens made his way up the river to Fort Orange with
the Dutch in slow pursuit.105 Preparation of the Zoutberg delayed the Dutch departure by several
days, leaving Eelckens approximately two weeks to trade with the Indians nearly uninhibited. By
the time the Dutch caught up with the William, anchored a mile south from Fort Orange, trade
between Eelckens and the surrounding Indians was well underway. Almost immediately after
pitching his tent, both Mohawks and Mohicans broke through the trees to trade with Eelckens,
pelts in hand. Until authorities from New Amsterdam arrived, all the Dutch at Fort Orange could
do was attempt to out-trade their English rivals whereupon they immediately fell to a
disadvantage. Eelckens, “beinge well acquainted” with the Indians and “havinge heretofore lived
foure yeare with them,” had the upper hand.106 Eelckens possessed key knowledge of Mohawk
trading practices that made for a successful intercultural relationship, and the Mohawks
remembered the ‘governor’ well for it. But just as they remembered the good traders, they also
remembered the bad. When Hans Hontom, appointed just a month earlier as the commies of Fort
Orange attempted to “challenge” Eelckens, the Mohawks withdrew.107 Saggodryochta, recalling
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how he witnessed first-hand Hontom violently mutilate and murder another Mohawk sachem, “at
once packed up his skins and rising up said, ‘That man is a scoundrel, I will not trade with
him.’”108 For a moment it seemed the English, via the intercultural connection established by
Eelckens, appeared to have superseded the Dutch in their relationship with the Mohawks, but the
success was short-lived. Van Twiller and the Zoutberg arrived to confiscate Eelckens’s goods
and escort him out of New Netherland. As for the Mohawks and the Dutch, Saggodryochta was
outraged a man of Hontom’s abhorrent character could become a principal representative of the
Dutch. In his native tongue, he threatened to kill Hontom “the first time they should find him
alone.”109 Hontom told them to “do their best.”110
The Mohawks did not hold back. Saggodryochta organized a massive force of 900
Konosoni warriors to send a message to their Dutch brothers and finally avenge the death of the
fallen chief Hontom murdered.111 In short order the army surrounded the fort, demanding the
surrender of Hontom, intent on avenging the death of the sachem he had tortured to death years
earlier112 Perhaps with the fate of Van Krieckenbeeck’s coalition fresh in his mind for the
moment, Hontom refused to leave. In a show of force and aggression the Mohawks retaliated,
setting ablaze the Company sloop docked on the river and slaughtering nearly all Kiliaen van
Rensselaer’s livestock.113 Hontom survived the onslaught, but the message was clear. The
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Mohawks controlled Ahnowahraake, including the Dutch who to them were one and the same
despite the colony-patroonship dynamic.
The Mohawks did not recognize colonial jurisdictions as the Dutch had, perceiving New
Netherland and its patroonships as one entity, one extension of their longhouse, and one to be
held accountable for its actions.114 The Dutch colonists did not see things the same way. Hontom
died soon after in a scuffle with Cornelis van der Vorst in Rensselaerswijck. How exactly the
fight started is unknown, but it likely ignited out of residual tensions from the Mohawk attack
that put the colony on edge. The Dutch knew the Mohawks were not to be trifled with, and
Hontom’s “behavior with the Indians was shameful.”115
Disaster struck for the Mohawks in 1633 when the first smallpox epidemic swept across
Ahnowahraake.116 The effects were devastating as Native Americans perished in unprecedented
numbers, never before seen by their own accounts. As the disease spread westward out of New
England, several indigenous groups suffered drastic population losses, effectively paving the
way for English settlement into the Connecticut River Valley where the recorded losses

114

Rensselaerswijck could send agents to trade wherever the WIC did not already have one. Trelease, Indian Affairs
of Colonial New York, 51.
115

Van der Vorst was the director of the patroonship at Pavonia further south. Jacobs states the argument turned to
blows when Van der Vorst insulted members of the WIC to which Hontom took offence. Van der Vorst was
probably in Rensselaerswijck along with Hontom to discuss the damage sustained from the Mohawks whereupon
Hontom likely received considerable blame on the part of his poor relationship with Saggodryochta as well as
Kiliaen van Rensselaer. Hart, Prehistory of New Netherland, 60-61; Jacobs, New Netherland, 455. Rink, Holland on
the Hudson, 120. For a detailed summary of how contemporaries viewed Hontom, see VRBM, 243-244.
116

Richter, Ordeal of the Longhouse, 58-59; Parmenter, The Edge of the Woods, 41. Evidence suggests this was the
first epidemic to affect Haudenosaunee populations in the seventeenth-century. Dean Snow and William A. Starna
estimate Mohawk population numbers dropped from approximately 8,000 strong to 3,200 by 1644, “SixteenthCentury Depopulation: A View from Mohawk Valley,” in American Anthropologist, New Series, vol. 91, no. 1
(March 1989), 142-149. For more on epidemics and population changes in Iroquoia, consult Appendices B and C of
José António Brandão, “Your fyre shall burn no more”: Iroquois Policy toward New France and Its Native Allies to
1701 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 145-169. Snow argues it was the arrival of Dutch children
(brought out by Dutch efforts to increase the colonial population) that ultimately led to the exposure of European
diseases to the Haudenosaunee, The Iroquois (Wiley-Blackwell, 1996), 99.

50

peaked.117 Contemporary writings closely followed the trail, with documentation of the sheer
destruction appearing in Bradford, Winthrop, Jameson, and others.118 Modern estimates place
Mohawk population numbers in 1633 at around 8,100 strong.119 Studies by Snow and Lanphear,
based on the archaeological data, estimate a mortality rate of 75 percent in Mohawk country,
leaving approximately 2,000 survivors.120
In an instant, the Mohawk vision for Ahnowahraake began to blur. The immediate severe
losses forced the Mohawks to regroup, in order to rekindling their imperial aims would require
hundreds of new captives to replace those that had been lost. They would mourn for their victims
on the battlefield, and would look to the Dutch for help. Understandably, the sudden losses from
smallpox slowed trade between the Mohawks and the Dutch considerably.
In light of both the recent diplomatic setbacks and a fear of French intervention, the
Dutch were quick to investigate what had happened.121 In December of 1634, a small expedition
led by Harmen Meyndertsz van den Bogaert, a barber-surgeon who arrived to New Netherland in
1630, embarked from Fort Orange into Mohawk country.122 By the time van den Bogaert visited
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the Mohawk Valley the following year, the disease had passed through the heart of Iroquoia into
Huronia [Wendake], but evidence of the epidemic remained.123 Some of the descriptions left by
Bogaert in his journal that documented his journey into Mohawk country provide clear
indications of a recent smallpox outbreak. Upon reaching the easternmost village, Onekahoncka,
van den Bogaert discovered Saggodryochta living “one-quarter of a mile from his village
because many Indians here in the castle had died of smallpox.”124 Van den Bogaert’s journal
does not detail his brief encounter with Saggodryochta, but historians can speculate what they
might have discussed. As the surgeon soon discovered, in spite of the obvious physical damage
smallpox had wrought on the Mohawk communities he visited, the disease did little to alter to
their spirits.
The timing of the Dutch expedition could not have been better. As van den Bogaert
traversed deeper into Mohawk country, the words “Allese Rondade,” or “Shoot,” echoed by the
piercing shouts of Mohawk warriors, reminded him of why Saggodryochta had been glad to see
him.125 The smallpox epidemic created a void in Mohawk communities that had to be filled
immediately. New warriors and matrons had to be adopted from neighboring indigenous groups.
The need for captives meant waging new wars, and the Mohawks, now well-versed in the power
of gunpowder technology, sought guns of their own to win them.126 From a Mohawk perspective,
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the Dutch were the perfect suppliers: the beaver skins Dutch traders wanted were relatively easy
to acquire, and more importantly, the Mohawks viewed the Dutch as expendable.
The Mohawks controlled the relationship, and as was made perfectly clear during Van
den Bogaert’s visit, they could just as easily turn to the French if a partnership with the Dutch
could not be achieved.127 Moreover, his journey illustrated the precarious position the Dutch
unwittingly found themselves in as a result. After days of refusing to discharge their muskets for
fear of their own safety, Van den Bogaert and his comrades eventually gave into the pressure,
firing a thunderous volley skyward that captivated his hosts. They had little choice, whether they
fired or not did not change the reality that their fates were in the Mohawks’ hands128. With the
leaders of the global arms trade at their disposal, the Mohawks ushered in “the dawn of a new era
in the Northeast.”129
Conveniently for the Mohawks, the Dutch were the perfect arms suppliers. By the 1630s,
the United Provinces were firmly established as the leading arms dealers of the world with
supply lines linked to the Baltic, Mediterranean, and East Indies.130 Trading in gunpowder
required connections to the East Indies and the cooperation of the East India Company, allowing
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for the swift development of commercial markets within which guns, gunpowder and
ammunition were sold to international bidders regardless of diplomatic relations. Moreover,
many Dutch traders were perfectly willing to trade munitions for beavers, often at exorbitant
prices. Although historians of New Netherland have mostly focused on the “wampum
revolution,” the Mohawks were purchasing guns early and paid steep prices for them.131
Dutch traders exploited Mohawk demands for guns, powder, and shot to the fullest
extent. During the 1630s, firelock weapons could be furnished for roughly 12 guilders, and a
pound of gunpowder for 2. The Mohawks, in turn, paid five to ten times the production costs in
up to 120 guilders per gun and 12 guilders for gunpowder, equating to approximately 20 and 2
beaver pelts respectively.132 Gunsmiths in New Netherland could make additional profits by
charging Mohawk warriors for repairs, a practice the Mohawks took considerable exception to
throughout the seventeenth century.133
The Mohawks benefitted from access to Dutch firearms, but also from advancements in
firearm technology. The emergence of the flintlock by the mid-1630s, a far and away
improvement from the antecedent matchlock or wheel lock, meshed nicely with Mohawk
imperial ambitions. The key component to the flintlock’s improved efficiency was the “battery,”
which combined the steel and pan lid into a singular cover that protected the charge from the
elements prior to ignition. This critical alteration, in addition to other cosmetic improvements,
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made the flintlock more compatible with indigenous warfare, a “dependable and relatively easy
to maintain” weapon that fit the Mohawks’ “skulking way of war.”134
Previous historical inquiries into the effects of gunpowder technology on the Mohawks
and Haudenosaunee are generally one-sided: the introduction of guns into Iroquoia resulted in a
growing dependence on European weaponry at the expense of declining cultural traditions and
knowledge, inducing an endless cycle of inciting wars to obtain beavers to obtain guns to fight
more wars.135 Yet, “in both this world and the next,” Richter points out, “Iroquois used European
goods and tools in distinctively Indian ways.”136 Richter, Parmenter, and Silverman have since
turned the tables, ushering in new ways to think about Native American warfare in strictly native
terms. Rather than subscribing to the Champlain Thesis, Silverman argues the gun quickly
became a central element in indigenous culture, especially as a symbol of Indian manhood via its
pragmatic uses in hunting and warfare, but also as a means of exercising cultural autonomy. 137
Indeed, gunpowder technology formed an integral role in Mohawk diplomacy. The
transfer of munitions, tools with symbolic meaning to power and sovereignty, helped facilitate
the preservation of kaswentha, maintaining a steady balance of exchange between the Mohawks
and their Dutch brothers. Mohawk warriors interested in procuring Dutch flintlocks “did not so
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much purchase European goods as they did ‘Indian goods’” constructed specifically to meet their
needs.138
This same adaptability that enabled the Mohawks to seamlessly adopt gunpowder
technology into their way of life swiftly pervaded the ritual adoption of people, a core element of
cultural preservation in Haudenosaunee society known as “requickening.”139 Following the death
of an individual, the deceased’s title, social role, and any duties associated with either would be
transferred to a living successor through ceremony. In the cases of high status individuals, these
positions were typically filled from within the lineage, clan, or village. For members of lower
social rank or importance however, Haudenosaunee communities relied on cultural adoption. As
a result, Mohawk warriors conducted raids or battles with their indigenous neighbors with the
explicit intent to capture potential adoptees. Captives deemed worthy of entry into society would
escape death by ritual torture, and in turn be ritually absorbed into social role vacated by the
deceased, thus restoring balance within the community. Ritual violence became the primary
avenue for dealing with tragedy.140
A successful “requickening” depended on success in war. The wars initiated in the 1630s
and onward were not as much fought over beavers as they were over captives for which the
epidemic of 1634 created a dire need. Between 1635 and 1640, the Mohawks waged “mourning
wars” in seemingly all directions, usually against their enemies.141 One of their ancient enemies,
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the Wendats, became a primary target. The harsh effects of smallpox in Wendake coaxed many
Wendats to convert to Christianity. According to W. J. Eccles, this made the Wendats favorable
targets for adoption, since the Mohawks would have perceived their willingness to convert to
Christianity as evidence of a weak cultural loyalty that could be exploited.142
The Mohawks did not shy away from attacking Europeans either. They made multiple
attacks against the English during the Pequot War. In August 1636 a war party of Mohawks
armed with Dutch flintlocks fell upon some English in Connecticut, killing several. 143 A year
later, a group of Mohawk gunmen joined forces with Pequots against a joint EnglishNarragansett coalition in Connecticut, a further warning to both the English and Narragansetts
that the Mohawks were not to be trifled with.144 According to Alfred Cave, Roger Williams’s
report of this second attack is false, but nonetheless, Williams’ observations of the Mohawks as
“most savage, their weapons more dangerous, and their crueltie dreadfull, roasting allive, etc.”
succinctly captures the consistent attitude of New England Indians towards the Mohawks.145
Even in a weakened state, they were a considerable threat in want of respect, a lesson the English
learned after Mohawk messengers delivered the head of Sassacus back to Connecticut in 1637.146
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The move served as a gesture for continued good trade relations with the English, but was also a
conspicuous reminder Ahnowahraake was a world the Mohawks controlled.
Both English and French agents recognized the ferocity of Mohawk warfare, but
ultimately blamed the Dutch for their rise in power. Contemporaries believed the Dutch were
intentionally dealing arms to the Mohawks in order to harass their European rivals. Moreover,
the resulting imbalance of power between Native American factions necessitated the need for
French and English agents to trade guns, gunpowder, and lead to their own indigenous allies, a
practice both factions abhorred for fear of their own safety. As the Mohawks expanded their
imperial reach, the effects rippled across Ahnowahraake, inciting tension and fear that affected
the relationships of Dutch, French, and English colonists with their neighboring Indian groups
for the next several decades. As intense as the effects of their partnership were however, neither
the Dutch nor the Mohawks intended to assist the other in the problems they shared ties to.
Neither party was certain of the role of the other in their own designs, neither fully trusted the
other, but for the moment both factions realized one could meet the needs of the other. It was a
symbiotic relationship in the making, yet neither the Dutch nor the Mohawks were willing to
acknowledge the signs that both had become dependent on the other for survival.

Conclusion
By 1639, a Mohawk-Dutch relationship began to solidify into something both sides
could recognize as mutually beneficial. Mohawk reliance on firearms developed hand-in-hand
with their desire to extend their longhouse, to make “one people.”147 Far-flung hunting
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expeditions for beaver pelts might not as of yet been necessary, but it fit snug within the motives
of Mohawk military campaigns. Wars for captives often served the dual purpose of gaining
access to new hunting grounds whereby additional beaver populations could be exploited.148
Despite some resistance from colonial officials and the WIC Directors, many Dutch traders were
more than willing to oblige. Even then they had little choice. Years of strained relations with the
Mohawks made perfectly clear that the Mohawks–could and did–trade with their French and
English rivals and more importantly, could easily exterminate New Netherland altogether. The
Dutch were expendable.
Two events in 1639 perfectly capture the dichotomous nature of New Netherland’s
existence in this early period. First, the lift of the company monopsony on the fur trade ushered
in a wave of private traders eager to capitalize on a burgeoning market. At the same time, in
recognizing that “which has already caused much evil and will hereafter result in greater evil if
no means be adopted,” the WIC attempted to officially halt the vending of guns, powder, and
shot to the Indians.149 Effective March 31, 1639, “every inhabitant of New Netherland … [was]
… most expressly forbidden to sell any muskets, powder or lead to the Indians, on pain of being
punished by death.”150 As far as the outcome, the Dutch received mixed results. The lift on the
company monopsony provided enough incentive for New Netherland’s population to boom with
scores of settlers flooding the docks of New Amsterdam over the subsequent years.
Consequently however, the newly-opened opportunity for profit attracted private traders who
bore no interests in adhering to the local laws that colonial magistrates lacked the resources to
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fully enforce. The ordinance prohibiting the trade of munitions would be one of several to be
restated over the duration of the colony, but the official legislation did little to curb the rampant
smuggling that private traders brought with them, much less the official company trade that
continued unabated.
The advent of European trade into Ahnowahraake did not render an old world new.
Certainly European goods helped reorient trade axes over which indigenous geopolitics
fluctuated, but these goods did little to affect the imperial strategies of Native American factions.
As has been discussed thus far, the Mohawks utilized traditional systems of adaptation and
survival to navigate change before and after the beginnings of European settlement. They did not
react to European colonization, but instead forced Europeans to accommodate their own value
systems and customs. It was the Europeans who found themselves constantly reacting to the ebb
and flow of the indigenous conflicts that continuously shift across the landscape, connecting the
worlds of New England, New France, and New Netherland beyond a point any of the three were
comfortable with. Far from a land where milk and honey flowed, Ahnowahraake was a world
enmeshed in intense geopolitical friction dating back to centuries that convulsed in a manner
utterly invisible to the first Europeans’ eyes.151 As the Dutch would quickly discover,
Ahnowahraake was a distinctly native world, and they would need the help of the Mohawks if
they were to survive it.
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CHAPTER TWO

GUNPOWDER DIPLOMACY: TRADE AND SECURITY IN NEW NETHERLAND AND
RENSSELAERSWIJCK, 1639-1659

Introduction
Perched atop his horse with a clear view of the Mohawk castle, Arent van Curler and his
envoy waited patiently “fully a quarter of an hour,” on a brisk morning in 1643 while their native
hosts prepared the welcoming ceremony.1 Van Curler knew the process well. Travelling from
village to village into the heart of Mohawk country, he had been well-received at every turn with
warm welcomes, smooth gift exchanges, and hearty meals just for the occasion, all indications of
the immense respect the Mohawks held for their Dutch brother. Standing in unison, the village’s
best warriors brandished muskets, took aim at the sky and fired. These were ceremonies
articulated to demonstrate the weight of Mohawk power. The Mohawks took pride in their rising
capacity as a military force, and no Dutch colonist had been more instrumental in this feat than
Corlaer.2 Having graciously acknowledged the salute, van Curler’s group approached, guided by
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the glowing smiles of their hosts that broke through the clearing smoke. “There was,” he later
wrote, “great joy among them because I had come.”3
This short cultural exchange, albeit part of a larger initiative in van Curler’s failed
attempt to procure French prisoners of war–a group that included Father Isaac Jogues–from his
Mohawk allies, marked the beginning of what would become an intense relationship between the
Dutch and the Mohawks. With the help of Dutch munitions, the Mohawks evolved from a
premier fighting force into an imperial power that could hold its own against Dutch, French, or
English foes, leading to their expansive conquests that would stretch from Iowa to Maine over
the following decades. In return, the Dutch received a powerful–and feared–native ally that could
serve to tie the Dutch economy into the fur trade while also providing mediation for intermittent
Dutch-Indian conflicts, both equally crucial to the colony’s economic prosperity and encouraging
immigration.
From a Dutch perspective, trading a steady flow of guns, powder, and shot to appease the
demands of their powderful Indian neighbors assured continued friendship and alliances crucial
to sustaining a colonial presence in Ahnowahraake. Yet these promises did little to curb the
prevailing fears of Indian duplicity. The “imminent danger of being suddenly attacked,
massacred and driven off” by Indians and Europeans alike was a constant threat in the minds of
both the colonists and the WIC, especially after Kieft’s War.4 This fear became the basis for the
ordinances that officially banned the trade of guns, powder, and shot. Indeed, by 1650 the WIC
acknowledged the trade had reached a point in which the “aforesaid contraband goods cannot
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easily be cut short or forbidden, without evident danger of new war and trouble between the
subjects of the State and the Aborigines.”5 The scarcity of gunpowder compounded the issues. In
trading away their limited gunpowder supplies for continued friendship, the Dutch were trading
away their best means of defense in exchange for temporary peace. Only a year earlier in 1649
did Director-General Petrus Stuyvesant remark on the paucity of powder available for the
“eventuality of new war.”6 With the looming threat of being overrun by the English in New
Haven permanently stitched in the back of Stuyvesant’s mind, the suppression of the gunpowder
trade became all the more prudent, especially following successive encroachments into the
Connecticut and Delaware River Valleys in the late 1630s and 1640s.7
Looking at the Mohawk-Dutch partnership through the eyes of van Curler and other
Dutch gunrunners yields a nuanced view of why the Dutch traded munitions to the Mohawks,
voluntarily and by force, and the implications of these actions for the combined futures of New
Netherland and Rensselaerswijck. Together, van Curler, and the Mohawk headman he dealt with
set dangerous precedents for how the Mohawks and Dutch negotiated with one another,
solidifying the place of gunpowder in kaswentha. From this moment on, the Mohawks expected
a continual supply of guns, powder, and shot from WIC representatives in order to maintain their
friendship, anything less threatened to break the chains that bound them together.
In 1643, Van Curler and the Dutch had reason to believe a bright future was on the
horizon. As Wim Klooster argues, “the Dutch empire in the Atlantic reached its greatest extent”
in 1642 following the additions of Luanda, São Tomé, and expansion in West Africa and Brazil,
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all on the heels of the Iberian disunion.8 After years of struggling to establish themselves in
North America in the same way, the Dutch finally conceded any progress to be made in North
America would come only with the cooperation of the Mohawks. By July 1640, Kiliaen van
Rensselaer dropped his charges of indemnity against the Mohawks for killing his cattle years
earlier–a change of heart likely influenced by the success of William Pynchon to divert Mohawk
trade in Springfield–and instructed van Curler to forge a new relationship with the Mohawks.9
Accordingly, “three very fine blankets” were distributed in van Rensselaer’s name to three
sachems. The first was for Saggodryochta, who van Rensselaer took careful attention to mention
by name, and the other two “to the two chiefs who have the greatest credit and power among the
maquaes [Mohawks] or to one of the principal men of the mahikans [Mohicans].”10 Doing so
was no difficult task for van Curler, who was already known to “spend too much time in the
woods” and had even constructed the patroon’s house on the western bank of the Hudson,
opposite Rensselaerswijck, but closer to the Mohawks.11 The letters detailing van Curler’s vivid
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ideas for the Dutch colonization of North America may not have survived, but his actions make
them clear.
Like van Curler, the Dutch of New Netherland depended on the Mohawks for survival.
The Mohawks’ firm grip on much of the fur trade made them an invaluable client for both the
company and its colonists. In addition, siphoning off munitions to the Mohawks increased the
protection of the colony. On one hand, increasing Mohawk power helped sustain their
dominance over the smaller indigenous nations that surrounded New Netherland on all sides. On
the other, fueling Mohawk military campaigns abroad worked well to both create a buffer zone
between the Dutch and their imperial rivals, the French and the English, while also serving as a
means to indirectly disrupt trade with the Native Americans of those areas. Lastly, elements of
fear and dependence also played a considerable part in Dutch motives. The WIC recognized the
degree to which New Netherland’s sustenance and economy depended on the Mohawks, and as a
result, feared the consequences potentially wrought should relations turn sour to the point the
Mohawks divert the fur trade to the English or French. Worse still, the Mohawks were powerful
enough in Dutch eyes to oust the colony altogether, either on their own or in a joint effort with
French or English agents eager to see New Netherland razed. Maintaining the gunpowder trade
with the Mohawks assured their allegiance, and with luck, their protection.

Rensselaerswijck
By the time of his trip in 1643, van Curler had done well to climb the ranks in his greatgrand uncle’s patroonship. After two years of training under Jacob Albertsz Planck, Van Curler
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was made the patroonship’s secretary and bookkeeper in 1639, and commies by 1641.12 Together
with Cornelis Teunisz van Slijck, representative of the patroon, and Pieter Cornelisz van
Monnickendam, who collected tithes and monitored operations on the Hudson, the three men ran
Rensselaerswijck. The three men, “all in their early twenties,” historian Janny Venema notes,
“repeatedly had differences of opinion.”13 Yet it appears from an early stage, van Rensselaer
favored van Curler over the others, and seems to have entrusted him with the greatest amount of
authority.14
The objectives of Rensselaerswijck changed considerably after 1639. Prior to the end of
the fur trade monopsony, WIC policies for New Netherland typically favored trade over
colonization and settlement. Patroons enjoyed separate colonial jurisdictions outside the control
of the West India Company so long as their businesses were conducted where company
representation did not exist in order to not interfere with the official trade. As part of the original
pro-colonization faction of the WIC, Van Rensselaer seemed disinterested initially in the fur
trade, evidenced by his tense relationship with the Mohawks in the 1630s. For years, van
Rensselaer continued to demand retribution for an incident involving Mohawk warriors and Hans
Hontom in 1632. Yet, by 1641, van Rensselaer appears to have changed course. He still
considered Rensselaerswijck as primarily an agricultural colony, but interests in taking
advantage of the fur trade were present.15 Always an astute observer of events in the patroonship,
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even from afar, perhaps van Rensselaer recognized the necessity of the fur trade in efforts to
promote and sustain a colonial settlement.
Van Rensselaer’s change in course, and subsequently Van Curler’s newfound duties as a
cultural liaison would force extensive changes in the Mohawk-Dutch relationship. Despite efforts
by Van Rensselaer to curb smuggling within his patroonship, as well as the effects of the
seasonal private traders that would float firearms and brandy up the Hudson, it would not be
enough to prevent Rensselaerswijck from turning into a reliable commercial supplier for
munitions, linens, and liquor.16 As a result, Rensselaerswijck and the private traders hiding under
its jurisdiction quickly set precedents for how the Mohawks and other Indians would pursue
relationships with New Netherland through the duration of the colony. Indeed, attempts by
Director-General Kieft to curb the hazardous trade of guns and alcohol failed to suppress the
operations in Rensselaerswijck where most of the illicit trading occurred.17 Indeed, “after 1639
there are many references to Iroquois armament, and one of the most commonly assigned
reasons for the growing tensions at Manhattan and the outbreak of Kieft’s War in February
1643.”18
The outgrowth of illicit trading in guns, powder, shot, and liquor from Rensselaerswijck
completely changed the nature of trading around Fort Orange.19 Almost immediately, official
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company trade at Fort Orange declined, while a local population of private traders quickly
sprouted. Like van Curler, these traders were commonly called boschlopers, secretive merchants
“who defied West India Company directives by peddling their contraband wares or brokering
trade with native inhabitants in the forests of and its colonial North America.”20 Under the cover
of foliage, these private traders, “well-provisioned with high quality trade goods such as textiles
and firearms,” undercut company prices and utilized the lack of locally-centralized government
offices to forge intercultural partnerships and alliances.21 Traditionally, historians have portrayed
these traders in specific terms, as “strong-armed” merchants not above resorting to physical
abuse or intimidation to acquire the business of Mohawk patrons.22 While violence did indeed
pervade many of these encounters, however, the treatment of these incidents as evidentiary
fragments of a frontier where “civility vanished” does little to push forth a stronger
understanding of intercultural relationships, especially ones the Mohawks often controlled.23
As the commies of Rensselaerswijck, Van Curler brokered an alliance with the Mohawks
on their own terms, travelling from his residence near Fort Orange with gifts that echoed loudly
in a world that hinged on commitment and reciprocity. Although van Curler technically by title
represented Rensselaerswijck, and not New Netherland, the Mohawks nonetheless perceived him
as an ambassador of all Dutch people, enabling van Curler to carry out a diplomatic mission
without official authority from the States General. As a result, he successfully resumed the
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dominant role in Mohawk-Dutch relations previously held by Eelckens, carving out a permanent
place in Mohawk memory as an influential intercultural contact and ambassador of all Dutch
people.24 Despite lacking any diplomatic titles or duties from the States General or West India
Company, “the Mohawks received him as the respected headman he appeared to them to be, with
all due ceremony as embellished with the fruits of intercultural trade.”25 Van Curler’s success
would set a precedent for years to come, forcing both Willem Kieft and later, Stuyvesant to
continue trading company munitions to the Mohawks, while also attempting to derail the
contraband trade the Mohawks willfully encouraged.26

Security
Faced with the constant, simultaneous threats of an English invasion or Indian massacre,
the Dutch had little choice but to continue trading gunpowder to the Mohawks for their own
security. The Dutch depended on their alliance with the Mohawks to help settle disputes with
other indigenous groups and for protection from potential French or English threats. Colonial
officials frequently called upon the Mohawks to act as mediators as happened in both Kieft’s
War and the Second Dutch-Munsee War–sometimes known as the Peach War–as well as other
small conflicts that intermittently plagued the colony. The Mohawks and Mohicans both exerted
heavy influence over the smaller Hudson Valley bands, and the Dutch used this power dynamic
to their advantage as best they could when necessary.

24

Richter, “Rediscovered Links,” 53.

25

Richter, Ordeal of the Longhouse, 94.

26

Richter, Ordeal of the Longhouse, 95.

69

Most of the friction between the Dutch and Indians in the early stages of settlement
stemmed over land. In response to the influx of colonists in 1639, Kieft made several land
purchases from the Indians in the vicinity of New Amsterdam.27 At first these transactions, such
as one land deed with the Rockaways, often came with stipulations that the Indians could remain
on the land to “plant corn, fish, hunt, and make a living” that could contribute to the welfare of
the colony through trade.28 While agreeable initially, however, sharing land with the Indians
soon became problematic for the Dutch. It was not uncommon for groups such as the
Rockaways, either unfamiliar with or apathetic towards European concepts of private property,
to frequently resell purchased land to different buyers in exchange for goods including guns,
powder, shot, knives, linens, wampum, and alcohol.29
Additionally, the lack of distinctive geopolitical boundaries often made settlers
uncomfortable, leading to intercultural disputes frequently worsened by alcohol.30 Colonists’
pigs, for example, proved to be quite troublesome, with numerous incidents of free-range pigs
destroying Indian gardens and crop fields.31 The hazardous effects of these occurrences are
captured in ordinances as early as 1640 warning that the continued failure to restrain livestock
will result in poor harvests and worse, “the Indians would be caused to move and develop a
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hatred against our nation and some injury might happen to one or the other of us.”32 These
specific clauses in land deeds and ordinances, moreover, reveal how Dutch settlers remained
reliant on the Indians for at least some of their food supplies. Surviving in Ahnowahraake meant
maintaining amicable relations. Moreover, the need to preserve healthy relationships with local
Indian nations was becoming increasingly difficult around New Amsterdam, “where the fur trade
was fast disappearing.”33
Navigating the complex geopolitics of Ahnowahraake required an adept awareness of
what was occurring in the forests surrounding New Netherland. By 1639, the Mohawks were
obtaining guns from English traders along the Connecticut River, and were less than shy about
showing them off to Dutch traders.34 Archaeological evidence suggests the Mohawks had long
been receiving firearms from Dutch sources at this point, but any indication that the Mohawks
might turn to English suppliers was a red flag to Dutch colonizers. Maintaining the trade
connection that sustained the colony’s economy and protected its borders meant the WIC would
have to reconsider how to go about preserving the colony’s relationship with the Mohawks, even
if the answer was obvious.35 The Mohawks wanted guns, and would go to great lengths to get
their hands on them.
Many of the smaller indigenous groups in the Hudson Valley and around Manhattan soon
looked upon the Dutch arms trade with the Mohawks and Mohicans with disdain, and it was
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partially the refusal of Dutch officials to permit the sale of firearms to the coastal Indian groups
around Manhattan that led to the outbreak of Kieft’s War. In contrast to Dutch strategies for the
Mohawks and Mohicans, colonial officials sought to avoid trading munitions to the smaller local
groups for fear of uprisings against Dutch settlers, only a short extension from the intermittent
conflicts that continued to impede further settlement.36 In 1639, officials in New Amsterdam
posted the first ordinance banning the sale of guns, gunpowder, and shot to the Indians.37 The
new law forced disgruntled Hudson Valley groups–incapable of asserting themselves in ways the
Mohawks or Mahicans could–to trek up to Rensselaerswijck where van Curler would draw up a
similar ordinance two years later.38 The Dutch took great precaution with regard to who
gunpowder went to in these early years, and the case of the smaller Munsee bands living in the
vicinity of New Amsterdam, the risks outweigh the benefits. Maintaining an adequate supply to
meet the demands of the Mohawks and Mahicans, moreover, was equally crucial. The Dutch
might have been the world leaders in arms dealing, but New Netherland was far from a top
priority in terms of imperial possessions and received resources accordingly. While the focus in
the Dutch Atlantic remained Brazil, carefully retaining munitions for the most important clients
was paramount.39
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In February 1643, a well-armed Mohican war party conducted a raid against unsuspecting
Wecquaesgeek and Tappan Indians, armed only with bows and arrows.40 According to De Vries,
“eighty to ninety” Mohican warriors had descended from Fort Orange, “each with a gun on his
shoulder” to levy tribute from the smaller Algonquin nations.41 At least seventeen
Wecquaesgeeks were killed. As the invaders made off with many captive women and children,
the bewildered survivors fled to Fort Amsterdam to seek refuge.42
That the attackers were Mohicans and not Mohawks is worth discussing further here.
O’Callaghan and Brodhead were both confident enough to ignore the primary documents and
assume the attackers were actually Mohawks and not Mohicans.43 The Mohawks were in fact
enemies of these smaller Algonquian groups, but attacks were rare and would have factored little
in Mohawk imperial designs at this time.44 The Mohicans, on the other hand, were allies with
these smaller Hudson Valley groups and as part of their covenant, occasionally called upon these
groups to collect tribute. According to De Vries, this attack was the result of the
Mohicans“want[ing] to levy a contribution,” probably in response to other events happening in
Ahnowahraake.45 Amy Schutt has argued the Mohican attack might have been a response to Van
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Curler’s renewed covenant with the Mohawks. “The Mohicans watched these activities
carefully,” Schutt continues, “and considered ways to make themselves valuable to the Dutch at
a time when the Mohawks were gaining an advantage.”46 The attack on the Weckquaesgeek and
Tappans aligns with both objectives, since exerting their influence of the wampum and corn
trades of the lower Hudson Valley, and by the same token, avenging the death of Claes Swits
would have allowed the Mohicans to bolster their position as Dutch trade partners in their own
terms. Building on highly coveted wampum connections gave them leverage over the Mohawks
as well.47
In the short and long term, the tensions between the smaller Hudson River indigenous
groups and the Mohawks, Mohicans, and even the Susquehannocks, helped create a state of fear
among the WIC Directors. Kiliaen van Rensselaer himself took quick precaution in the event a
new Indian war might spread up river. Venema speculates it was likely the 1643 attack that
might have encouraged Kiliaen van Rensselaer to install Nicolaes Coorn as a drill sergeant on
Beeren Island along with artillery along the southernmost side. These installments initiated the
process of transforming the island into a defensible retreat for the colonists as well as an ideal
location for storing company goods and housing an arsenal over which Van Rensselaer hoped to
maintain tight control.48 An inventory list from 1643 included “two iron three pounders with
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their gun carriages, ladles and sponges, a cannon, gun carriages, musket balls, muskets, firelocks,
pistols, spears, powder, ball molds, and other equipment for a value of f. 1094.18.”49
For fear of an attack, colonial officials expected settlers to have adequately equipped
themselves for training and protection. The guns, gunpowder, and lead that made its way to the
colony were mostly property of the WIC and kept in the colonial armories. There were times the
WIC felt it necessary to supply colonists with guns, powder, and shot before crossing the
Atlantic. In a letter to Stuyvesant, the Directors note their permission directed to Antonia
Juriansen, a mother travelling with a large family aboard the Valckenier in 1648 “to take with her
12 guns, 50 lbs. of powder and as much lead for the defense of her family in time of need.”50 The
Directors paid close attention to these particular cases. In order to insure “all smuggling be
prevented,” the WIC routinely requested Stuyvesant to maintain close watch on incoming
colonists “to see whether they have not made a profitable trade in arms, instead of keeping them
for defense.”51
Although their relationship with the Mohawks was at least partly to blame for the
internecine fighting with the local Indians, the Dutch still relied on this connection for the safety
of the colony. Colonial magistrates knew well enough to take advantage of the influence the
Mohawks exerted over the local bands of the Hudson Valley, and frequently called upon
Mohawk sachems to mediate conflicts and help restore peace. It was only after Kieft’s first visit
to Fort Orange in the seven years he had been in New Netherland that progress towards peace
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were tangibly in reach. In the summer of 1645, Kieft embraced kaswentha for the first time,
calling upon Mohawk and Mohican ambassadors to assist drawing up the terms of a new peace
treaty.52 With the assistance of Van Curler and the representatives of Rensselaerswijck, an
agreement was swiftly met. Shortly thereafter, Kieft, in the company of Rensselaerswijck
officials and Mohawk ambassadors journeyed back to New Amsterdam. There “under the blue
canopy of heaven,” a ‘masked’ Mohawk sachem Agheroense, serenaded his international
audience with metaphors of brotherhood, peace, and the laws of kaswentha.53
Evidently, much of Agheroense’s speech, undoubtedly clouded in metaphor akin to
Haudenosaunee tradition, went over Dutch heads. The “mask” Agheroense wore captivated
onlookers including van der Donck, who later wrote that Kieft and La Montagne determined the
substance was gold, prompting secretive expeditions into the mountains “which the Indians had
indicated perfectly.”54 This distraction, over a substance that turned out to be pyrite, perfectly
captures the lack of awareness of even the most adept Dutch intercultural liasons of Mohawk
customs. The mask symbolized not wealth or beauty, but clarity, an important theme deeply
rooted in the metaphorical Tree of Peace from the Deganawidah Epic.55 Unbeknownst to Dutch
observers, Agheroense–by covering half of his face in pyrite–was actually replicating a specific
concept from Haudenosaunee oral traditions. The pyrite–ironically, given the Dutch reaction to
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it–represented the “clouds that covered the sun and implied the absence of clarity and reason.”56
While addressing the forum of Dutch colonists and Indians before him, the unpainted side faced
the Dutch indicative of their adherence to kaswentha, while the gold faced the Indians, an
intentional signal that the Indians had been behaving poorly and with lack of clarity, for why else
would they seek to harm the Mohawks’ Dutch brothers.57
On August 30, a general peace was declared, culminating in the signing of a treaty
between the Dutch and the several Indian Nations involved, all under the supervision of the
Mohawks, “the strongest and most feared in the country.”58 The negotiations provided the
Mohawks with an opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to kaswentha and their
relationship with the Dutch as well as a means of strengthening their influence over the local
Munsee groups, in order to take advantage of their wampum production.59
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Trade
When Adriaen van der Donck wrote, “the beaver is the main reason and the source of the
means for the initial settlement of this fine country,” he was not wrong.60 In fact, it took the
Dutch just two decades to exhaust the beaver population around Manhattan Island to near
completion by 1639.61 This posed significant challenges to the colony’s development with a new
wave of colonists on the way. The end of the WIC’s monopsony on the fur trade was a final
resort to encourage settlement. It incited a sharp increase in colonists while also exacerbating
New Netherland’s problems including its peripheral importance to the Dutch in the Atlantic.
Unlike in Brazil, the Dutch in New Netherland did not possess a mint to sustain a metallic-based
economy or sugar to attract many capital investors, resulting in a local currency driven by
wampum and beaver pelts.62 Success of the colony and its inhabitants quickly entangled itself
with the unreliable current of the fur trade, ultimately tying both settlers’ and traders’ fates to the
land that was constantly shifting from geopolitical tensions below the surface. As these new
colonists would soon find, Ahnowahraake was no more stable than the ships they sailed in on.
While the fur trade around New Amsterdam began to dwindle as a result of the declining
populations in the surrounding areas, the fur trade at Fort Orange expanded tremendously in the
1640s, resulting in the swift armament of Haudenosaunee war brigades.63 Jogues reported the
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Mohawks possessed “nearly three hundred arquebuses” in 1643, and by the following year,
Dutch traders “sold for furs in the consequence of great profit” enough guns, powder and lead for
the Mohawks to field an armed force 400 strong.64 With the French establishing new posts at
Montreal and Fort Richelieu in 1642, the Mohawks were more than happy to oblige, and “gave
everything they had” for firearms.65
Although colonial officials recognized the inherent dangers of trading munitions to the
Mohawks, the intimate ties between the fur trade and New Netherland’s economy ultimately
bound the colony to its continuation.66 Private traders and settlers alike depended on the fur trade
for survival and many families took on illicit enterprises at the risk of substantial fines and even
banishment in the face of poverty.67 In 1657 for instance, Beverwijck officials discovered
twenty-three year old Susanna Jans serving one daring Mohawk patron a concoction of beer,
brandy, and wine on the grounds that her “husband having double hernia and being therefore
unable to earn his living and she being burdened with three small children, for whom she can buy
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no food except with beavers.”68 Initially, the court resolved to have the defendant pay a steep
fine of 500 guilders, but upon observation the final fee amount was never transcribed.
Considering the Susanna Jans’ household would never have been able to pay the fine, it is
possible magistrates either looked the other way or settled out of court.69 Connivance, in Dutch
society, was common practice.70
Private traders eager to turn a quick profit and return to Europe were even less likely to
abide by colonial regulations. While some families might have resorted to illegal measures in
times of need, itinerant traders disinterested in settling permanently in the New World felt less
inclined to obey local regulations that protected the security of the New Netherland. As a result,
lifting the monopsony in 1639 not only caused an upsurge in private traders, but an equal spike
in illicit trading. Smuggling remained a continuous problem through the entirety of the colony’s
duration. The high demands and profitability of selling guns, powder, and shot enticed private
traders. Although legal ordinances made participation in the contraband trade punishable by
death, the WIC appears to have been lenient on the issue. Adopting the same policies used to
deal with matters of religious tolerance, the Directors encouraged Stuyvesant to “take good care
that through this winking no more ammunition be sold than each one had need of for
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protection.”71 These ordinances were continually renewed to no avail.72 Private traders continued
smuggling contraband to the Indians, and colonial magistrates lacked the means of stopping
them. Even then, not all those who were caught were necessarily punished.73
Two distinct classes of merchants developed in New Netherland in the 1640s: major and
minor. The major merchants were generally permanent residents, and demonstrated interests in
climbing the social rankings with large amounts of capital and family connections. The minor
merchants, otherwise known as the Scotch merchants that frequently drew the ire of Kiliaen van
Rensselaer, were seasonal.74 Often independent, these merchants made voyages to New
Netherland on private loans known as bottomry bonds.75 These traders, crucially, did not
typically own places of residence in the colony, and therefore have traditionally been understood
as apathetic to the local ordinances prohibiting the vending of firearms or liquor. Discussions of
smuggling, as a result, usually focus around them. As we shall see however, merchants wellgrounded in the affairs of New Netherland and Rensselaerswijck were also heavily involved. 76
Petrus Stuyvesant would do his best to put an end to the clandestine trade in arms following his
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assumption to the position of Director-General of New Netherland in 1647. As he soon
discovered though, the private trade in gunpowder had already taken a life of its own.
Stuyvesant’s crackdown on the illicit trade began in May 1648, the fiscal of New
Netherland, Hendrick van Dyck uncovered a major smuggling operation and arrested Jacob
Reynsen for “selling gunpowder, lead and shot to the Indians.”77 The court proceedings reveal a
tremendous amount of information regarding Reynsen’s network connections, activities, and
eventual sentencing paint a vivid picture of the inability or unwillingness of colonial officials to
fully suppress illicit trading networks. Reynsen was convicted on two charges: buying guns, gun
barrels, and locks from the company smith and corporal, Barent Ennesz van Noorden, and
subsequently sending these arms along with powder and lead to Fort Orange where his partner,
Jacob Schermerhoorn, sold them to the Indians.”78 The gunpowder consisted of 70 pounds
brought over from Holland with him in prune barrels, and an additional 75 pounds purchased
from Egbert van Borsum and Abraham Willemsz.79 Reynsen admitted to smuggling lead into
New Amsterdam himself by casting overboard a watertight cask containing ten staves of lead to
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a location he later returned to fish it out undetected.80 This case involving Reynsen and
Schermerhoorn provides not only the most revealing example of smuggling operations in New
Netherland, but also of the company’s response. Reynsen, Schermerhoorn, and others were
found guilty of smuggling and illicit trading, the consequences of which being that “the
Christians are weakened and the barbarians strengthened.”81 Yet, their actions went unpunished.
Several aspects of the official response to this particular smuggling case are telling of
how the colonial government lacked the necessary means of curbing the contraband trade. First,
the colonial government seemed disinterested in pursuing the maximum penalties, namely
execution, for their prisoners. Although the crimes of Reynsen and Schermerhoorn were
punishable by death, Stuyvesant, “considering the petition and recommendation of several honest
persons and Inhabitants of this place and the former good behavior of the offenders,” opted to
moderate the sentence.82 Instead, “to punish them as an example to others,” he ordered the
confiscation of their goods and a five year banishment from the colony to begin on the next ship
out.83 As for van Noorden, he was sentenced to house arrest inside the smith shop for one year in
order to compensate the value of the total goods sold as company property. He too avoided
execution, but on the pretense of being a first-time offender.84 By August 1st, a petition among
the colonists successfully prompted the remission of Reynsen’s and Schermerhoorn’s
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banishment. Their exile null and void, Stuyvesant resolved to “declare them henceforth capable
of going, coming and returning here as other respectable persons are permitted to do.”85 Despite
the gravity a punishment of banishment carried, leniency prevailed. For better or worse, Jacob
Reynsen and Jacob Schermerhoorn were free men again.
Broader measures to curb smuggling were equally ineffective. Upon learning of
Reynsen’s method of casting off contraband goods into the bay, the company immediately
responded by stationing a vessel, De Liefde, under the command of the naval store guard on
board at Sandy Hook to monitor and convoy incoming ships from patria.86 Interestingly, this was
done “without written resolution adopted by all the members of the council, in order that it might
proceed more secretly.”87 The presence of Govert Loockermans on the Council of Nine bound
Stuyvesant against making his intentions known.88 Stuyvesant hoped to gather closer
observations of the operations of Govert Loockermans and his ship, De Valckenier.89 The
targeting of Loockermans suggests his influence on the affairs of Reynsen and Schermerhoorn. It
is possible Reynsen’s tactics of hiding watertight crates of contraband goods into the bay may
have been a well-established practice within Loockerman’s circle. If or how long the plan was
carried out however, is not known. A report from August 15 notes De Liefde was in desperate
need of repair and prone to heavy leakage. Lacking the materials and carpenters to repair the
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vessel and replenish its provisions, Stuyvesant and Council resolved to sell the ship with the
intent to dismantle it for parts if no buyer could be found.90 These were troubling times for the
Dutch colony. A decaying infrastructure and stagnant population contributed little to prevent the
continued seepage of munitions to their potential enemies.
To make matters worse, the root of Reynsen’s smuggling activities went to an English
owned ship. The St. Beninjo, while captained by the Dutch skipper Snoy, was owned by
Englishman William Westerhouse. The ordeal with Westerhouse’s ship became the point of
contention over Stuyvesant’s push for the Hartford Treaty. Both the Dutch and English argued
over the jurisdiction of the St. Beninjo. As Stuyvesant understood the scenario, Westerhouse
sailed into New Netherland territory with the intent to trade goods, contraband or otherwise,
without paying company fees. Controlling English traders like Westerhouse would help put
down Dutch smuggling.91
Before Loockermans emerged as a prominent schepen of New Amsterdam, he was a low
ranking cook from Turnhout, Brabant.92 Like many of the other powerful merchant class of the
1650s, he used his ties to trading to strengthen his personal position in the wake of the colony’s
population boom during those years as traders flooded the countryside.93 He made most of his
90
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success trading around Fort Orange and the Delaware River.94 It is possible he entered the
contraband trade through his connection to Van Twiller, another thorn in the side of the WIC
who was caught shipping gunpowder out of the United Provinces in 1653.95 His involvement in
the fur trade goes unquestioned, but his illicit work in the contraband trade is less well known.
Both the English and Swedes were growing agitated with Loockermans’ dealings.
There is irony to the chaos of 1648. Amidst the efforts of the magistracy to cut down on
the contraband smugglers and traders, the official Company trade in guns, powder, and lead
continued. Just a couple months prior to Jacob Reynsen’s arrest, Stuyvesant received orders from
the Directors to continue selling powder to the Indians while enforcing the contraband
restrictions.96 The Directors, weary of more conflict with the natives in the wake of the
disastrous Kieft’s War, urged Stuyvesant to continue the detrimental trade. They feared the war
enabled the surrounding Indian groups to become “conscious of their strength,” and
consequently more anxious to provide themselves with muskets, powder, and lead.” Company
officials–growing increasingly paranoid of their Munsee neighbors–often saw through Indian
requests for munitions veiled by a need for hunting, but nonetheless resolved to maintain a
secretive trade so to pacify any ill-will. Not wanting to quell their anger further, the Directors
explain, “we perceive them to be so extremely eager, that we fear, they would rather begin a new
war against us, than be entirely deprived of these articles.” They ordered Stuyvesant to supply
the Indians “sparingly” given the present situation of the colony rendered a new war “wholly
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unadvisable.”97 He would do so only through the Company officers whilst simultaneously
preventing private trading. One wonders how Stuyvesant perceived these directions. How could
his employers expect him to maintain an official contraband trade with the Indians while
simultaneously denying colonists the rights and benefits of the same? Smuggling was a rampant
problem in the colony, and Stuyvesant lacked the resources to stop the main contributors. With
hope of curbing the contraband trade, Stuyvesant renewed the ordinance of 1645, “relative to the
trade In powder and lead.”98 As for the official Company trade however, Stuyvesant’s options
were limited. As the English rightly put it, the Mohawks were indeed growing bolder. Their
ascendancy, fueled by Dutch gunpowder, would mean increased demand for contraband goods.

Appeasement
Indeed, the period from roughly 1648 through the 1650’s saw a substantial rise in
Mohawk prowess and reach. Previous Iroquois historians have regarded this period as
destructive and shaped by indiscriminate violence directed by need for beavers and captives.99
Parmenter, however, asserts Iroquoian rampages into Wendake drew upon ancient principles.
Faced with the challenges of substantial population loss combined with now established
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European settler groups within the Iroquoian spatial domain, the Haudenosaunee underwent a
soft reset.100 The Wendats maintained a pivotal role in this process. Apart from the potential
benefits of captives, the longstanding rivalry with the Wendats made absorbing Wendake into
Iroquoia an accomplishment of intense, symbolic power. This extension of the longhouse
remained crucial to the “requickening” process that began to unfold after 1650.101 That the
Iroquois could also land a disruptive blow to French operations in Canada in the process was an
added bonus.
Gunpowder featured centrally to the Iroquoian designs of renewal in these years. The
means by which they could have planned to undertake campaigns as far as Iowa rested heavily
on a trusted source for additional munitions. Historians have done well to grasp the Iroquois
perspective in these developments. Silverman correctly discerns the heavy influence firearms left
on Iroquois military power in Wendake and elsewhere.102 Moreover, Benjamin Schmidt and Jon
Parmenter have respectively emphasized the significances of cartographic knowledge and
conceptions of space among the Haudenosaunee.103 Knowledge of their surrounding terrain and
peoples proved just as important as guns themselves. Expanding their geographical reach
brought the benefit of new hunting grounds that could produce additional beavers and sustain
growing populations.104 The Dutch had little say in how the Mohawks and their brethren used the
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munitions they acquired. Far less so, could they say no when the Mohawks returned looking for
more.
The Mohawks had their own reasons for arming themselves. Peace negotiations with the
French continued to stagnate in the years following Kiotsaeton’s speech in 1645. Following
another failed missionary expedition that cost Father Jogues his life in 1646, and numerous
attempts to convince the Wendats to turn against the French, the Mohawks settled on a more
aggressive strategy that would cut off all ties between New France and Ahnowahraake.105 This
strategy quickly took shape following Jogues’s death, with the Mohawks using their intimate
knowledge of their northern hunting grounds to systematically blockade Algonquin and Wendat
convoy routes to New France.106 Tensions escalated further the following year, as the Mohawks
joined forces with the Senecas to inflict direct assaults on Wendake beginning in July 1647.
Once again, disease was a driving factor. A second surge of smallpox raged across
Iroquoia in 1646-1647, forcing Haudenosaunee to regroup.107 In June 1646, an unknown Indian
pregnant woman managed to escape captivity from the Mohawks to Trois-Rivières. In her
weakened state, starving and unborn child dead, she informed the Jesuits the Mohawks were
“inflicted with a general malady, which caus[ed] great numbers of them to die.”108 Over the next
several months, wave after wave of Haudenosaunee warriors, mostly Mohawks and Senecas,
steadily eroded the edges of Wendake and even Anishinaabeg. Jesuit reports from the 1640s and
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1650s detail specific attack strategies, generally involving armed Haudenosaunee warriors killing
the men and making off with as many women and children as they could take.109
The Wendats suffered most, and historians have generally declared Wendake to be utterly
destroyed by 1650.110 Haudenosaunee war parties led by Mohawks, Senecas, and Onondagas
continued to pursue the remaining pockets that fled westward into Anishinaabeg. More attacks
would come in the years that followed, as the Haudenosaunee “shattered” the Petuns, Neutrals,
and Eries by 1657.111 French contemporaries that attributed the success of the Haudenosaunee to
their access to guns, gunpowder, and lead were most certainly correct. Crucially, although
descriptions of these wars provide numerous in-depth examples of Haudenosaunee ingenuity and
effectiveness in battle, horrified European observed to horrified European onlookers, blamed
Dutch guns for the damage the Haudenosaunee caused.112
The Five Nations benefited from these onslaughts in distinct ways. For the Senecas,
Cayugas, and Onondagas, the attacks effectively cleared out new hunting grounds that expanded
their source base for food and beavers. The Mohawks, in return, received prisoners and the spoils
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of war, as well as the reciprocal military aid from their Haudenosaunee brethren against a newly
forming Franco-Susquehannock alliance.113

Retaliation
European colonists on all sides of Iroquoia grew increasingly alarmed at the breath of
Mohawk power. Witnessing the disappearance of the Wendats first hand, French officials found
it prudent to begin arming the neighboring Indian Nations in New France and northern New
England. The French took the additional step of extending terms of an alliance with the United
Colonies in 1650, arguing the Mohawk aggression against the Abenaki and Sokoki would prove
hazardous to English settlements. Yet the residual fear of Mohawk aggression from the Pequot
War influenced the English decision to decline the offer.114 Moreover, the United Colonies were
preoccupied with threats closer to home where relations between the Mohegans and
Narragansetts began to boil over.115 Countless rumors circulated in English circles of an
impending Indian attack, with the Dutch supplying the arms. Meanwhile to the south, the

113

The French were hoping to ally themselves with the Susquehannocks and Swedes against the Dutch, who in
response called upon the Mohawks to attack the Susquehannocks, hoping to prime New Sweden for capture;
Trigger, Natives and Newcomers, 275; Parmenter, Edge of the Woods, 75-76; Van Zandt, Brothers among Nations,
184-185.
114

RCNP 9: 113; Parmenter, Edge of the Woods, 82-83; Salisbury, “Toward the Covenant Chain,” 62-65.

115

On the history of the conflict between Uncas, sachem of the Mohegans, and Ninigret, sachem of the Niantics and
Narragansetts, and their entanglements with the Dutch and English, see Michael Leroy Oberg, Uncas: First of the
Mohegans (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Julie A. Fisher and David J. Silverman, Ninigret, Sachem of the
Niantics and Narragansetts: Diplomacy, War, and the Balance of Power in Seventeenth-Century New England and
Indian Country (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014); Katherine Grandjean, American Passage: The
Communications Frontier in Early New England (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 76-109; and
Lipman, The Saltwater Frontier, 168-173.

91

Swedish and English in the Delaware Valley and the Chesapeake both took to arming their
indigenous neighbors as well, especially the Susquehannocks.116
French, Swedish, and English observers blamed the Dutch for the rise of the Mohawks
and promptly demanded Stuyvesant to cease and desist the “daingerous liberty” of trading guns,
powder, and shot to the Indians.117 Stuyvesant acknowledged the concerns of his neighboring
governors, but as he well knew from his recent attempts to cut off the munitions network of
Reynsen and Schermerhorn, halting the illicit trade in gunpowder was beyond his control.
Indeed, Stuyvesant knew well of Govert Loockermans’ contraband network well before governor
of New Haven, Theophilus Eaton, complained of Loockermans’ selling of “powder, gunnes and
lead” to the Indians with the intention “to instigate the Indians there against the English.”118
Stuyvesant stood firm, refusing to concede any knowing of Loockermans’ activities he most
certainly knew to be true. Dissatisfied with Stuyvesant’s ploy, Governor Eaton fired back with a
letter that illustrates the remarkable–yet unsettling–underground network Loockermans had
created. The region “concerning this dangerous trade,” Eaton explains, stretches from “att
Aurania fort, at Long Island, within the river of Conneticut, att Narrowgansett, and oth[er places
within the English] jurisdictions.”119 He describes Loockermans’ “crooked and perverse waye,”
on Long Island as well: “with everie Coate hee would give a pownd of powder, which procured
him a quicke markett, and soe furnished the Indians, with powder that they could sell to the
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English.”120 Eaton then goes on to say, “the same Indians further testified, that Govert wisht
them to Cutt of the English, and the Dutch (to such a worke) would furnish them with peices,
powder, and shott enough.”121 Stuyvesant had no answer, but he knew eventually, the English
would.122
Anglo-Dutch relations rippled over the continued trade to their indigenous neighbors,
with traders like van Curler and Loockermans standing at its center. Rumors circulated around
southern New England that the Dutch were conspiring with the Narragansetts against the
English, using the sloops of private traders to discreetly smuggle munitions into the estuaries of
Narragansett Bay.123 Although it was later determined most of the rumors had been intentionally
circulated by Uncas, Loockermans played no small part in giving them added credibility.124 For a
moment, the English thought they had finally caught Loockermans in May 1648, only to realize
they had arrested the wrong Govert. Shortly after his arrest, Govert Aertsen appeared before the
Council in New Amsterdam to request an official document of personal identification that he
may produce before the United Colonies magistrates to prove he was not in fact Govert
Loockermans.125 Aertsen had been spending time in Rhode Island “where he was threatened to
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be put into prison, it being said that he was Loockemans.”126 A Captain Cleroq informed Aertsen
that Loockermans was already well known in the area for selling powder and lead to the Indians,
and regarding the misunderstanding, “they would have confiscated his sloop for that reason had
he been Lookmans.”127 There could be no question Loockermans was causing trouble in all the
wrong places. Stuyvesant knew the English were looking for reasons to oust the Dutch there,
which would surely happen if he allowed Loockermans to continue his illicit business.
Between the slippery dealings of Loockermans, the rumors of a Narragansett attack, and
lately the Dutch confiscation of the St. Beninjo in New Haven, the commissioners of the United
Colonies would tolerate the chaos no longer. In October 1648, Stuyvesant received a scathing
letter concerning “a daingerous Liberty taken by yours to sell guns, powder and shott, and other
Instruments of warr to the Indians.”128 The letter reads heavily with concern towards the trade at
Fort Orange where the Commissioners perceived the Mohawks to becoming more “bould, and
dareing and may proue daingerous to us all.”129 English aggression was temporarily stalled,
however, following the death of John Winthrop Sr. in 1649. Winthrop’s death provided a brief
moment for reconciliation between the English and the Dutch who had become fond of Winthrop
over the years.130 Stuyvesant made the most of the opportunity. In 1650, he met with the
governors of the United Colonies to draft a new boundary line between New Netherland and
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New England. The resultant Hartford Treaty ceded western Long Island to the English, and set a
new boundary line northward from the coastal town of Stamford.131 New Netherland lost a great
deal of territory in the deal, but by biting the bullet and formally recognizing New Haven,
Stuyvesant hoped the English might resolve to respect New Netherland’s boundaries going
forward. As Andrew Lipman has noted, the treaty negotiations failed to address either English
encroachment on the Delaware or the illicit arms trade with the Indians, implying Stuyvesant
likely knew further action would be required to counter English expansion.132
Indeed, the beginning of the First Anglo-Dutch War in Europe gave Stuyvesant reason to
believe the end was near. While the conflict never officially reached North America, it doubtless
influenced the actions of governor Eaton who requested assistance from Cromwell to help
overtake New Netherland.133 Cromwell approved. In late 1653, the Dutch caught wind of an
impending invasion orchestrated by Cromwell’s government, prompting the swift construction of
fortifications in New Amsterdam.134 Fortunately for the Dutch, a prompt peace agreement
between England and the Dutch Republic would force Cromwell to divert the expedition to the
French in Acadia. For a moment it seemed the English threat had fizzled out. Stuyvesant made
the most of the opportunity, redirecting the resources he had compiled to fight the English
towards New Sweden. Worrisome developments had been unfolding along the Delaware River
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as well where the Swedes succeeded in capturing Fort Casimir, indefensible for lack of
gunpowder.135
Increased hostility between New Sweden and New Netherland had been brewing for
some time, particularly over the arms trade. Both the Dutch and Swedes complained of each
other selling gunpowder to the Susquehannocks as part of concerted efforts to ruin each other’s
colonial enterprises. In 1648, New Sweden Governor Johan Printz is noted to have “protested
and complained vociferously” of the operations of Govert Loockermans who had been “highly
suspected here by many people for contraband trade of guns, powder and lead to the Indians.”136
The Dutch were quick to accuse Printz of the same.137 It was the taking of the fort and the
continued disruptions of trade there with the Susquehannocks that encouraged the WIC to
empower Stuyvesant in dealing with it. Conveniently for Stuyvesant, this special attention only
came after the loss of Dutch Brazil in January 1654.138
The Dutch-sponsored Iroquois attacks also drew particular resentment from other native
groups, especially the Susquehannocks. As allies of the Wendats, the Susquehannocks looked
upon the rising Iroquois hegemony with particular disdain. Their alliance with the Wendats as
mutual rivals of the Haudenosaunee caused the Susquehannocks to view “the assault as a direct
attack on themselves.”139 Seneca and Oneida attacks against the Susquehannocks of the Niagara
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River Valley and Ontario peninsula directly between 1652 and 1654 forced the Susquehannocks
to pursue guns, gunpowder, and lead with increased ferocity, but also compelled them to
reconsider their relationship with the Dutch.140 The Dutch conquest of New Sweden in 1655
opened up New Netherland to fierce retaliation by the Susquehannocks for having eliminated
their premier European partner.
Like the Haudenosaunee and Susquehannocks, the Dutch too were in a process of
realignment. Antagonization of Portuguese forces in South America drew attention to Dutch
Brazil. The First Anglo-Dutch War isolated Dutch forces in Brazil, leaving the colony
susceptible to Portuguese invasion.141 The surrender of Brazil back to the Portuguese was a
heavy loss for the WIC, but beneficial for New Netherland. The colony’s new attention came just
in time. In a bold move, New Sweden’s new governor, Johan Rising captured Fort Casimir that
May. When asked why the fort gave in without resistance, Commander Bicker predictably
replied, “there is no powder.”142 By November, Stuyvesant received the permission and
gunpowder from the Directors to seize New Sweden altogether.143 The takeover of the colony in
1655 went smoothly, but carried heavy consequences. It appears the Susquehannocks did not
take kindly to the removal of their premier trading client, and retaliated with a vengeance.144
Stuyvesant and New Sweden governor, Johan Printz had been arguing back and forth
over the continuing trade of guns, gunpowder, and lead to the Indians of the Delaware,
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particularly the Susquehannocks. The Susquehannocks, the dominant group in the area, relied on
gunpowder technology to offset the ascendancy of their Mohawk rivals. With New Sweden often
lacking materials, they turned to the Dutch with the hope of establishing steady trade lines.
Indeed, a letter sent back to Stuyvesant in September of 1648 concluded the Susquehannocks
were “very unhappy that this river is not continually stocked with our goods. The Swede
presently has little merchandise left; consequently, if we had any here, there would be without a
doubt a favorable trade with the Minquas.”145 Loockermans capitalized on the opportunity. Printz
had already been complaining of Loockerman’s trade in the area earlier in the year. Although
Loockermans’ dealings may have been private, Printz interpreted them as actions sanctioned by
Stuyvesant and the WIC. He complained about Stuyvesant’s “arrogant and unneighborly
conduct” regarding Stuyvesant’s having “ordered some beavers from the Indians with the
intention of trading them for some contraband merchandise.”146 Amid the accusations towards
Loockermans as well as the arrests of Jacob Reynsen and Jacob Schermerhoorn, Stuyvesant
summarized the intensifying relations between New Netherland, New Sweden, and New Haven
to the WIC Directors:
“It is known to me and to all your honors that since our arrival here frequent complaints
have been received from our neighbors, the English and Swedes, as well as from our
own subjects, about the altogether too dangerous and prohibited trade in powder, guns
and lead carried on with the natives, whereby our persons, although we protest our
innocence before God, are accused and suspected of conniving at this trade, not only by
our neighbors, the English and Swedes, but also by some of our vassals, and that not
without some semblance of Justification and reason, because the trade is carried on so
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generally, in regard to which the fiscal, who by virtue of his office is most concerned
therein, has become either too lax or blind.”147

Stuyvesant recognized the detrimental effects of a trade he lacked the power to stop.
Maintaining a flow of arms to the Indians had its benefits in diverting trade, but the results
were still concerning. The colonial gunpowder trade grew parallel to rising tensions among
New Netherland’s imperial rivals. Moreover, the problems pertaining to New Sweden were
of less importance than those of an expanding New England. There, the illicit trading with
Indians by merchants like Loockermans only seemed to contribute to the growing
apprehension behind English encroachment into the Dutch colony.
Stuyvesant was in the midst of executing a significant ransom while these laws were
being introduced. On October 17th, 1655, an envoy of fourteen captured “Christians” marched
into Fort Amsterdam. They were sent by the Achkinkeshaky chief, Pennekeck, who “requested
that the honorable director general show his faith by sending powder and lead.”148 With hope the
rest of the prisoners may be turned over, Stuyvesant resolved to send him “two Indian prisoners
captured by our people, although not of his people, as a present and a little powder and lead.”149
Unwilling to assume the subordinate role, Stuyvesant thought it necessary to inform Pennekeck
that prisoners ought to be returned “with the goodness of the heart.” The powder and lead, he
claimed, were not part of the ransom, but intended as a “token of our good faith, and that only so
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that they do their best with the other sachems to gain the release of the other prisoners.”150
Stuyvesant assured more powder and lead would be sent upon the return of the rest of the
prisoners, but only the condition the gunpowder was a gift and not part of a ransom. He tried to
hold his ground in the negotiations, but nevertheless lacked any power in swaying the pendulum
his way. However Stuyvesant worded his decisions would not change the troubling power
dynamics New Netherland shared with the local Indian groups during these years.
Stuyvesant’s strategy was failing. Responding to Dutch inquiries on the prisoners,
Pennekeck demanded an additional 75 pounds of powder and 40 bars of lead for the remaining
28 prisoners.151 Having “seriously considered the hardship of the captured Christians,”
Stuyvesant and his Council conceded to meet the demanded amounts of powder and lead.
Moreover, the “demonstrate to them our sincere intentions,” they opted to send “an additional 35
lbs. of gunpowder and 10 staves of lead over and above the ransom as a gift.”152 Gunpowder
continued to drain out of the company vaults as New Netherland failed to fulfill a dominant role
in Ahnowahraake.

Conclusion
Gunpowder played a crucial role in the cultivation of Indian-European partnerships. In
response to the volatile changes brought about by European settlement, groups like the Mohawks
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and Susquehannocks both coveted European clients. Europeans needed furs, and the Indians
wanted guns. The Susquehannocks in this case, “cultivated Europeans as clients, while some
Europeans cultivated Native Americans as trading partners.”153 Van Zandt correctly applies this
framework to understand the reasons for the Susquehannock onslaught of New Amsterdam, and
takes it further. When viewed collectively, the Mohawk attacks made possible by Dutch
weaponry suggest the Peach War resulted from a long build-up of Susquehannock resentment
toward the Dutch who favored the Mohawks–their on-again-off-again enemies–in trade. Beyond
avenging the end of their Swedish partnership, the Susquehannocks were actively protesting a
Dutch-Iroquois partnership that threatened their continued existence.154
The resulting dynamics of the Peach War are telling of how Indians negotiated their
position with the Dutch around gunpowder. At a time when Stuyvesant’s need for gunpowder
was critical, he found himself forced to give quantities away as ransom for prisoners captured by
Munsee groups during and after the Peach War. One residual attack of six Dutch men hunting at
“Schoorsteenveger’s plantation” resulted in a man’s torso being fully pierced by an arrow. The
thirty unidentified Indians captured four men and as ransom demanded a wealth of goods
including “20 double handfuls of gunpowder.”155 These sort of negative consequences from
private European excursions happened frequently enough by then to call for an ordinance to be
adopted by the Director-General and Council soon after. Not wanting to continue paying
ransoms that incentivized the Indians, the ordinance decried, “no person, of whatever capacity he
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may be, shall henceforward undertake to proceed or to go inland without first having applied for
and obtained the special consent of the director general or their deputy.”156
This was the world Arent van Curler and the Mohawks created. By the 1650s, the
colonial trade in gunpowder had expanded well beyond the means of European control. Private
traders like van Curler willfully traded munitions to the Mohawks, molding in place a specific
medium of intercultural exchange colonial governments were forced to abide by. The Mohawks,
in return, happily absorbed the Dutch into the extended longhouse as brothers both figuratively
and literally through marriage with Mohawk women. “The Mohawk and Munsee women who
entered into these few recognized, permanent relationships and their male kinsmen,” Susanah
Shaw Romney has shown, “sought to access power inherent in the other-than-human quality of
their odd neighbors,” gunpowder surely among them.157 Just as among the Anishinaabeg, the
Mohawks sought marital kinship ties to “solidify diplomatic bonds.”158 Van Curler recognized
the benefits of these cultural exchanges and reaped the rewards. In the 1650s he conceived a
child with a Mohawk woman, and would eventually receive rich Mohawk land in return.159
An intimate relationship with the Mohawks had its benefits. While Stuyvesant abhorred
the illicit munitions trade and the problems it helped create, he nonetheless felt compelled to
maintain an official supply line of gunpowder to the Mohawks for the security of the colony and
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preservation of the fur trade. The subsequent rise of the Mohawks, climaxing with the dispersal
of the Wendats, naturally incurred negative reactions from French, English, Swedish and Native
neighbors. Indeed, the imperial success of the Mohawks and the expansion of Dutch settlement
into Beverwijck marked the furthest extent to which the Dutch-Mohawk partnership would
reach. As we shall see in the next chapter, however, it was all downhill from here.
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CHAPTER THREE

THE RECKONING: THE COLLAPSE OF THE MOHAWK-DUTCH PARTNERSHIP, 16591665

Introduction
Following the “usual ringing of the bell,” churchwardens, Nicasius de Sille and Govert
Loockermans prepared to address the bustling crowd anxiously seeking refuge from the cold
January air.1 As an order of appreciation for the good fortune that had been bestowed upon New
Netherland over the course of 1658, the Director-General and Council proclaimed March 13,
1659 as a day of prayer, and de Sille had been tasked with delivering a speech Stuyvesant had
written himself just for the occasion. As the bustle of an anxious crowd dropped to a whisper, de
Sille spoke, bringing Stuyvesant’s words to life from the page. “Honorable and well beloved,” he
began, “... the good and all merciful God has favoured and blessed this newly rising Province…
with many and innumerable mercies and benefits.”2 Of these blessings, de Sille recounted the
agreeable health of the colony, a newfound peace with the neighboring Indians, and the
“remarkable increase of population and trade.”3 Stuyvesant would soon discover, however, that
his optimism was sorely misplaced.
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Two parallel trajectories emerged in the 1660s: the decline of Mohawk power and the
final descent of New Netherland. After years of warring for captives and beavers in the distant
corners of Ahnowahraake, the Mohawks finally showed signs of slowing down. The rise of the
Mohawks in the 1640s and 50s prompted many of their enemies to begin building arsenals of
their own so that by 1660, the tables had turned. The Susquehannocks had access to guns,
powder, and lead from English in the Chesapeake as well as Dutch and Swedish traders and
knew how to play one power off of another.4 The Mohicans and their eastern allies wasted no
time in acquiring gunpowder weapons either. Aside from the Dutch traders at Fort Orange,
Silverman speculates Indians of the Upper Connecticut River Valley such as the Pocumtucks,
Pennecocks, and Sokokis most likely received guns from John Pynchon’s trade post in
Springfield as well as the French to the north.5 These Indians benefited from connections to New
France as well, with the Western Abenakis acting as gun runners between French traders and
their Algonquian speaking allies in New England.6 By acquiring reliable access to gunpowder,
the Indian rivals of the Mohawks increased in power, putting themselves in a better position to
fend off military attacks and even coordinate their own against Iroquoia and New Netherland.
The Dutch, for their part, worried these campaigns would bring about potentially hazardous
consequences for the colony. Soon enough, retaliatory raids from New England Indians began
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striking the area around Fort Orange.7 Indeed, the Mohawks would eventually recover from the
ordeals of the 1660s. Their Dutch brethren would not.8
New Netherland’s economy continued to give way as the fur trade showed signs of a
crash. Indian wars around the colony and the decline of the Mohawks and Haudenosaunee
slowed the incoming stream of pelts while prices skyrocketed as a result of private Dutch,
English, and French traders. Moreover, New Netherland was once again embroiled in conflicts of
its own when conflict broke out at Esopus again in 1659 and again in 1663, steadily draining the
limited resources that remained in the colony as the WIC stumbled towards bankruptcy. Making
matters worse, the continued encroachment of the English into Oostdorp (Westchester) and Long
Island seemed to confirm the rumors of preparations for an incoming Anglo invasion.9
The Mohawk-Dutch partnership had seemingly run its course, no longer capable of
sustaining the increasing outside pressures of Native American conflicts and European advances.
Dutch attempts to remain neutral in Mohawk affairs grew increasingly ineffective. In the late
1650s, Mohawk requests to Fort Orange officials for diplomatic assistance with the French fell
on deaf ears. La Montagne sent out a small delegation in 1658 to no avail, and subsequent
requests were ignored.10 The French, too, took a position of neutrality rather than assist in
resolving the conflict. As Trelease notes, both the Dutch and French were content to let “their
Indian allies do most of the fighting.”11 Nevertheless, these European strategies of neutrality
7
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rarely produced the desired result, with Dutch, French, and English colonial governments
constantly finding themselves entangled in the contests of their indigenous allies.
Observations of animosity among local Indian groups in addition to incoming attacks by
New England Indians and the Susquehannocks suggest the Dutch may have perceived Mohawk
vulnerability, and consequently, their own.12 For years now the Mohawks had provided a reliable
buffer zone for the Dutch, but their waning power did not bode well for the colony, especially
given the growing resentment neighboring Indian nations and Europeans felt for the Dutch and
their involvement in the Mohawks’ rise in power. Their fates were intertwined. Iroquois
recession during these years combined with Dutch instability made New Netherland particularly
susceptible to an invasion of English and Native forces.
Indeed, 1659 was a year of mutual decline for the Dutch and the Mohawks, their
unsustainable partnership finally showing signs of significant wear from the violent ebb and flow
of Ahnowahraake. In addition to renewed warfare with the Munsees, by 1659 New Netherland
and Rensselaerswijck were both inundated in what one historian has described as a “trinity of
economic plagues:” the continued devaluation of wampum currency, saturation of the beaver
market, and a chaotic and unpredictable fur trade waning in the event of the wars that enveloped
the forests of the province.13 Meanwhile in Iroquoia, the fragile peace between the
Haudenosaunee and New France broke down yet again. Negotiations once again gave way to the
combined pressures of internal strife within in the longhouse, botched rescue missions to recover
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prisoners, and the inability of French Jesuits to abide by the principles of kaswentha.14 Worst of
all, the iron chain binding the Mohawks and Dutch together was eroding away, unsheltered from
the hostile climate of Ahnowahraake as their respective pressures pitched both sides against each
other. After Dutch emissaries failed to assist the Mohawks broker a peace with the French in
1658, silence fell between then, neither side content with the situation at hand, nor how to use the
benefit of their relationship with the other to improve it.
The Mohawks spoke first. In an extraordinary session at Fort Orange that September, a
disgruntled Mohawk delegation aired the grievances against the Dutch to an audience of
important Dutch officials and cultural liaisons including La Montagne, Jeremias van Rensselaer,
and Arent van Curler.15 Several of the Mohawks’ concerns were critical issues. They reminded
the Dutch that they “are brothers and that we are joined together in chains,” but complained the
relationship “lasts only as long as we have beavers.”16 They bemoaned the trade in alcohol, and
asked that no more brandy be sold to their nation on the grounds that “if we drink ourselves
drunk, we cannot fight” the French.17 They also repeated past protests against the violent trading
practices of Dutch boschlopers that continued to harass Mohawk trappers in the woods.18
Like the French, the Dutch too were guilty of violating the terms of kaswentha in recent
years. Citing how the Mohawks took it upon themselves to fight the French, the common enemy
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of their Dutch brethren, they demanded that gunsmiths no longer be permitted to charge Mohawk
gunmen for repairs and “finish their gunstocks at first opportunity.”19 Anything less would be
seen as interfering with Mohawk imperial aims, a clear violation of kaswentha. To this end, the
Mohawks also demanded more gunpowder, and complained that while the French appear to have
enthusiastically distributed firearms to their neighboring First Nation allies, their Dutch brothers
only provided guns at a price. The Mohawks appear to have been feeling the effects of this
change in policy in New France, and demanded both horses and men to repair their palisades and
help assist in recover captives in New France.20 Lastly, as if to tie the iron knot that bound the
Mohawks and Dutch together, the Mohawks reminded the Dutch of their duties as fathers in
Mohawk society, calling upon Dutch widowers of Mohawk women to adhere to the traditional
mourning practice of giving “the relatives of the deceased one or two suits of cloth.”21 This
poignant clause, an indicator of the “increasing interpersonal bonds between the Mohawks and
Dutch settlers, reminded the Dutch their relationship had become more intimate than they might
have liked to believe.22 “You need not present us with any return,” concluded the Mohawks,
effectively challenging the Dutch to deliver on their promises with more than paltry gifts.23
An untimely fever prevented Stuyvesant from personally addressing the Mohawks’
concerns, invoking the need for a special council of leading cultural liaisons to trek into Mohawk
country to make amends. Carrying gifts of wampum and gunpowder, van Curler and Jeremias
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van Rensselaer led the Dutch embassy into the Mohawk castle, Kaghnuwage, ready to renew
their “old friendship and brotherhood.”24 Following the established model of diplomacy dictated
from countless Mohawk orations at past gatherings, the Dutch emissaries wasted little time
before recounting their shared history to their audience that included the three principal sachems
of the Mohawks. Drawing from van Curler’s agreement with the Mohawks in 1643, the
emissaries–likely van Curler himself– reminded their Mohawk brethren “it is now sixteen years
ago that we made our first treaty of friendship and brotherhood between you and all the Dutch,
which we then joined together with an iron chain.”25 The Mohawks, the Dutch assured, had “no
reason to doubt that we shall remain brothers,” and to this end the Dutch bestowed upon the
Mohawks sachems a hefty gift including 75 pounds of gunpowder and 100 pounds of lead.26
Shortly after these gifts “were gratefully accepted by the chiefs and all the bystanders,” however,
celebrations were abruptly cut short by news of trouble in Esopus. The Dutch might have
restored relations with the Mohawks, but they were not out of the woods yet.

Trouble in Paradise
Hostilities between the Dutch and the Esopus Indians dated back as far as 1653.
Encouraged by a new peace between the Five Nations and New France, a new wave of colonists
swarmed into the area. The increased pressure for limited fertile land left the Esopus in a tough
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position, already strained by the Mohawks and Mohicans who frequently called upon them from
tribute, usually in the form of corn.27 As pressure mounted on both sides, Dutch settlers worried
about potential Esopus raids, especially after learning of Esopus involvement in the Peace War.
Meanwhile, the Esopus exhibited little trust in the new settlers, based on their previous
experiences with Fort Orange traders that often left them drunk.28 The tense relations prompted
Stuyvesant to begin constructing a fort there along Rondout Creek that became known as
Wiltwijck (present-day Kingston).29 His journal makes various notes of the construction process
and its deficiency of resources including the lack of gunpowder.30 Thankfully for its inhabitants,
a slender 50 pounds of gunpowder arrived in May of 1659, just enough to ward off the 500 men
siege in September.31 Relations improved slightly in October when a small box of powder was
included in a trade with some Esopus, to which they decided the Dutch were “well-intentioned”
and promised to “come henceforth every day with Indian corn.”32
Under the impression that a permanent peace with the Esopus would be impossible so
long as Indians and colonists continued to share the limited fertile land, the Directors expected
Stuyvesant to drive the Esopus out for good, and implored him to enlist the help of the Mohawks
to do so. Stuyvesant might have agreed, but he feared the repercussions of asking the Mohawks
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to assist in what he perceived would have been an easy task for them. In Stuyvesant’s eyes, the
continued military success of the Mohawks in recent years rendered them an unpredictable ally,
“a self-exulting, arrogant, and bold tribe made too haughty through their continuous victories.”33
Indeed, after repeated successes by the Mohawks against the French themselves and their allies,
Stuyvesant feared a decisive Mohawk victory against the Esopus might reduce the Dutch
position in the partnership, thereby justifying continued taunting from Mohawk warriors, and a
perceived vulnerability from other Indian nations. Stuyvesant desperately needed the help of the
Mohawks, but he wisely perceived the image which the Dutch had made for themselves among
the Mohawks’ many enemies. Stuyvesant knew his colony was vulnerable, and beyond repeated
demands for munitions and soldiers, there was in fact little he could do about it.34
In the interim, Stuyvesant’s directions to Wiltwijck to appease the Esopus with small
gifts of powder did little to improve relations in Esopus.35 Strangely, the officials at Fort Orange
appear to have lost hope of peace with the Esopus, and declined Mohican offers to mediate the
conflict on the grounds that the Esopus sachems were less inclined to meet at Fort Orange
themselves. In frustration, the Mohicans washed their hands of the matter. They warned the
Dutch, “must not be angry with them, if it should happen, that the Esopus savages were to injure
or capture some Dutchmen along the river and near Fort Orange.”36 Nevertheless, Stuyvesant’s
strategy of coercion proved successful–at least temporarily– in forcing the Esopus into a peace
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treaty in 1660. In contrast, Paul Otto has argued the Esopus may have been pushed for peace by
other Indian groups including the Hackensacks, Wappingers, Mohicans, Susquehannocks, and
Catskills; the Mohawks were also involved.37 He explains the Esopus decision to give in as part
of a larger transition of smaller Hudson Valley and Delaware groups who began to willfully–or
reluctantly–accept Dutch presence in the area.38 For Stuyvesant, a lasting peace would provide
the opportunity to act upon encroaching English settlers in the area, but in the end, it would not
last.39
The peace treaty of 1660 failed to address the discrepancies between Dutch settlers and
the Esopus. For one, the forced submission of the Esopus into a peace did little to erase the longstanding animosity Esopus Indians had for their Dutch neighbors. These feelings were amplified
by heavy alcohol consumption, especially during times of stress such as the formation of a
second Dutch settlement at Nieuwdorp (present-day Hurley). Lastly, the Dutch retained many of
their Esopus captives were “employed” with the slaves on Curaçao. Their reasoning was as
follows:
“...to release them, would not only tend to create disregard and contempt of our nation
among neighbors as well as our own subjects, but also the neighboring barbarians and
especially the Esopus savages would glory in it, as if they inspired such great awe to
our people, that we were afraid to rouse their anger and that we had no courage, to treat,
according to their merits and as an example for others, the prisoners, among whom
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there are some, who have dared to murder our people, captured by them, in cool blood
and with unheard cruelty.”40

Even if Stuyvesant had returned the prisoners, it remains possible that violence was unavoidable.
Against the advice of Stuyvesant, settlers branched out from Wiltwijck to establish a new town,
Nieuwdorp in 1662, angering the Esopus.41 War would break out again a year later in a
coordinated attack, adding further damage to the economically crippled colony.
The rapid depopulation of beavers in Iroquoia and recurrent Indian Wars that prevented
the Mohawks from hunting elsewhere forced the fur trade into a steady decline after 1657. As
historian William Cronon has noted, the commodification of beavers and wampum drastically
altered Native American systems of hunting and honor. “Certain things began to have prices
[sic] that had not had them before,” Cronon continues, “one could buy personal prestige by
killing animals and exchanging their skins for wampum or high-status European goods.”42
Indians of the Upper Connecticut River Valley where beaver populations still persisted, for
instance, no longer hunted beavers on the basis of need only.43 Instead, these Indian nations
including the Abenaki, Sokoki, Penacooks, Pocumtucks, and Mohicans benefitted from trapping
as many beavers as possible. Pelts in hand, these Indian trappers could then exchange their skins
in flourishing trade centers such as John Pynchon’s estate in Springfield where Indians of
Southern New England gathered with wampum, while John Pynchon and Haudenosaunee traders
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carried English and Dutch goods.44 Some historians have speculated this decline in trade resulted
from the diversion of trade to Pynchon’s enterprise in the Connecticut River Valley which was
on the rise after local beaver populations in Southern New England withered away.45
The Pynchon family had been successfully diverting the flow of Mohawk and Mohican
pelts from Dutch hands since the 1630s.46 Springfield’s location on the Connecticut River, “upon
the great Indian trail leading from the Narraganset and Pequot country, via the Westfleld river, to
the Mohawk country above Albany [Fort Orange],” allowed John Pynchon to tap directly into
preexisting indigenous trade routes, making his post an ideal stoppage point for Indian caravans
of wampum or beaver pelts.47 Like van Curler, Pynchon also exhibited the qualities necessary to
host cross-cultural encounters, making himself an influential representative of the English in the
forests of Ahnowahraake. Indeed, much as the Mohawks referred to the Dutch as “Corlaer’s
men,” the people of New England were subsequently known by the Mohawks as “Pynchon’s
men.”48 The Mohawks held Pynchon in high regard, and it is no coincidence that when they
delivered the head of Sassacus to the English in 1637, it was directly to Pynchon’s doorstep.49
Pynchon’s business remained a significant threat to the Dutch fur trade, who blamed Pynchon for
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having caused the fur trade to be “much damnified and undervalued not onely to the Inriching
the said Native barbarians but the overthrow of the trade.”50
Despite these supposed successes, the dwindling fur trade in Connecticut drove John
Pynchon to further into New Netherland. In 1659, he formed a new company with the powerful
English merchants William Hawthorne and William Paine designed to develop new fur trade
connections to the west.51 Together, Hawthorne and Pynchon conducted an exploratory survey of
the Hudson Valley, hoping to find a sufficient place of operations for the new venture.
Convening with the town officials at Beverwijck, the two requested permission to establish a
new post near Wappingers’ kill, offering in return the alluring prospect of a new place to obtain
English cattle which Dutch settlers had a particular affinity for.52 Recalling how the Wappinger
Indians aligned themselves with the Esopus, and their particular hostility during and after the
Peach War, Stuyvesant knew potential collusion with Pynchon was not out of the question.53 He
later warned the Directors against allowing Pynchon to establish himself in the Hudson Valley
where he may “cut off our beaver trade, as they had done” in Connecticut.54
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By 1660, the lack of local beavers forced a greater dependence on Dutch munitions as
they expanded into enemy hunting grounds.55 In preparation of a long journey into Canada, a
Seneca caravan stopped at Fort Orange so to stock up on munitions before entering enemy
territory. Citing their obligation to capture beavers for their Dutch brothers, the Seneca pleaded:
“They say, we must work hard to fetch the beavers through the enemy's country, therefore we
ask, that we may obtain much powder and lead, for if the enemies overpower us, where shall we
then catch the beavers.”56 Despite the ability of Haudenosaunee war parties to beat back French
defenses, trapping envoys behind enemy lines were not to be taken lightly.57 French documents
confirm the desperation of the Haudenosaunee, reporting on the Seneca caravan, 600 strong, that
“[carried] their Beaver-skins to the Dutch with great inconvenience and by long and perilous
routes” from beyond Montreal.58 Despite short term success, continued excursions such as these
wrought disastrous consequences for the Haudenosaunee and Dutch. French colonists and their
Indian allies alike sought to put an end to the Dutch-harassment of their people. Resentment
towards the Haudenosaunee-Dutch partnership continued to build.
In addition to the faltering beaver trade, New Netherland’s economy also suffered from
major wampum inflation. Its value decreased by approximately sixty percent between 1641 and
1658, “and more than 200 percent during the following decade.”59 While the WIC took
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precautions to regulate the quality of wampum produced for the purposes of trade, company
officials could not prevent traders such as Pynchon from introducing wampum into New England
markets, where the shell beads were typically undervalued.60 “Apart from trying to keep the rate
equal to that of the English colonies by continual devaluation,” Jacobs writes, “few solutions to
the problem could be found.”61
This posed a significant dilemma for the Dutch, who needed to maintain wampum’s
value at manageable levels if the fur trade was to remain economically viable. Unfortunately for
Europeans, however, no amount of gunpowder or linen possessed the spiritual qualities of
orenda inherent in wampum. Compounding the issue, the seemingly endless warfare of the
Mohawks and other Haudenosaunee created the need for an increased reliance on Condolence
and Adoption ceremonies, facilitating a constant need for new additional wampum, the “conduit
for rebalancing.”62 Needless to say, the continuous inflation of wampum made it increasingly
difficult for Dutch bookkeepers to balance the account books of the official company store and
merchant houses, resulting in money lost for both parties, at a time when economic sustainability
was especially pertinent. Even one historian has gone so far to argue the economic failure of
New Netherland reduced the colony to ruin before the English frigates arrived.63
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As wampum values dropped, beaver pelt prices skyrocketed, drawing great ire among the
Dutch settlers of the Hudson Valley that relied on the fur trade for income.64 The fur trade
appeared to be on the rise in Beverwijck in 1656 and 1657, only to fall into sharp decline by
1659.65 Many colonists blamed their economic misfortunes on the boschlopers, the rugged
private traders of the woods unafraid to undercut established prices or intimidate their clients
through the use of force to secure business deals. Usually contracted out by other merchants,
these “brokers” as they were known, offered a selection of presents to native clients, as a means
of showcasing the goods available for sale at the patron’s residence in Beverwijck. This system
allowed the smaller traders of Beverwijck to better compete with the “principal traders” who
enjoyed a greater degree of trade connections and access to resources which allowed them to
generally offer better prices and acquire most of the business.66 Many of these principal traders
felt the boschlopers’ violence towards the Mohawks and disregard for market values threatened
the fur trade altogether, and in May 1660, petitioned the court of Beverwijck–made up almost
entirely of principal merchants–to outlaw the use of European brokers.67 According to Jacobs,
the court compromised with a resolution that forbid the use of both European and Indian brokers,
but recurrent violations forced an amendment that allowed the use of Indian brokers to
continue.68 Many Dutch traders continued to violate the law on the pretense of chasing after lost
horses or collecting blueberries, but the rift in itself among the inhabitants of Beverwijck, as
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Jacobs notes, demonstrates how the decline of the beaver trade “exerted serious pressure on the
society.”69
While order among the Dutch traders devolved into chaos, indigenous conflicts around
Ahnowahraake continued to impede on the flow of pelts into New Netherland from the outside.70
By April 1664, a frustrated Stuyvesant blamed the poor state of the fur trade, incurring thousands
of guilders in expenses, on the continued “the wars which the Maquaes [Mohawks] and
Sinnekuit [Senecas] wage against the Northern and Canadian [Indians].”71 The looming threat of
English retaliation made Stuyvesant’s calls for peace all the more dire. The United Colonies
magistrates had grown increasingly unapologetic over the continued English encroachment into
New Netherland, and in 1659 incredulously reminded Stuyvesant of the “English territorial
rights” that extended from “Sea to Sea.”72
The English Restoration in 1660 added an additional layer of concern for Stuyvesant.
Without a legitimate charter, Connecticut imperialists seized the opportunity to “encourage
Charles II to define their colony as they did,” a grandiose design that engulfed Rhode Island,
New Haven, Long Island, and all of New Netherland.73 In haste, Winthrop, Jr. quickly set about
planning a visit to London, where he intended to pledge the loyalty of his ‘formerly’ puritan
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colony to the new king. Perhaps aware of Winthrop’s intentions, Stuyvesant asked him to visit
New Amsterdam before he crossed the Atlantic.74
New rumors quickly spread of English settlers negotiating land sales near Wappinger’s
Kill. “Many hounds are the hare’s death,” Stuyvesant warned the Directors, implying the Dutch
colony would soon be overrun without bolstering its settler population considerably.75 “As the
state of affairs in England under the last changes is so uncertain,” Stuyvesant lamented, “it is
undoubtedly to be feared, that they may send some colonists with cattle there overland, to crawl
along in time and finally obtain their end.”76 In resolve, Stuyvesant suggested the WIC go to
such extreme ends as to seek out “homeless Polish, Lithuanian, Prussian, Jutlandish or Flemish
farmers… easily to be found during this Eastern and Northern war.”77 Under the assumption his
employers will succeed in finding new colonists, Stuyvesant lays out his plan for settlement in
the following lines:
We shall on our side endeavor to provide them with cattle and necessary
provisions and other means and in order that these people may not be delayed
upon their arrival here, I hope, if it pleases God to give me life and sufficient
health, to go there during the coming autumn, view the land and buy it from the
savages and at the same time look up an opportunity, to make the settlement
defendable, which with the blessing of God will increase and not only will
promote civilization and bring safety to the yachts and passengers travelling up
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and down the river, but will also cause mistrust and terror among the barbarians
or natives.78

Beneath a thin veil of optimism, Stuyvesant’s plea reveals some of the chronic issues that
plagued Dutch colonial efforts in Ahnowahraake from the beginning. First and foremost, his
emphasis on contracting foreigners highlights the perpetual problem for the Dutch West India
Company of populating their colonies with native Dutch people. Domestically, the United
Provinces remained blissfully absorbed in the Dutch Golden Age by the mid-seventeenth
century, including a favorable economic prosperity that left Dutch people little reason to risk
everything by migrating to the New World.79 Stuyvesant rightly understood, that although
unlikely, the WIC had a better chance in recruiting refugees from the wars that continued to tear
through Northern and Eastern Europe.
This inability to implant dense settlements in the heart of Ahnowahraake directly
contributed to the colony’s downfall in a number of ways. Unlike the English, New Netherland
and Rensselaerswijck never attained the same level of settlement growth, producing a strong
enough polity that could hold its own under the constant pressures of Native American
geopolitics. Instead, the small settlements that dotted the Hudson, Connecticut, and Delaware
river valleys quickly fused with the local Indian peoples, producing fragile economic and
political unity out of which Dutch-Native partnerships became the basis for survival. Moreover,
as was the case with the Mohawks, the Dutch sometimes entered into these relationships in
subordinate roles, leaving themselves ultimately tied to strengths of their native partners. In this
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sense then, the Mohawks were the best Native American ally the Dutch could have had, but it
was also this connection that led to their downfall.
Despite the tattered state of affairs in New Netherland and Rensselaerswijck, Arent van
Curler’s relationship with the Mohawks continued to bear fruit. In April 1661, van Curler–
accompanied by three Mohawk sachems–journeyed down to New Amsterdam where he would
finalize his purchase of Mohawk land that would ultimately become the town of Schenectady.80
The plans contradicted Stuyvesant’s attempts to consolidate Dutch settlements, but the expansion
solved the problems of both the Mohawks and the Dutch of Rensselaerswijck. Rensselaerswijck,
while small, had steadily become overcrowded over the years resulting in an overabundance of
settlers sharing a pitiful swath of land that was not necessarily fertile.81 The Mohawks openly
encouraged van Curler’s plans, drawing Dutch trade connections further into Iroquoia off the
treacherous paths often stalked by enemy Indians.82 Stuyvesant remained apprehensive, but knew
the new settlement could help address the need for produce in New Netherland and
Rensselaerswijck while also drawing the fur trade further away from the English.83 Stuyvesant
worried, too, that van Curler’s connections might draw the center of the fur trade away from
Beverwijck and further cripple the colony.84 With the English shadow steadily sprawling over
New Netherland, however, the ill effects of the new settlement might as well have been mute.
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The tip of that shadow emerged as the sails of John Winthrop Jr.’s ship pierced the
horizon of New Amsterdam’s harbor in July 1661. Stuyvesant did his best to conceal the chaos,
and made sure to welcome Winthrop as a respected head of state, saluting the arrival of
Winthrop’s ship with a 25-pound discharge of powder.85 Stuyvesant respected Winthrop as a
friend, but approached their planned meeting with caution. With rumors of a new Anglo-Dutch
war in the air, Stuyvesant calculated his actions carefully.86 He knew inviting Winthrop to New
Amsterdam, allowing his English rival two weeks time to take invaluable notes on the city’s
fortifications and stores, was a risk.87 He also knew Winthrop intended to meet with Charles II in
order to legitimize Connecticut’s territorial claims. By inviting Winthrop, Stuyvesant hoped to
confide in Winthrop that he might see the Hartford Treaty ratified by the new king, ending
officially the threat of an English takeover for good.88 Only time would tell if Stuyvesant’s plea
worked, but as Lou Roper has shown, Winthrop had no intention of fulfilling Stuyvesant’s
wishes.89 With Connecticut unable to expand anywhere but west, Stuyvesant knew New
Netherland could not possibly figure into Winthrop’s greater designs. As Winthrop’s ship
embarked for England, another 25-pound charge sent him off. Stuyvesant later had the gunner
record the discharge in a logbook. From that moment on, every documentable use of gunpowder
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in the colony would be recorded for the inevitable day when Stuyvesant would have to defend
himself for his actions in the eventual surrender of the colony.90

Iroquoia in Recoil
The Mohawks had problems of their own. By the 1660s, the Haudenosaunee longhouse
had begun to crumble under the pressure of the shifting power dynamics over the last several
years, pitting the Mohawks against the Onondagas and Senecas at points, as these nations
developed their own ideas of how to renew themselves in a rapidly changing world. Externally,
the Mohawk imperial expansion seemingly reached its peak, no longer possessing the distinct
upper-hand in firearms as they had previously. Indeed, the arming of the indigenous enemies of
the Haudenosaunee by English and French agents left the Haudenosaunee in a state of recoil. As
the walls of the longhouse began to crack, the Dutch worst fears quickly became reality.
The rise of the Susquehannocks posed significant challenges for the Haudenosaunee. In
the 1650s, the Susquehannocks suffered at both Dutch and Iroquois hands as the Dutch
conquered New Sweden and the western Iroquois nations conducted military raids into
Susquehanna and the Chesapeake. As an Iroquoian people, the Susquehannocks lived under the
constant threat of Haudenosaunee captivity raids. The Dutch conquest of New Sweden removed
an integral piece in the Susquehannock’s support system, creating the need to find new suppliers
of guns, powder, and shot.91 Fortunately for them, as David Silverman has pointed out, “a
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changing political landscape encouraged rapprochement between the Susquehannocks and
Maryland.”92 Given the superior strength of the Susquehannocks, “Maryland had concluded that
it was more politic and profitable to seek alliance with the Susquehannocks through the arms
trade than to continue trying to resist them.”93 The Susquehannocks made the most of their new
Atlantic connection, bolstering their defenses with munitions, cannons, and in at least one fort,
fifty English soldiers that could tutor Susquehannock warriors in the art of siege warfare.94
Accordingly, this newfound strength so emboldened the Susquehannocks were conducting
military expeditions deeper into Iroquoia.95 Indeed, by the 1660s the Haudenosaunee became
increasingly fearful of Susquehannock war parties to the point Iroquois caravans to Fort Orange
numbered as many as 600 strong.96
Disagreement among the Five Nations over how to address the ascendance of the
Susquehannocks temporarily split the longhouse in two. The Senecas wanted to continue fighting
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the Susquehannocks while maintaining peace with New France.97 Having enjoyed peaceful
relations with the Susquehannocks in recent years however, the Mohawks desired the opposite
and refused to give on the matter despite pleas for help from the Senecas, Cayugas, and
Onondagas faced with the growing threat of Susquehannock raids into western Iroquoia.98 The
refusal of the Mohawks to break their peace with the Susquehannocks nearly brought the Five
Nations into a civil war. Although tensions never came to blows, the threat of a split in the
longhouse was great enough for a moment to warrant Mohawk requests for Dutch cannons and
horses to strengthen their forts along with an expedition to the Mohicans to “renew the old
friendship.”99 Scant documentary evidence leaves relations between the Senecas and Mohawks
relatively ambiguous in these years, but by 1660 Dutch records suggest that both sides remained
on edge. In July 1660, Stuyvesant granted the Senecas’ request for gunpowder on the condition
they “make and keep peace with the Macquaas [Mohawks]” and only “use it against their
enemies, where they have to bring the beavers from.”100It remains unclear when the Mohawks
made peace with the Senecas, but their efforts to mediate conflict between the Seneca and
Susquehannocks were less successful.101 For the time being, the Mohawks could only hope for
the best. Another deadly bout with smallpox between 1660 and 1662 again created the need for
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captives.102 Maintaining peaceful relations with the Susquehannocks allowed the Mohawks to
focus on adoption raids to the north and east.
Faced with the need for captives, pelts, and wampum, the Mohawks tore eastward
through Ahnowahraake, stretching as far as Maine and Nova Scotia.103 The dispersal of the
remaining Iroquoian peoples in Canada and peace with the Susquehannocks left the Mohawks
with little choice but to begin adopting Algonquian peoples. The Abenaki appear to have been a
favored target. They had been sporadically assisting the Canadian Indians in battles against the
Mohawks since the sixteenth century. More recently, the Mohawks detested the Abenaki for
acting as middlemen between the French and their enemies in the Connecticut River Valley
including the Mohicans and Sokokis.104 Both Dutch and English officials tried to curb Mohawk
aggression to no avail. The Europeans reportedly succeeded in drawing a peace agreement
between the Mohawks and “Northern Indians” in the Spring of 1661, but the Abenaki might not
have supported the terms.105 Shortly thereafter, Abenaki on the Kennebec slaughtered an armed
party of Mohawks coming to collect tribute. The Abenaki tortured and killed twenty-nine,
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leaving one half-scalped survivor with orders to “tell his country men that like ignominy was in
store for them if they undertook a similar act of molestation.”106
The Mohawks returned with a vengeance. In March 1662, a fourteen year old Abenaki
refugee reported to the Jesuits that a Mohawk war party of 200 men had set out on a rampage
into Abenaki territory, “resolved to return only at the end of two years, after having roamed over
the entire land.”107 The next month the Mohawks defeated a band of Abenaki on the Kennebec
River to avenge the deaths of their kin.108 Weeks later, the same Mohawks ambushed close to
one hundred unsuspecting Abenaki coming to trade along, taking close to eighty captive.109
Prisoners and booty secured, the Mohawks turned to the horrified English settlers cowering in
the fort. The sachems reportedly desired to form an alliance with the English there, but no sooner
did the English provide gifts then the Mohawks killed ten of their cattle and ransacked the
trading house.110 By the time the Mohawks reached Nova Scotia the English had had enough.
While the exasperated governors of Nova Scotia and Massachusetts Bay furiously penned off
letters to Stuyvesant, other representatives met with Mohawk headman to discuss reparations.
The Mohawks, restating their sole interests in fighting the Northern Indians, rebuffed the
charges, unconcerned that the English possessed the power to stop them.111 For Stuyvesant,
however, the writing was on the wall. Governor Sir Thomas Temple’s words echoed through the
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empty powder kegs: “[if] matters remain as they are, then we are sure, the Maquaes [Mohawks]
will be shortly attacked by the English neighbors and the savages.”112
The consequences of hostility towards the French became increasingly more pronounced
for the Mohawks. Frequent raids against French indigenous allies eroded French reluctance
against arming the local First Nations to the point that by 1662, French gun merchants finally
designed their own flintlock model to comparable in portability to Dutch designs. Supplying the
local natives with guns strengthened the buffer zone between the Iroquois and French, but also
meant First Nations could better defend themselves. The Mohawks would discover this the hard
way when a joint military expedition with Oneida warriors succumbed to Ojibwa gunmen along
Lake Superior, killing most of their party.113 On the part of the French and English, increased
imperial involvement directly threatened Iroquois power and spatial mobility. The dissemination
of firearms to French and English indigenous allies levelled the battlefield. “Without the
advantage in firearms,” Silverman writes, “the Iroquois no longer enjoyed the lopsided victories
they had come to expect and that were their measure of a successful campaign.”114 As we shall
see, these circumstances only got worse when the French Crown seized control of the colony the
following year.115
The recent defeats pushing the Mohawks to the brink of collapse incurred significant
consequences for the colonial economy and security of the Dutch. The increasing vulnerability of
the Mohawks, exacerbated by recent defeats in New England and Anishinaabe, left the door open
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for retaliatory Indian-European attacks that could prove fatal for colonists or worse engulf the
colony whole.116 Moreover, without the strength of the Mohawks, the Dutch all of a sudden lost
their chief bargaining chip with the Munsees at moment when the waters of the Esopus were
once again percolating with tension.117 Meanwhile, with the WIC on the verge of bankruptcy
across the Atlantic, the economy of New Netherland rested almost entirely on the fur trade, the
economic lifeline that depended directly on Mohawk and Haudenosaunee power and influence.
These were, as Trelease accurately described, the “perils of coexistence.”118

The Fall
Shortly after sunset on February 5th, a powerful earthquake struck near Quebec, the
tremor and its aftershocks jolting Ahnowahraake for several days. Strong reverberations
channeled through St. Lawrence basin and as far as Boston and New Amsterdam. causing
landslides and levelling buildings in its wake. New France bore the worst of it: “Mountains were
swallowed up; Forests were changed into great Lakes; Rivers disappeared; Rocks were split, and
their fragments hurled to the very tops of the tallest trees.”119 Modern studies suggest magnitude
levels wavered between 7 and 8 on the Richter Scale.120 “All the elements,” wrote one witness,
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“seemed armed against us, and threatened us with the direst disaster.”121 In New Netherland, the
ground quivered from Beverwijck to Manhattan. Undoubtedly relieved to have escaped disaster,
Jeremias van Rensselaer commented, “we had an earthquake which was very strong further
inland and did a lot of damage to the houses of the French.”122 However fortuitous Dutch
colonists perceived themselves was soon to be forgotten. The “year of many disasters” was only
just beginning, and the Dutch would soon find themselves overwhelmed in a whirlwind of
calamity, so catastrophic that only God could have caused such destruction.123 God’s wrath, it
turns out, “was kindled against New Netherland.”124
The worst was yet to come. Early into the spring, extraordinary flooding caused by
melting freshets upstream inundated the corn fields. At the time, Jeremias van Rensselaer could
not yet estimate the potential damage done to that year’s harvest, but later events paint a dark
picture.125 For the Esopus, the timing of the floods could not have been worse, as they continued
to find themselves pushed farther and farther away from fertile lands by incoming waves of
Dutch settlers, while their remaining corn mounds frequently fell victim to Dutch livestock.126
Meanwhile, tensions continued to brew over the illicit alcohol trade, sporadically inciting
violence between natives and settlers, especially after news had been received that many Esopus
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prisoners from the last war had been sold into slavery at Curaçao.127 It is also possible the
Mohawks called upon the Esopus for tribute in the form of wampum or even captives. The
Esopus fell under increased pressure to preserve their independence in the face of both increased
Dutch settlement and the Mohawk want of tribute, and eventually caved.
On June 7, an armed band of Esopus warriors descended upon the unsuspecting Dutch
settlers at Wiltwijck and Nieuwdorp. “They took a good time to strike,” as most of the men were
out in the fields, isolated and unarmed.128 In the blink of an eye, the Indians reduced the
settlement to ruin, killing many of the men, burning the houses, some of which sheltering women
and children, and plundering whatever goods they could find including ammunition and clothing.
In total, officials counted 65 settlers to be either dead or captured. Those taken captive included
one man, Jan Gerritsen, and at least eight women, and twenty-six children.129 Only a fortunate
shift in the wind kept the entire town from burning to the ground. The massacre initiated a new
war the Dutch were ill-prepared to fight, especially with the Mohawks “hard pressed and
surrounded by their enemies.”130 While the Esopus warriors made off with prisoners and booty,
the Dutch survivors huddled inside the fort, waiting for Stuyvesant and reinforcements.131
While the Dutch continued to recover from the destruction of the Esopus Wars, both
England and France made concerted efforts to restructure and strengthen their respective claims
in Ahnowahraake by 1663. The new regime of Charles II bent under the pressure of Winthrop,
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Jr., other influential merchants, and even the Duke of York to sponsor a recalibration of English
America that included the ratification of previously illegitimate charters and the go-ahead to oust
the Dutch colony.132 Meanwhile across the English Channel, King Louis XIV of France
proceeded to overhaul the colonial government of New France. After assuming control of the
colony, Louis XIV relegated its operations to Jean-Baptiste Colbert, one his ministers and “the
most powerful man in France.”133 Colbert envisioned a new role for New France in a burgeoning
French Atlantic world. Moreover, Colbert had the power and resources to address the various
local problems of the colony, the highest being the Mohawks.134 Colbert drafted plans for an
army of 1,000 French soldiers to be sent to New France to address the problem of the Iroquois,
but it would take additional years to put the “massive campaign in motion.”135
By extension, the administrative changes in New England and New France empowered
their respective Native allies, allowing the enemies of the Mohawks to blockade pathways to
hunting grounds to the point that “the trade ceases so abruptly that one hardly sees an Indian …
because the path is not safe for the Indians.”136 The timing could not have been worse, given the
current strain that wars with the Esopus and the exhaustive campaigns of the Mohawks put on
Dutch gunpowder stores. The turbulence of Native American conflicts in Ahnowahraake
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rendered the Dutch woefully ill-prepared for an invasion. While their enemies prepared for a
massive offensive, both the Dutch and Mohawks were at a point of recoil.
The threat of an English invasion was quickly becoming a reality.137 The governors of the
United Colonies had been complaining of the Dutch contraband trade for years. As early as
1628, Bradford lamented over the empowerment of local Indians by the trade of “peeces,
powder, and shote, which no laws can restraine, by reasons of ye bassnes of sundry unworthy
persons, both English, Dutch & French.”138 Evidenced from letters to Stuyvesant from English
governors in the Chesapeake and New England, complaints of the trade continued through the
1650s.139 In September 1663, Stuyvesant received his latest complaint from Colonel Temple on
Nova Scotia, bemoaning of the most recent developments in the war between the Mohawks and
the Sokokis. Saheda defended the actions of the Mohawks, recalling to the Fort Orange officials
that he had warned Temple to “not trouble himself between them [the Mohawks] and the
Northern Indians.”140 In the face of Temple’s request for peace, the Mohawks showed no signs
of backing down. Moreover, Temple’s letter contained an alarming new development for the
Mohawks and Dutch. The English were no longer fearful of attacking the Mohawks
themselves.141 As English encroachment into Oostdorp and Newesingh increased in the 1660s, so
too did threats of violence.142
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Convening at Hartford in October, the Dutch representatives reminded the English once
again of the oft-ignored boundaries set by the Hartford Treaty, but their pleas fell on deaf ears.
Winthrop, Jr. confided in his guests that Connecticut’s patent honored New Netherland’s
boundaries, but his plan had already been set in place. Always an adept negotiator, Winthrop
willfully leveraged his inside knowledge of New England’s government in order to procure a
royal charter for Connecticut. For the invaluable intel on the United Colonies, Charles II awarded
Winthrop with a blank map, allowing Winthrop near free rein to decide Connecticut’s western
borders as he pleased. Stuyvesant continued to hope that a pan-Indian peace might allow him to
refocus his efforts on negotiations with the English. Reading between the lines of Mohawk bullet
holes, however, the writing was on the wall.143
With Temple’s threats in the back of his mind, Stuyvesant seized the opportunity
following a sound victory against the Munsees, to call for a general peace in October 1663. More
rooms had been circulating of a pan-Indian invasion among some of Algonquian nations, and
Stuyvesant worried the colony might be on its last leg.144 Enclosed with his instructions to
Lieutenant Couwenhoven on the exchange of prisoners with the Munsees, Stuyvesant informed
Couwenhoven of intentions to go to Fort Orange “before the winter and speak with the Maquaas
[Mohawks], to see whether peace can be made between them, the Mahicanders [Mohicans] and
the Northern Indians, so that each tribe may go quietly hunting beavers.”145 The Mohicans, with
a heavy emphasis on their sachem, Aepjen, had remained faithful to the Dutch cause to find
peace with the Esopus, but new evidence had been mounting of a potential Mohican-English
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alliance, and worse, of their renewed involvement in the wars between the Mohawks and the
Sokokis. Shortly after receiving Stuyvesant’s orders to arrange peace negotiations, La Montagne
caught wind of a joint Mohawk-Seneca expedition travelling to fight the Sokokis, that had taken
a circuitous route above Cohoes Falls to avoid detection by the Dutch or Mohicans.146 La
Montagne’s return letter dashed any hope of Stuyvesant’s of negotiating a general peace. The
Mohicans, La Montagne reported, had abruptly abandoned “their land and their corn.”147 Of the
other Indians around Fort Orange, La Montagne observed “a strange and unheard of disposition,”
as if the worst was yet to come.
1663 ended in the same rough fashion in which it began. That December, the Mohawks
suffered another major defeat to the Sokokis at Fort Hill.148 Before leaving, the war party
stopped at Fort Orange, likely for munitions, where they told La Montagne the planned
expedition was a response to a previous defeat that left a number of Mohawks and Senecas dead.
Evidently, the Mohawks had accepted a peace offering from the Sokoki without consulting the
Senecas and Onondagas. When the latter pressed the Mohawks to renew hostilities, the
Mohawks stepped back, reluctant “to storm their castle, for it is strong and cannot be taken by
us.”149 Ultimately, however, the Mohawks were finally persuaded to join, and they would lose
the most men in the fight. Sokoki gunmen successfully warded off an early onslaught of
146
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Mohawk, Seneca and Onondaga warriors. In desperation, the attackers furnished an improvised
explosive from a sack of gunpowder that they ignited and hurled over the palisades. The Sokoki
defenders quickly extinguished the flames. Utterly defeated the Iroquois withdrew, wounded,
captive-less, and at least 100 men short.150
The truth was hard to bear, but the Mohawks and their allies no longer held an advantage
in firepower.151 Moreover, the Mohawks must have been especially frustrated, having lost the
most men in a conflict they tried to avoid. Stuyvesant knew the defeat was cause for concern. He
prayed that Fort Orange might “remain unmolested,” by retaliating war parties and realized
neutrality in the indigenous conflicts was no longer an option. “We can expect only little trade,
as long as this war between the natives lasts” Stuyvesant concluded, “it would be therefore best
to pacify them by intervention.”152
In May of 1664, a general peace was made with the involvement of most of the Hudson
Valley groups as well as the Mohawks, Mohicans, Hackensacks, and Marsepinghs of Long
Island.153 The majority of the local Indian groups could no longer afford to protest Dutch
colonization as they had become entrenched in the European colonial economy by 1664. Their
connections to these markets via Dutch traders were too vital to risk.154
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Weakened by disease and short of ammunition, the Mohawks too, begrudgingly settled
for peace with the New England Indians. In May 1664, a Mohawk delegation accompanied by a
few Mohicans and two Dutchmen, doubtless eager to see the fur trade resume, journeyed to the
Pocumtucks with presents and good will. Until the most recent war with the Sokokis, the
Pocumtucks had long been allies of the Mohawks, mostly as middlemen in the wampum trade
with the Narragansetts.155 Relations appeared to be restored, but ended abruptly a month later
when the Pocumtucks murdered a visiting Mohawk delegation in cold blood, a telling moment
that reveals the change in stature of the Mohawks. Among the dead, Jeremias van Rensselaer
reported, was Saheda, “much beloved by us and the Indians on account of his knowledge.”156
Some historians have suggested the Mohicans might have been complicit in the killings, based
on the ensuing escalation in hostilities between them and the Mohawks.157
Rumors had already been circulating that the Mohicans and English had joined forces.
Following Saheda’s death, Jeremias van Rensselaer reported the Mohicans had not only sided
with the Northern Indians, but had become increasingly aggressive and attacked his farm.158 The
Mohicans worked alongside the Abenakis to blockade the Mohawks from reaching eastern
hunting grounds. With the help of English guns, the Algonquians “render[ed] the roads very
dangerous,” further suppressing the struggling fur trade.159
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An intriguing report by van Couwenhoven in March 1664 detailed possibilities of
collusion between Wappinger Indians and the English of Connecticut–almost certainly Pynchon–
who allegedly promised the Wappingers land in Esopus should they help kill the Dutch.160 When
confronted by Dutch authorities, Wappinger emissaries denied the charges, citing their distrust of
the English and want of friendship with the Dutch. As the Dutch knew however, the Wappingers
were allies of the Esopus and remained on the fence through most of the Esopus Wars.161 With
English encroachment continuing on Long Island and elsewhere, and rumors of a new patent
looming, Stuyvesant continued to lament to the Directors on their failure to secure the royal
ratification of the Treaty of Hartford.162
The Dutch imperial presence as a whole in the Atlantic had been in decline for several
years and New Netherland felt every blow. The West India Company failed to recover from the
substantial loss of investment return following the loss of Dutch Brazil in 1654 and many
speculated the internal structure of the company would eventually lead to financial ruin.163 The
WIC never attained the level of profit sustained by the VOC and consequently did not receive the
luxury of state support the VOC regularly received as a “commercial enterprise and war
maker.”164 The lack of influence over the States General left the WIC constantly wanting of
resources that could be redirected abroad, rather than on the continent. The power vacuum left by
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the Spanish de-occupation of the Low Countries left the States General in a tense standoff with
Louis XIV, who appeared to have his eyes set on the claiming the region for himself. With the
need for soldiers and munitions in the Dutch Republic, it became increasingly difficult for the
WIC to send the necessary troops and munitions to New Netherland, a colony of little
significance at this point in grander Dutch imperial designs.165 The WIC simply could not meet
Stuyvesant’s perpetual demands for munitions and soldiers. Only two company ships carrying
munitions–with roughly 800 pounds of gunpowder between them–docked in New Amsterdam in
1664 when an English invasion was almost guaranteed.166
By the 1660s, the Dutch had grown numb to the arms trade that they initially sought to
prevent in earlier years. After Stuyvesant’s failed attempts to halt the illicit arms trade upon his
arrival in 1647, the courts hardly regulated the trade other than to repost previous ordinances.167
Indeed, in the court proceedings in which the West India Company shamelessly chastised
Stuyvesant for surrendering the colony, the company officials evidenced the open knowledge
that gunpowder had become the most important good of the fur trade, with private merchants
taking care to thoroughly provision themselves for the annual trading season.168 Many of these
merchants sold guns, powder, and lead indiscriminately to Indians regardless of whether or not
the they were allies or enemies of the colony. During the final war with the Esopus, the enemy
Indians were free to arm themselves from the flea market of sloops floating on the Hudson.169
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The Mohawks took advantage of this freelance trade as well, as one Dutch observer noted when
he observed two Mohawks paddling down the Hudson with an estimated 300 pounds of
gunpowder and 400 pounds of lead.170 Moreover, although most of the presents given at
diplomatic meetings usually consisted of gunpowder and lead, by the 1660s, the Dutch appear to
have been designing firearms specifically for their native partners. As Silverman has pointed out,
Indian guns took on a lighter design than the European equivalent, clearly adjusted for the longdistance transportation that necessitated Iroquois warfare and hunting.171 The thought that the
Dutch embraced the Indian demands is rather unsettling when the effects of the trade on the
colony’s downfall are considered.
New Netherland fell in two different worlds simultaneously. Rumors circulated of
English and Indian collusion directed at both the Mohawks and Dutch. While the inhabitants of
New Amsterdam braced for the incoming English fleet, the Dutch settlers in Beverwijck and
Rensselaerswijck feared an Indian massacre. Evidence suggests the English were instigating
animosity between the Mohicans and the Dutch and Mohawks, but an attack from the north was
not out of the question either.172 “Everything is very [uncertain] here,” wrote van Rensselaer,
“and we do not know which side [misfortune] will strike us, nor what is hanging above our
heads.”173 In desperation, the colonists beckoned Stuyvesant for help, who wasted no time in
getting to Fort Orange to investigate matters himself.174
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No sooner did Stuyvesant reach Fort Orange than the sails of four English frigates
appeared over the horizon of present-day New York harbor. Under the command of Sir Richard
Nicolls, the fleet “disembarked their soldiers about two miles off at Gravesend,” and weighed
anchor in Nyack, guns trained on Fort Amsterdam.175 To the south, the English settlers of Long
Island, some of whom having lived under Dutch jurisdiction for years, began forming ranks. To
the east, Englishmen on foot and horseback were arriving by the day, “hotly bent on plundering
the place.”176 To top it off, their forces included a concourse of “600 Northern Indians and 150
French privateers.”177 In haste, Stuyvesant quickly made his way back to New Amsterdam
whereupon he had a letter penned off to Nicolls to inquire upon his business. Nicolls’ reply came
the next morning. Stuyvesant would either surrender the fort and colony to the English or face
“the mysteries of the war.”178 Despite the tendency of historians to mistake Stuyvesant’s
stubbornness for foolishness, Stuyvesant knew resistance was out of the question. With a
shortage of men, defenses in disrepair, and only “a slender supply of powder either in the fort or
in the town,” the Dutch stood no chance against an multinational force that surrounded the fort
on all sides.179
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The English had conquered a shell of a colony, a shattered mosaic of imperialists’ dreams
and economic promises that gave way to the intense geopolitical environment that made
Ahnowahraake so difficult to survive in. Stuyvesant’s signature on the capitulation papers may
have surrendered New Netherland to the English, but it was to the constrictive entanglements of
Native America to which New Netherland fell. Historians have often glossed over the English
takeover of New Netherland as a quick affair and an inevitable product of English expansion.180
Instead, we uncover the saga of a desperate colony on the fringe of a declining imperial network,
poorly provided and unable to escape the torrents of Native American warfare. Stuyvesant’s
signature, transferred a power to the English, that was never his to give.181
In late September, a Haudenosaunee embassy led by Canaqueese met with Nicolls and
George Cartwright at Fort Orange (now Fort Albany) to discuss the regime change. In exchange
for favorable trade options comparable to those enjoyed by the Dutch and “kaswentha demands
for the Iroquois right of free trade and for English noninterference in their war with the
Pocumtucks and Abenakis,” the Iroquois pledged mutual-assistance to future English designs as
well as intel of England’s newfound territory.182 As many of the Dutch traders, including van
Curler continued to live in the area, Canaqueese and Mohawks for the time being continued to
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enjoy their longstanding connection to the world arms market that would propel Mohawk war
expeditions across the Great Lakes in the subsequent years.183 Formalities aside though, it took
time for the relations between the Mohawks and English to smooth over. Demonstrated by
Mohawk demands for future noninterference in their wars with the New England Indians, the
Mohawks had not forgotten that it was the English that empowered their enemies, and many still
held the English responsible for Saheda’s death.184 In some ways, the official transfer of power
had little effect on the affairs of the Mohawks. From their perspective, Richter concluded,
“things proceeded largely as they had during the final unpleasant years of New Netherland.”185

Conclusion
In October 1665, Stuyvesant–now back in the Dutch Republic–appeared before the States
General to defend his actions in the surrender of New Netherland to the English. The WIC, in
dire need of support from the States General, needed a scapegoat.186 Stuyvesant, as shown by the
evidence he personally compiled for his report, was determined not to let it be him.His account,
the “Report of the Honble Peter Stuyvesant, Late Director-General of New Netherland, on the
Causes Which Led to the Surrender of that Colony to the English,” illustrates in vivid detail his
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point of view of the colony’s demise.187 One by one, he listed the reasons that compelled him to
surrender. First and foremost, Stuyvesant rightly reminded the States General of the
overwhelming English presence to the east “who numbered fully 50 to our one, continually
encroaching on lands within established bounds,” further allowed by the “default of the
Boundary so repeatedly requested.”188 Second, he recalled the “exceedingly detrimental, land
destroying and people-expelling wars” of the Indians that so reduced the state of the colony that
upon arrival, Stuyvesant found Fort Amsterdam “resembling more a mole-hill than a fortress,
without gates, the walls and bastions trodden under foot by men and cattle.”189 Third, that the
inhabitants of New Netherland lacked “a suitable garrison, as necessity demanded, against the
deplorable and tragical massacre by the Barbarians, whereby we plunged three times into
perilous wars.”190 Lastly, “powder and provisions failing… we were necessitated to come to
terms with the enemy, not through treachery or cowardice… but in consequence of an absolute
impossibility to defend the fort, much less the city of New Amsterdam, and still less the
country.”191 With regard to this final point, Stuyvesant estimated the company store in
gunpowder to be less than 2,000 pounds, and less than 600 pounds of that usable, “the remainder
old and damaged.”192

187

DRCHNY 2: 365-371.

188

Supported by various references to the Hartford Treaty and the need for its ratification; DRCHNY 2: 365, 384401 (relevant appendices).
189

DRCHNY 2: 365.

190

DRCHNY 2: 365-366.

191

DRCHNY 2: 366.

192

DRCHNY 2: 366, For a complete log of the company gunpowder store from May 1661 to the surrender in
August 1664, see DRCHNY 2: 460-470.

146

Notwithstanding the lucidity with which Stuyvesant paints a long history of neglect in
this account, there are important pieces missing.193 As we have seen in this chapter, the Dutch
and the Mohawks suffered their seemingly disparate declines together, their fates permanently
intertwined after years of symbiotic relations both sides benefited from. Stuyvesant’s defense–
and his employers’ incredulous response to it–narrate a more complicated arch, yielding to
another world beyond the trees surrounding New Amsterdam on all sides. New Amsterdam
might have fallen to the English, but Ahnowahraake claimed Fort Orange and Rensselaerswijck,
where private traders like van Curler always kept sufficient supplies of gunpowder in-store for
their Mohawk clients.194 How much gunpowder remained in these stores in August of 1664 is
tough to say. The WIC Directors chastised Stuyvesant for his failure to make use of it, but
various supplementary depositions suggest the Directors were misinformed.195 Even then, if the
Dutch traders of Beverwijck and Rensselaerswijck did have sufficient quantities of power, the
long history of the Mohawk-Dutch partnership suggests the Mohawks were in fact the ones who
controlled its use.
This was the half that has never been told. New Netherland might have fallen to the
English in 1664, but it was its ties to Ahnowahraake, and the imperial ambitions of the
Mohawks, that contributed to its ruin most. It was the rise of the Mohawks, not Dutch farmers,
that drew the particular ire of English, French, and Swedish colonists. It was the Mohawks who
transformed themselves with Dutch gunpowder, overtaking broad swaths of Ahnowahraake as
they sought to expand their influence and survive in a world that changed shape with every
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epidemic and every war. It was with Dutch gunpowder, that Mohawk gunmen made explosive,
everlasting impacts across eastern North America. All the while what little gunpowder left in the
company stores in Fort Amsterdam and Fort Orange, sat unused until it was useless. No matter
how many firearms or pounds of gunpowder or lead the Dutch brought with them to
Ahnowahraake, it was the Mohawks that Europeans and Indians feared the most.
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CONCLUSION

Jon Parmenter summarized it best: “Europeans arriving on the periphery of Iroquoia
during the early seventeenth century found themselves quickly enmeshed in preexisting
indigenous conflicts ranging from the St. Lawrence River to the Chesapeake Bay.”1 Identifying
the usefulness of the Dutch arms trade from the start, the Mohawks quickly absorbed the Dutch
as a trade partner of mutual benefits. The Dutch profited from the fur and contraband trade, while
the Mohawks took advantage of their access to arms and gunpowder to subjugate their enemies,
or in the case of the Wendats, force them to disperse. This Mohawk-Dutch partnership attracted
negative attention from other native groups and European forces until eventually, the tensions
boiled over into a full-scale invasion. To make matters worse, the WIC, hobbling by this point,
lacked the resources to help the colony.
Having traded away the bulk of the powder to the Indians, and expended most of what
was left in the Esopus Wars, the Dutch were ill-prepared to defend their colony from a takeover.
And so without a shot–save for the bloody massacre Colonel Richard Carr carried out against the
inhabitants of Swanendael–New Netherland was transferred into English hands.2 Historians have
generally characterized Stuyvesant in this event as stubborn, medieval or “authoritarian.”3 Yet,
reducing Stuyvesant to a flawed leader at the center of a “Shakespearean” tragedy does little in
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reflecting on who the man truly was.4 Stuyvesant knew far better than to end “things the way
they ought to end, in good, quenching blood and fire.”5 A close study of the colonial gunpowder
trade reveals that he lacked the powder to do so.
Analysis of the colonial gunpowder trade uncovers several intriguing and important
themes of colonial development in the Early Modern age of empires. On the one hand, we see
the gross mismanagement of a finite resource, while on the other, we develop an understanding
of how Dutch colonizers reacted to the volatile environment dictated by Native American
competition and European rivalries. How the Dutch operated in New Netherland is better defined
by the forces that pulled them rather than the ones they controlled. Naturally, their efforts to
maximize the efficiency of the fur trade resulted in pursuing Indian alliances as mutually
beneficial partnerships. The Dutch, entering North America as the world leaders in arms trading,
carried a massive advantage over their European rivals by having internal connections to goods
the Indians desired. Yet, things fell apart. New Netherland never attained the importance that the
colonies in the Dutch West Indies or West Africa held. With gunpowder trickling down through
markets that involved massive quantities going towards continental conflicts, naval wars, more
important colonies, and even other European powers, New Netherland sat at the bottom of the
barrel. Perhaps had supply lines to New Netherland been less constricted, the colony may have
been better supplied with munitions and soldiers. Nevertheless, such was not the case, and the
colony ended up trading away far more gunpowder than it could afford to lose. Even during the
war in 1663, Esopus Indians could obtain “whatever powder and lead they wanted,” from the
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floating flea-market of sloops on the Hudson.6 The Dutch had so little control over their
situation, two Mohawks could float down the Hudson in a canoe with an estimated 400 pounds
of lead and 300 pounds of powder as freely as they pleased.7 New Netherland always seemed to
be a world the Indians controlled.
Complicating things further, the Dutch and Iroquois retained differing ideas of how to
develop their partnership in the wake of expansion. Consider the Hartford Treaty of 1650.
Stuyvesant pursued the treaty, and persistently pushed his employers for its official ratification in
order to protect the colony’s borders. He lists this failure of settling the border dispute as a
predominant factor to the colony’s downfall.8 Stuyvesant conceived the issue in legal boundary
jargon by which Native Americans did not abide. While he was trying to solidify New
Netherland’s borders, the Mohawks were trying to expand their spatial outreach without any
regard for colony lines. When Iroquois war parties entered New England and New France with
guns, they blamed the Dutch for participating in “a dangerous liberty taken by many of yours in
selling guns, powder, and shott.”9 Clearly, the Dutch and Iroquois conceived their maps of North
America in very different ways. These outlooks were too embedded within their respective
worldviews to be reconciled.10
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The colony’s trading of gunpowder to the Mohawks as well as their enemies helped
cultivate a mutual resentment of the Mohawk-Dutch partnership by English, French, Swedish,
and Native forces. It was under these pressures, combined with the seemingly continuous state of
war with local Indian groups, that New Netherland collapsed. Its efforts to retain Mohawk
allegiance set in motion a current of gunpowder dealings that propelled the colony into the
affairs of a powerful Indian Nation that it neither controlled or trusted. The results were
disastrous. The dangerous liberty of trading guns, gunpowder, and lead rendered the Dutch
woefully unprepared for an impending invasion.
Some may argue the Dutch were incredibly short-sighted for being so tolerant of a trade
that put weapons in the hands of their enemies. I would argue however that New Netherland
officials had little choice in the matter. Stuyvesant, as evidenced by his post-takeover testimony
in the Hague, demonstrated extensive knowledge of the colony’s shortcomings and problems that
led to the capitulation.11 Trading away their defensive strength in kegs of powder may not seem
advisable, but given the circumstances the colony encountered, it may have been the only option.
The Directors recognized this and thus an official company trade of guns, gunpowder, and lead
carried on through the life of the colony. Moreover, private traders like Arent van Curler, Jacob
Reynsen and Jacob Schermerhoorn quickly recognized the lucrative markets available for guns,
gunpowder, and lead. Colonial magistrates never truly had the tools to stop them. The WIC
shared the same objectives as the private traders they sought to obstruct, connections and profits.
The mismanaged affairs of the colony should come as less of a surprise than that a colony run by
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motley crew of traders and settlers lasted as long in North America as it did. Perhaps gunpowder
was just as influential in the colony’s successes as in its downfall.
Historians of this period, and of Dutch-Indian relations in general, have developed the
unfortunate tendency to gravitate around the cultures of violence and conflict that tore the colony
apart.12 With undeniable certainty, analysis of the gunpowder trade solidifies many of their
claims. Indeed, as David Silverman has profoundly demonstrated, firearms directly contributed
to the “violent transformation of Native America.”13 Yet, there is a whole other world that this
study of the gunpowder trade uncovers, one of alliances and accomodation. Through the eyes of
individuals, both cultural leaders and intercultural brokers, different patterns and themes become
clearer and more pronounced. Taking the perspective of Saggodryochta or Arent van Curler, we
begin to see the world they shared in more complex ways than what may be reduced to a frontier
or borderland. Their worlds overlapped considerably, and historians must continue to work
towards reconstructing this shared space.14
*

*

*

For too long, scholars have written the history of North America with their eyes on the
ground. Middle grounds, divided grounds, and native grounds have now been used at length to

12

Trelease, Indian Affairs, 138-174; Merwick, The Shame and the Sorrow, 133-180; Jennings, The Ambiguous
Iroquois Empire, 47-57, 113-142; Bailyn, The Barbarous Years, 242-275; Steele, Warpaths, 110-136.
13

Silverman, Thundersticks.

14

A trajectory of this concept is already well underway, see James Axtell, The Invasion Within: The Context of
Cultures in Colonial America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Karen Ordahl Kupperman, Indians and
English: Facing Off in Early America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); Michael Leroy Oberg, Dominion and
Civility: English Imperialism and Native America, 1585-1685 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); Cynthia Van
Zandt; Brothers Among Nations; Fur, Colonialism in the Margins, Hatfield, Atlantic Virginia.

153

describe the intense confluence of entangled histories and borderlands.15 Meanwhile, historians
facing eastward have turned their backs on the heart of the continent, a whole other world “far
from centers of European population and power,” where “Indians were more often able to
determine the form and content of intercultural relations than were their European would-be
colonizers.”16 Lastly, historians’ efforts to counter outdated narratives of indigenous declension
and dependence by declaring colonial landscapes new worlds for all may have inadvertently
glossed over the established strategies by which numerous indigenous adapted to the changes
wrought by the arrival of Europeans, their trade goods, and diseases.17 Following the trajectory
set in motion by historians of native grounds and imperial entanglement, Ahnowahraake
challenges some of these assertions and offers glimpses into a world as seen from within, a
volatile and highly-contested space dominated by indigenous quests for independence,
sovereignty, and survival.
Looking at the continent from above has its advantages, but also limitations. Historians
have become masters of magnification and de-magnification, yet the lens in use always has a
center and periphery, producing a vignette with a focus on the center that inevitably blurs the
edges. As a result, regional studies of the colonial world–including the Great Lakes, Chesapeake,
Northeast, and Southeast to name a few–commonly fall victim to the analytical vacuum in which
outside influences blend into the background, blurred into a landscape that is sophisticated, but
incomplete.
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In many ways, the development of Atlantic history helped to the address some of these
issues. In reconnecting Europeans and Africans to their roots on the opposite side of the Atlantic
rim, historians transformed the history of colonial North America in substantial–even
paradigmatic–ways. But what of Native Americans? How do their origins, histories, and
established traditions play into colonial narratives when there is no distant land to reconnect
them to? North America was their space, their land, their home, their world. As recent works
focused on the heart of the continent–“intact and unconquered”–have shown, the advent of
European goods did not immediately change that.18
With regard to the Haudenosaunee, Richter and Merrell offered profound insight on this
issue: “Perhaps future research should shift away from the familiar area of Indian relations with
Europeans and towards contacts, conflicts, and connections among the Five Nations and their
native neighbors.”19 It is those contacts, conflicts, and connections that make up Ahnowahraake,
a world that does not disconnect from the Atlantic, but rather connects the vast Indian social
world of North America to it. We see then in the shared space of Iroquoia and New Netherland,
among other regions of intercultural exchange, the confluence of two worlds where continent and
ocean collide. Peering down onto a static landscape, in my view, fails to capture such dynamism,
the tectonic shifting of peoples, traditions, and ideas that left North America in a constant state of
change. Rather than looking down, “A Daingerous Liberty” explores Ahnowahraake through the
individuals and communities that made it. Through the eyes of Saggodryochta and Arent van
Curler, or Mohawk warriors and Dutch gunrunners, we see the ever-changing web of contacts,
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conflicts, and connections that made up their world, each of their lives immortalized as links in
the chain historians continue to “renew” and “make bright.”20
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